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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the post-apartheid South Africa's Africa policy through the lens of Kalevi 
Holsti's 'national role conceptions' conceptual framework. One of the most significant 
preoccupations of the post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policymakers in the Nelson 
Mandela and Thabo Mbeki administrations (1994-2008) was defining the country's new 
identity. This was indeed not a simple task by any measure. In assigning national roles to 
their country, the Mandela and Mbeki administrations struggled to divorce South Africa and 
themselves from an apartheid-inspired foreign policy deeply rooted in the Global North. 
The new foreign policy that emerged was largely couched in morality, Africa, and the Global 
South. There were two distinctive features of this foreign policy, however. While Mandela 
emphasised the promotion of human rights in Africa as South Africa's major national role, 
Mbeki preoccupied his administration in the task of renewing Africa. South Africa played a 
leadership role through walking a tight rope in constructing partnerships with both African 
countries and the developed countries, anchored in ending conflicts and supporting economic 
development. 
However, this thesis argues that Pretoria, seat of South Africa's government, realised that 
national role conceptions as defined by Holsti do not operate in a global vacuum. Case 
studies are examined to argue that, given its global ranking as a 'middle power', South 
Africa's national roles were more successful in areas of its African interventions where its 
national interest converged with those of powerful countries in the Global North. Pretoria's 
interventions in Lesotho, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, although often 
faced with operational hiccups, were by and large fairly successful. This was precisely 
 iii 
because Pretoria's national roles, in the above-mentioned countries in which it intervened to 
resolve conflicts, converged with bigger powers within the global arena. 
In the case of South Africa's intervention in Zimbabwe, this thesis argues that it was difficult 
to enforce its national roles as they came in direct conflict with those of the developed 
countries in the West, led by Britain and the United States of America. Therefore, South 
Africa failed to register foreign policy successes because of the stalemate between its own 
national role conceptions and those of external powers. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUALISATION 
 
The question of the role of South Africa in the continent will always come up, and will have 
to be addressed with courage and humility. South Africa, objectively, has the characteristics 
of a middle-power, which are: (a) a comparatively strong military; (b) a comparatively strong 
and dominant economic base; (c) fiscal stability; (d) relative social and political stability; and 
(e) a government that has effective control over its territory and borders. However, in order 
for South Africa to play a role in the continent, the country will need to go beyond the will 
and start addressing its capacity to exercise such a role.
1
 
After four decades of global isolation and 'pariahood', post-apartheid South Africa's leaders 
understood that they were facing a completely unfamiliar regional and international 
environment. The first fourteen years of multiracial democracy from 1994 to 2008, South 
Africa's foreign policy under the stewardship of the globally renowned Nelson Mandela and 
Thabo Mbeki embarked upon a new, more transformative approach in formulating its 
international relations agenda. These leaders laid the firm foundation of South Africa's 
foreign policy deeply anchored in Africa. South Africa's national role conceptions
2
 first and 
foremost were perceived to be one of peacemaker and bridge builder between the developed 
nations in the north and developing countries in the south especially Africa. 
                                                          
1
 Mbeki, Thabo. "Umrabulo, Special 51st National Conference Edition." African National Congress (ANC), 16. 
August 2002. 100. See also, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?=2932. 
2
 Kalevi Holsti defines national role conceptions as, (1) 'includes the policymakers' own definitions of the general 
kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their 
state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional system. It is 
their image of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment'. 
(Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." International Studies Quarterly, 14 ( 3). 
September 1970.) 
 2 
The impetus for this search for a new foreign policy identity was informed mainly by four 
factors. First was the demise of apartheid in South Africa and the end of the Cold War in the 
1990s. Post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy makers found their country and 
themselves operating on completely new global terrain. This was terrain mainly defined by 
the triumphant western countries with the United States of America (US) at the helm. The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) - a former ally of some African liberation 
movements including the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa – lost its sphere 
of influence in Eastern Europe, disintegrated and collapsed.
3
 Secondly, the African continent 
was engulfed in intra-state conflicts, massive civil strife and poverty. Thirdly, despite the 
demise of apartheid and the dawn of a democratically elected government in South Africa, 
the country's position in Africa remained questionable. Apartheid South Africa had pursued a 
regional policy of destabilisation which caused massive loss of human and infrastructural 
capital. The extent of the apartheid's regime destruction in Southern Africa is estimated to 
have left, 'two million people dead and US$62.45 billion worth of infrastructural damage.
4
 
The demise of apartheid did not remove the lingering suspicions Africa had on the future role 
South Africa could play in the continent, to the extent that some African states harboured 
fears of hegemonic imposition from post-apartheid South Africa on military and economic 
issues.
5
 
Furthermore, the country confronted an image and identity crisis. Given the legacy of 
apartheid inspired foreign policy pursued over the years, the newly democratically elected 
leadership realised that the country required an urgent overhaul of its foreign policy. It was 
not a matter of changing simply the apartheid foreign policy but also the norms and values 
                                                          
3
 Maharaj, Mac. "The ANC and South Africa's Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace, Berghof Series, 
Resistance/Liberation Movements and Transition to Politics." Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict 
Management. 2008.  
4
 Nolutshungu, S. "Constructive engagement." A Journal of Opinion, 12 (3/4). Autumn-Winter 1982. 34. 
5
 Alden, Chris, and Mills Soko. "South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and Its Discontents." 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 43 (3). 2005. 
 3 
that underpinned it. In this endeavour, South Africa's foreign policymakers refocused its 
foreign policy towards the African continent. There was an immediate shift in foreign policy 
focus from a strict alignment with Western countries to one that was universal with its roots 
deeply entrenched in Africa. 
More critically, South Africa's foreign policymakers redefined the country's new roles in 
Africa. Conscious of South Africa's eminent place in Africa, the country was required to 
contribute massively to peace and stability on the continent. 
With the above in mind, post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policymakers perceived 
themselves to be morally bound to play a leadership role in Africa's renewal. For Nelson 
Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, if South Africa failed to play a leading role in Africa, the 
political and economic stabilisation of the continent if goes unchecked it will spill over to 
South Africa.
6
 There were other reasons for the post-apartheid South Africa's leadership to 
focus their foreign policy attention on Africa. Since its inception in 1912, the ANC and other 
liberation movements in South Africa placed a high premium on African unity and solidarity. 
It was therefore impossible to ring fence South Africa from the rest of the continent because 
if the country becomes an, 'island of prosperity in the sea of poverty
7
' it stands to attract 
massive economic and political refugees to its own shores. In the struggle against apartheid, 
South Africans relied heavily on the assistance and solidarity from fellow Africans and others 
in the international community. It was therefore imperative to use South Africa's relative 
                                                          
6
 The ANC has always pronounced commitment to African economic development, political stability and the 
need to end Africa's marginalisation in the global arena, both in exile and in post-apartheid South Africa. 
(Mandela, N. "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs. 1993. 89-92.; Pfister, Roger. "Gateway to 
International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa. 1960-1994." Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 41 (1). 2003.; Daniel, John. et al. "South Africa in Africa: Trends and Forecasts in a 
changing African Political Economy." State of the Nation: South Africa 2007. Eds. Buhlungu, Sakhela. et al. 
HSRC Press. 2007.  
7
 Landsberg, Chris. "International Policy and the African and South Agenda in Rethinking South Africa's 
Development Path: Reflection on the ANC's Policy Conference Discussion Documents." Centre for Policy 
Studies. Ed. Omano Edigheji. June 2007.  
 4 
economic and political power to assist those striving to liberate themselves from war and 
poverty. 
Driven by these imperatives, post-apartheid South Africa undertook a gradual approach 
towards assuming a leadership role in Africa. However, South Africa's newly assumed 
leadership role on the continent did not go unchallenged. In Nelson Mandela's Presidency, 
South Africa's leadership was brought to momentous test. In an attempt to play a leadership 
role, South Africa's policymakers found themselves embroiled in some of the most intense 
conflicts in Africa. In 1995, it was the Nigerian crisis
8
 that erupted in West Africa in which a 
military junta embarked upon massive human rights violations. The South African attempts 
to lead Africa in the resolution of the Nigerian crisis failed to prevail on the rest of the 
African continent. Instead, its role in Nigeria was questioned to the level of defeating the 
objective of its Africa centric foreign policy. 
Closer to home, South Africa's foreign policymakers were caught off guard by sudden 
political turmoil in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997 and Lesotho in 
1998. In both cases, South Africa was criticised of playing double standards. In the DRC, 
South Africa argued for a peaceful resolution of the conflict through a dialogue between 
warring parties. When the Lesotho political turmoil erupted South Africa used the military as 
the main tool of diplomacy to bring peace and stability. Further criticism for double standards 
came over South Africa's policy on Zimbabwe. Since 2000, political tensions in Zimbabwe 
presented surmountable challenges to South Africa's Africa policy. President Thabo Mbeki 
preferred Quiet Diplomacy in the face of what the international community perceived as 
                                                          
8 Geldenhuys, Deon. The Idea-driven Foreign Policy of a Regional Power: The Case of South Africa. University of 
Johannesburg. http://www.giga-
amburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/english/content/rpn/conferences/geldenhuys.pdf 
 5 
human rights abuses in Harare under President Robert Mugabe. Diplomatic pressure on South 
Africa to play an active leadership role in Zimbabwe brought limited results. 
In all these interventions, South Africa received a mixed response at home and abroad. 
Globally, South Africa has largely been recognised as an important African leader. This is 
particularly true in international forums such as the United Nations (UN) and the Group of 
Eight most industrialised countries (G8). South Africa's growing influence was specifically 
acknowledged by the European Union (EU), which sought a strategic partnership with the 
country in all matters patterning to global peace and security, development, democracy and 
peacekeeping in Africa. South Africa has also been acknowledged as an important African 
voice by the US; Britain; France; Germany; Russia; China; India and Brazil; and Japan. 
The roles that South Africa played in the formulation and promotion of the New Partnership 
for Africa's Development NEPAD enabled it to expand its own efforts to deal with the 
African Agenda.
9
 It furthermore, contributed significantly in the restructuring of Africa's 
multilateral forums such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union 
(AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Despite its own domestic 
challenges, South Africa has contributed significant resources in promoting peace in other 
African conflicts such as in Comoros, the Ivory Coast, Sudan (Southern Sudan and Darfur) 
and in the Ethiopia – Eritrea border dispute. 
In most of these interventions, South Africa managed to carve its own niche
10
 as a 
responsible regional power on the African continent. Hence, South Africa is often perceived 
                                                          
9
 Landsberg, C. "Africa Emerging Continental Governance Regime." Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) Policy Brief, 
(50). September 2007.; de Waal, A. D. "What's new in the 'New Partnership for Africa's 
Development'?"International Affairs. 78 (3). 2002. 466. 
10
 Landsberg, C., and D. Monyae. "South Africa's Foreign Policy: Carving a Global Niche." South African Journal 
of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2006. 
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to be occupying a leadership position in Africa. There are many roles attributed to the 
country. They range from as a 'regional hegemony', 'middle power', the African voice, the 
leader, the negotiator, and the African champion. Central to South Africa's Africa policy is 
the desire to promote peace and security. It also seeks to build effective mechanisms that can 
see Africa receive a fair share of global distribution of political and economic power and 
benefits. 
South Africa's newly-found leadership role in Africa did not go unnoticed. Active 
involvement by Pretoria, seat of South Africa's government, in African affairs raised high 
expectations at home and abroad that it could resolve some of the conflicts on the continent. 
Due to the lack of adequate institutional capacity, limited resources, skills, and diplomatic 
strategies and tactics, South Africa worked closely with other African countries in building 
sufficient consensus and common goals to resolve conflicts. 
The aim of building a broad African consensus on African issues was largely informed by the 
need to limit criticisms of South Africa bullying its ways in diplomatic circles. More often 
than not, South Africa's Africa policy can be directly linked to its domestic imperatives such 
as poverty alleviation. Instability on the African continent was perceived to be having a 
corrosive effect on the hard-won democracy at home. It was apparent that instability in one 
part of the continent has a direct impact to South Africa and the world. Therefore, South 
Africa's foreign policymakers' argued vehemently within global forums that instability in 
Africa has negative impact on global security. This view has received support in developed 
countries especially in the post September 2001, terrorist attack on the US. South Africa 
advanced the argument that Africa's peace and security should and must be a shared global 
responsibility. This idea gained prominence in the NEPAD document.
11
 
                                                          
11
 de Waal, A.D. Op. cit. 473. 
 7 
To effectively contribute to Africa's renewal, South Africa's foreign policy–makers 
understood the importance of adopting new national roles. South Africa's foreign policy 
approach towards African issues was characterised by gradual changes during the Mandela- 
Mbeki presidencies (1994 to 2008). While there were no fundamental shifts in foreign policy 
terms from Mandela to Mbeki, there was a wide and visible gap in their focus, strategy, style, 
and indeed tactics towards matters concerning the African continent. Mandela's government 
concentrated on the fundamental question of internal (South African) nation-building while 
Mbeki championed a continental renaissance. Nevertheless, the recasting of Pretoria's post-
apartheid foreign policy - Africa policy included - got its head start under Mandela with the 
country's entry into the OAU, Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and other multilateral 
arrangements. Therefore, the argument that South Africa was reluctant to play a leading role 
in Africa during Mandela's rule (often advocated by Mandela's critic), fails to appreciate, let 
alone understand, the strength and weaknesses of both leaders. In addition to this, the 
argument does not take into account the different priorities that the transition needed to 
undertake in terms of foreign and domestic policy. While consolidating peace and the reform 
of state institutes at home, South Africa had limited capacity and resources to deploy in the 
African continent. Thus, the more stability on the domestic front, allowed greater 
involvement of South Africa on the African continent. 
The breadth of this approach can be better understood through Mbeki's foreign policy vision 
of an African renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa's Development Programme 
(NEPAD).
12
 These visions of a better, economically viable, politically stable continent, to a 
larger extent, propelled and positioned South Africa as a leader in Africa. This represented an 
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important turning point. South Africa's success in the region was dependent on its capability 
to align itself with regional and continental institutions, creating a harmonious relationship 
instead of a discordant one. The governing party, the African National Congress (ANC) 
under Thabo Mbeki captured this at its national conference in 2002: 
There are two ways that South Africa can meaningfully contribute to the African 
renaissance: (a) it can 'bully' others, whether they like it or not; or (b) it can work 
through existing continental, multilateral structures to advance and support the 
defence of progressive principles and ideals that have collectively been agreed to. It is 
the latter role that South Africa will have to consider; deploy its resources and 
political experience to advance and accelerate the implementation of the African 
Union and NEPAD. The realisation of Africa's renaissance will be difficult to achieve 
without South Africa's commitment to play its role in the continent.
13
 
This thesis takes a historical approach to examine how South Africa deployed its resources 
and political experience in the first fourteen years of democracy thus 1994 – 2008 to advance 
its national role conceptions expounded in NEPAD mainly to renew Africa? This will be 
done through the use of case studies to critically assess South Africa's leadership roles in 
three major areas of conflicts; i) Lesotho, ii) Great Lakes Region (DRC and Burundi), and iii) 
Zimbabwe. 
1. 1 The Context of the Thesis and the Research Questions 
This thesis examines why and how post-apartheid South Africa embarked upon a leadership 
role in the field conflict resolution in Africa. The focus of the thesis will therefore be limited 
to three major case studies (Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the Great Lakes region of DRC and 
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Burundi) in which played different leadership roles of interventions in mediation, peace 
enforcement, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction and development. In doing so, 
the thesis attempts to answer four broad questions: firstly, to what extent have the post-
apartheid South African foreign policy makers redefined their national role conceptions in 
Africa? Secondly, how do the rest of the African continent and the world at large perceive 
South Africa's role in Africa? Thirdly, to what extent has South Africa's interventions in 
Africa enhanced its leadership role in Africa? Fourthly and lastly, what lessons, if any, that 
South Africa learned about leadership role in Africa that comes directly from its involvement 
in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the Great Lakes Region DRC and Burundi). 
1. 2  Research Problem and Objectives of the Thesis 
In the late twentieth century, the Southern African regional subsystem
14
 underwent a period 
of turbulent change. Apartheid South Africa was one of the major initiators of instability in 
the region. Pretoria's involvement in Africa's conflict resolutions, whether seen from the 
perspective of South Africa, the region, or the international community, had long been 
dictated by the survivalist power politics of racial domination. Indeed, it has been well 
documented that apartheid South Africa's regional policy sought economic and political 
dominance.
15
 The challenge confronted by the post-apartheid South Africa, however, was 
about constructing acceptable new leadership roles in Africa. 
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One cannot talk about leadership roles in a vacuum, however. Any understanding of 
leadership must be understood within the context of power politics. As stated earlier, the 
nature and balance of power within and among African states - particularly in Southern 
Africa - has always been in favour of South Africa. At the same time, it is crucial to realise 
that the possession of tangible (hard) and intangible (soft) assets of power by a state does not 
necessarily guarantee compliance from its weaker neighbours. The history of international 
relations has been marred regionally and globally by powerful states that have failed to 
translate their relative power in relation to their weaker partner(s). The main aim and 
objective of the thesis is to show how the post-apartheid South Africa succeeds in obtaining 
favourable foreign policy outcomes particularly in countries in which it promotes peace and 
security. 
1.3  Limitations and Scope of the Thesis 
Defining a role and having it accepted by other actors is a basic objective of states in 
international relations. The thesis will attempt to document and explain the manifestation of 
South Africa's leadership role(s) in Africa within the parameters of the period 1994 - 2008. 
The major weakness of the thesis lies in the fact that some official documents and records are 
inaccessible. Furthermore, the primary actors of South Africa's Africa policy such as the 
President and some of the senior officials were not accessible for one to interview them. To 
mitigate these shortcomings, a wide personal network within government and civil society 
circles was consulted in addition to the number of documents that were accessed. 
1. 4 Significance of the Thesis 
The thesis is justified because it seeks to contribute to the debate on the changing nature of 
leadership in international relations, but does this from a South African perspective. Recent 
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literature
16
 exists on scholarly enquiries around the issue of leadership in international 
relations; however, it is mainly concentrated on the behaviour of the major powers, such as 
the US, overlooking local or regional perspectives on leadership. South Africa's role in 
Africa's quest for peace, security, and democracy is important, and must be documented, as 
additional debate is needed on whether and under what conditions political leadership may be 
subject to change. Such debate is necessary to understand not only protection of political and 
economic stability in the Southern African region, but also the consolidation of democracy at 
home, South Africa itself. 
Secondly, the thesis is justified in order to meet the gap in literature on the new, evolving role 
of regionalism within South African policy discourse. Regionalism has become a building 
block not only for economic integration, but also for the success of regional governance 
initiatives such as NEPAD, and pan-African unity initiatives enshrined in the African Union 
(AU), successor to the OAU. If Africa cannot become an example - if not a leader - of peace 
and democracy, then the goals of the African renaissance vision embodied in NEPAD will be 
deeply undermined. 
Thirdly, the study is needed in order to explain the global trends that appear to be favouring 
regional integration. All of the above-mentioned factors require clear regional leadership to 
form the basis on which success can be achieved. Apartheid South Africa bred civil wars and 
corruption in the region. What was in question at the time was whether the democratic South 
Africa could decisively exert a positive influence in Africa. In its initial phase under 
Mandela's presidency (1994 – 1999), Pretoria struggled to have a clear and coherent Africa 
policy. This was primarily exacerbated by the manner in which South Africa handled the 
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crisis in Nigeria in 1995. However, during Mbeki's presidency (1999 – 2008) the country 
assertively implemented its Africa policy with varying degrees of success. 
1.5 Qualitative Case Study Methodology 
Because of its strengths, case study is a particularly appealing design for applied 
fields of study such as education, social work, administration, health, and so on. An 
applied field's processes, problems, and programmes can be examined to bring about 
understanding that in turn can affect and perhaps even improve practice. Case study 
has proven particularly useful for studying educational innovations, evaluating 
programs, and informing policy.
17
  
This thesis adopts a qualitative case study methodology as its research approach.
18
 It follows 
the research strategy that Marshall, Rossman, and Yin consider effective for case study 
research.
19
 According to these authors, research requires the interpretation of both 
documentary evidence (primary sources) and interviews (secondary sources).
20
 A number of 
methods were used to gather qualitative material. These included participation in meetings 
and workshops on African and South African foreign policy, empirical observation of 
political events, and in-depth interviews. 
According to Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, qualitative case study methodology allows a 
phenomenon to be revealed and understood from a multiple facets or lens.
21
 Simply put, 
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qualitative case study methodology is defined by Robson as "a strategy for doing research 
which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence.
22
" In using a multiple-case studies 
methodological approach the thesis will gain more evidence as how South Africa’s foreign 
policymakers define their country’s role conceptions. In the period 1994–2008, South African 
leaders Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki intervened in Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Burundi and Zimbabwe using different foreign policy strategies and 
tactics.   
The advantage of applying multiple case study according to Yin is that it; 
Enables the researcher to explore differences within and between cases. The goal is to 
replicate findings across cases. Because comparisons will be drawn, it is imperative 
that the cases are chosen carefully so that the researcher can predict similar results 
across cases, or predict constraining results based on a theory.
23
             
Yin further provides perhaps a much more comprehensive definition of qualitative case study 
methodology which informs this study. He stated that: 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident. [It] copes with the technically distinctive situation in 
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
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triangulating fashion, another results benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.
24
     
Like most research methodologies, qualitative case study have its own limitations. The 
researcher is the primary data collector and does the analysis. It therefore requires a great deal 
of training and skills to maintain the researcher’s integrity as well as ensuring that sensitive 
information observed is abused. It is argued by scholars such as Shields and Hamel that, ‘the 
case study has basically been faulted for its lack of representativeness…and its lack of rigour 
in the collection, construction, and analysis of the empirical materials that give rise to this 
study. This lack of rigour is linked to the problem of bias… introduced by the subjectivity of 
the researcher and others involved in the case.
25
"            
1. 6 Participation and Observation 
In order to become familiar with 1994 to 2007 subject matter, I became actively immersed in 
South Africa's informed foreign policy community. Experience as an intern at the Institute for 
Global Dialogue (IGD) in 1997 - 98 opened a plethora of formal and informal networks that 
handled foreign affairs matters, within governmental and civil society spheres. For example, I 
personally organised the civil society indaba seminar on South Africa's chairmanship and 
hosting of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). Further to this, valuable experience was 
gained working for the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) from the 31st of 
August to the 3rd of September 1998, providing analysis when NAM was hosted in South 
Africa at the time. I was therefore provided with many opportunities to participate and 
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observe high-level foreign policymakers engaging and interacting with their foreign 
counterparts. 
I also participated in what became the first African renaissance conference held at the Indaba 
Hotel in Fourways, Johannesburg on the 27 – 28 September 1998. This conference, organised 
by Professor Malegapuru William Makgoba from Wits University, attracted many Africanist 
black scholars. In many public and scholarly quarters, this conference was perceived to be all 
about Mbeki's intention to strengthen and consolidate an Afro-centric constituency within 
South Africa's foreign policy community. This was followed by participating and observing 
numerous Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department of Defence (DOD), academic 
and public briefings, and seminars that outlined in detail the future of South Africa's foreign 
policy, and especially its Africa policy. 
As a member of the South African Election Observer Team in Zimbabwe's Presidential 
Election of 2002, I gained invaluable insights by observing both South Africa's foreign 
policy-makers' crisis management strategy and events in Zimbabwe's highly disputed 
election. I have testified before the South African Parliament Portfolio Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, on South Africa's foreign policy in Southern Africa. This activity provided me with 
an excellent opportunity to interact with this critical body that serves as an oversight of the 
then Department of Foreign Affairs turned Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation (DIRCO) on the conduct of foreign policy. Lastly, I have extensively 
contributed to national and international print and electronic media, in which I debated 
alongside senior foreign policy actors on many issues concerning Africa's international 
relations. 
As a methodological approach, 'participation' affords meaningful, usually first-hand, 
information. According to Marshall, the participatory approach originated in the fields of 
 16 
Cultural Anthropology and Qualitative Sociology. It serves as both an approach to enquiry 
and as a data-gathering tool.
26
 In my case, participation demanded that I become involved 
with the social worlds of the main actors of South Africa's foreign policy. Although I cannot 
claim that I have obtained all necessary official records related to my research area, I have 
however, gained some helpful insights into organisational and institutional lives of South 
Africa's foreign policy makers. This participatory approach was supplemented by in-depth 
interviews in which observation also played an important role. 
I have benefited through both funding and mentor support by the Centre for Africa's 
International Relations (CAIR) located at the University of the Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg. Specifically, this support enabled me to undertake fieldwork in Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe. During these field trips, I was able to interview government officials, members of 
the civil society, and academics on their perceptions about South Africa's foreign policy in 
the region, and especially their views on Pretoria's interventions in their respective countries. 
1.6.1 Interviews 
Interviews obviously constitute a critical part of this thesis. These interviews can be described 
as 'conversations with a purpose'. I was able to access insightful and relevant information for 
the thesis through these interviews. However, limitations arise because many civil servants 
are bound by work-confidentiality agreements. Some respondents were unwilling or 
uncomfortable in sharing and discussing some of the sensitivities that arise in government-to-
government negotiations and agreements. The main reason given for not divulging such 
information was 'national security' or the fact that such information was classified. Some of 
the information received through the interviews, therefore, is not used in this thesis. Some of 
the challenges that arise from such interviews are that they are often difficult to manage, as 
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the source of the information may not be attributed. In many cases, the choice has been made 
to forgo using sensitive information that would be difficult to verify. This speaks directly to 
the question of ethics that need to be observed at all times in research. 
Senior members of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the academic community 
have also been interviewed. This was a useful endeavour as it provided critical views about 
the performance of South Africa's foreign policy. Some of these individuals have vast 
networks and experience as either former employees of the apartheid or post-apartheid 
governments and sometimes both. 
1.6.2 Review of Documents 
Numerous documents were reviewed in the form of minutes of meetings, formal policy 
statements of the DIRCO, Presidential annual addresses to the national Parliament and the 
weekly letters that President Mbeki in particular wrote in his capacity as African National 
Congress (ANC) president. Newspaper and radio interview transcriptions documents from 
other government departments relevant to foreign policy have also been used. These include 
the Department of Defence (DOD) and the Ministry of Finance's annual budgetary allocation 
to Foreign Affairs. All of these data-gathering tools provide the thesis with a fairly sufficient 
pool of information for gaining an understanding of South Africa's foreign policy makers' 
perspectives on their country's leadership role and contribution to Africa's renewal. 
1. 7 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters.  
The first chapter has been covered already. It outlines the foundation of the thesis providing 
an introduction, context, methodology and the limitation of the thesis.  
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The second chapter provides the conceptual framework. It employs Kalevi Holsti's national 
role conceptions
27
 and Joseph Nye's soft power
28
 as analytical tools for understanding post-
apartheid South Africa's Africa policy. The chapter further examines various existing 
interpretations of South Africa's power position in Africa, particularly within the Southern 
African sub region. Four main definitional terms used in literature on South Africa's foreign 
policy are given. These are 'regional hegemony', 'middle power' 'pivotal state', and 'sub-
imperialist', The thesis furthermore, compares and contrasts the utility of these terms vis-à-vis 
that of national role conceptions and soft power as the most useful ways of understanding 
South Africa's Africa policy. 
The third chapter sketches the historical overview of South Africa's foreign policy. The 
chapter charts the evolution of South Africa's foreign policy from the formative years of the 
Union of South Africa in 1910 to the birth of apartheid in 1948. It further documents the 
evolving nature of the apartheid foreign policy, especially regarding changing regional and 
international factors. For instance, apartheid South Africa started with foreign policy 
objectives of seeking the global acceptance of apartheid policy to one that became extremely 
defensive with the spread of self-determination in Africa. This eventually led to the demise of 
apartheid, entering a phase of transition in which the National Party (NP) and the ANC 
formed a Government of National Unity (GNU). In 1994, South Africa's foreign policy 
entered its current phase which found expression by the end of the Mandela presidency in the 
African renaissance vision articulated by his Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki. 
The fourth chapter focuses on South Africa's intervention in Lesotho in 1998 as the thesis' 
first case study.  
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The fifth chapter looks at Pretoria's interventions in Burundi and the DRC.  
The sixth chapter examines South Africa's quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe.  
Chapter seven provides the lessons learned in South Africa's Africa policy particularly in its 
involvements in conflict resolutions in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Burundi and the DRC.  
The thesis closes with a brief conclusion in chapter eight. 
1.8 Conclusion 
The main aim of this section was to establish clear parameters of the thesis. Having fairly 
covered sufficient ground as how the thesis shall progress, henceforth, it turns to the first 
chapter. The first chapter preoccupies itself with two main issues namely; it introduces Kalevi 
Holsti's national role conceptions as the theoretical foundation of the thesis and provides a 
wide range of literature on South Africa's foreign policy informed by three major schools of 
thoughts thus realist, liberal and Marxist in international relations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
SOUTH AFRICA'S QUEST FOR NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS 
 
South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this 
continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts… 
Nelson Mandela
29
 
 
In the field of International Relations and Politics, a country's foreign policy is a valuable 
strategic tool used to advance its interest abroad. In a developing country like South Africa, 
getting this national role conceptions 'right' is critical - not only for positioning itself in the 
global arena, but for forging the types of global and regional partnerships needed to nurture 
South Africa as a new "active agent of progressive change".
30
 In the founding years (1994 – 
2008) of democracy, South Africa's relationship with countries within the African 
subsystem
31
 has been viewed as a critical yet often misunderstood aspect of its foreign policy. 
The challenge of South Africa's foreign policy-makers was to define new national role 
conceptions for the democratic South Africa in Africa. In other words, what were the new 
national roles foreign policymakers in Pretoria envisioned their country playing in Africa in 
the post-apartheid? What are the useful conceptual, analytical and theoretical tools that 
inform such national role conceptions in the post-apartheid South Africa? It is against this 
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backdrop, therefore, that this chapter discusses concepts and theories associated with the 
post-apartheid South Africa's position in the international affairs in a broader spectrum and to 
later pay more particular attention to Africa. The main aim of the chapter will be to simply 
provide a broad theoretical understanding of; a) national role conceptions, b) soft power, c) 
regional hegemony, d) pivotal state, and; e) regional imperialist. In doing so, the chapter will 
be able to provide a rich body of literature in which these concepts and theories are used 
specifically with reference to South Africa's role in Africa. 
One very important opportunity for taking on a leadership role lay in exploiting various 
aspects of the country's 'relative power' in addressing Africa's long unfulfilled quest for peace 
and security. Strangely, while the country was capable of wielding considerable relative 
power in this realm, South Africa's foreign policy makers relied mainly on 'soft power' in 
seeking compliance from others in the region. The promotion of democracy and human rights 
were considered paramount in South Africa's foreign policy. What was not clearly stated 
however was the shared sense of national identity and the understanding of the country's 
purpose, role and value in international arena? 
While national role conceptions are critical to the foreign policy making process, scholars 
have more often than not, labelled this part of foreign policy-making as a non-issue. Hence, 
limited comprehensive studies have been published on South Africa's foreign policymakers' 
understanding of their country's role in Africa. In seeking to understand what the elements of 
national role conceptions are in this respect, and to address gaps in previous research, the 
next section of the chapter offers an analysis of national role conceptions identified by Kalevi 
Holsti. 
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2. 1 Defining the Concept: National Role Conceptions 
Holsti's conceptual framework of the "national role conceptions" has been chosen as a useful 
avenue through which to explore post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy. In a seminal 
1970 article, Kalevi Holsti defined national role conceptions as: 
The policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, 
rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should 
perform on a continuing basis in the international system.
32
 
The decisions, commitments, rules and actions that Holsti wrote more than three decades ago 
contain general foreign policy norms and ideas, and yet are applicable to the formulation of 
national role conceptions which can help foreign policymakers anywhere in the world. 
Applied to the South African case, foreign policymakers did not only define the roles their 
country perform on a continuous basis in Africa and the world, but took into account more 
subtle roles which reflected basic predispositions, self-perceptions, fears, configurations and 
attitudes toward the outside world, while taking into account relevant systematic, geographic, 
and economic
33
 frameworks. Holsti's view of role conceptions enabled South Africa's foreign 
policy scholars understand internal and external factors that influence foreign policy decision 
makers.
34
 
2.2 The Origins of the Concept of National Role Conceptions 
Holsti drew his national role conception framework from scholars outside the field of 
international relations. Generally, the concept of national roles derived from humanistic 
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debates and discourse originating as far back as in the 1920s and 1930s in social science 
disciplines such as social psychology, sociology, and anthropology. These fields at the time 
examined roles within the context of patterns of human conduct. The study of roles at that 
time was basically aimed at linking the functioning of the social order with the characteristics 
and behaviours of individuals. For instance, Parsons stated that, "the social system has a 
locative process by which the problem of who is to get what, who is to do what, and the 
manner and conditions under which it is to be done was made explicitly clear".
35
 In this 
respect, Parson sees social systems as containing inherent mechanisms and 'solutions' which 
not only provide roles, but can predict and determine behaviour. 
In 1934, Mead expanded the notion of roles by observing that in social, individuals work out 
their own role by taking on the role of 'the other'. Under Mead, socialising and 'role learning' 
was essentially the same thing, and through socialisation one could even develop one's self.
36
 
This led to the idea of role articulations, that enable one to find out whether a relationship is 
productive or not. In applying role theory particularly to the study of international relations 
and philosophy, Rousseau saw an opportunity to link the idea of 'expectations' as a predictor 
for. He saw roles as "the attitudinal and behavioural expectations that those who relate to its 
occupant have of the occupant and the expectations that the occupant has of himself or 
herself in a given situation".
37
 
Foreign policymakers formulate decisions based on a number of factors. Key among them is 
the perception of the role they think their country/state should and must play with their 
constituents in the domestic, regional, and international arena. Role theory, therefore, is 
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useful in describing the of states and other collectivities. Therefore, it is sufficient to see role 
conceptions as nothing but, simply social phenomena. 
To this end, Holsti was largely influenced by the role theory. He placed great emphasis on the 
role theory in his formulation of the national role conceptions. It is critical to acknowledge 
therefore that national role conceptions as conceptualised by Holsti, originated from other 
field of study such as social psychology, sociology and anthropology.
38
 However, a national 
role conception has found much greater utility in international relations and politics in the 
post 1945 world order. 
Holsti's 'typology of national role conceptions' was primarily developed to enquire about how 
foreign policymakers perceive the roles their states played in the international system. To do 
this, Holsti embarked upon a tedious task of reviewing volumes of speeches, parliamentary 
debates, radio broadcasts, official communiqués and press conferences of 71 governments. In 
so doing, he distilled seventeen role conceptions, from various sources generated by foreign 
policy makers. The four main assumptions Holsti came up with are: 
I. Foreign policy makers have national role conceptions; 
II. National role conceptions are more influential than the role prescriptions 
emanating from the external environment in shaping foreign policy; 
III. The sources of national role conceptions are a complex mixture of location, 
capabilities, socio-economic characteristics, system structure and the 
personalities of leaders; and 
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IV. The consequences of national role conceptions include both a constraining 
effect upon foreign policy for a particular nation as well as a type of input that 
affects stability and change in the international system.39   
In his findings, Holsti divided these role conceptions into three specific categories; a) Cold 
War role conceptions, b) Non-aligned role conception, c) and, regionally oriented role 
conceptions. 
2.2.1 Cold War Role Conceptions 
Within the Cold War category, Holsti identified ten types of roles, countries played in support 
of either the US or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the two bipolar centres; a) 
faithful Ally; b) Anti-Imperialist Agent; c) Defender of the Faith; d) Bastion of the 
Revolution-Liberator; e) Regional Protector; f) Non-Aligned Orientations; h) Active 
Independent; i) Mediator-Integrator; j) Bridge; and k) Isolate. 
Faithful Ally 
According to Holsti, a country's role can be determined by the ideological orientation it 
pursues or ascribes to. For example, a country such as Britain was largely influenced by its 
strategic ally, the US in the pursuit of the containment strategy to counter the spread of 
communism in the world. Due to such ascribed national role, Britain was perceived to be a 
faithful ally to the US 
An Anti-Imperialist Agent 
In Holsti's typology, an anti-imperialist agent is a country that fully supported the USSR such 
as Cuba. Such a country perceived its role to be one of rolling back what it saw as an 
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imperialist tide in the world. Cuba's intervention in Africa and especially one in Angola in 
1970s is a classic example. 
Defender of the Faith 
This type of role, according to Holsti, was based on a foreign policy which favoured defence 
of an ideological value system, rather than defence of a clearly defined territory under attack. 
An example can also be the case of Cuba's intervention in Angola as in the anti-imperialist. 
Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator 
This was a role that befitted China during the Cold War. It hosted and trained various 
liberation movements throughout the so-called third world, often competing with the Soviet 
Union. 
Regional Protector 
This role entails a special leadership stance that the most powerful country within a region 
assumes. Holsti identified the 'protectee' as taking on a role that was based on expectations 
that others would defend them. This role is often taken up by countries that are relatively 
powerful within a given region. They perceive their countries as bound by history (given the 
economic, military, and political strengths possessed in relation to others in the region) to 
play an active role in the protection of the region. For instance, apartheid South Africa fell in 
this category of countries that perceived their role to be as regional protectors of 'western 
norms and values'. 
2.2.2. Non-Aligned Orientations Role Conceptions 
Holsti divided the notion of Non-Aligned role conceptions into five separate types. These are; 
a) independent, b) active Independent, c) mediator-integrator, d) bridge, and; f) isolate. 
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Below, descriptive explanation will be given to shed more light on their meaning as defined 
by Holsti. 
Independent 
In this role conception, according to Holsti, a country pursues its national interests within the 
context of a policy of non-alignment and self-determination. This meant that the country 
guarded jealously against any erosion of its autonomy or sovereignty by either the US or the 
USSR in the bipolar world order during the Cold War. Numerous countries considered 
themselves as independent during the Cold War However, the level of independence varied in 
degrees. For example, India, Egypt, Indonesia and Malaysia are some of the countries that 
projected themselves independent of global powers. 
Active Independent 
This role according to Holsti includes active participation of a country within the global arena 
without much fear of hindrance by global powers. It implied that a country would take an 
active non-aligned position on matters affecting the international system without or prejudice 
against any other country. It also involved possible mediation functions as well as diplomatic 
outreach to areas of the world otherwise considered unfriendly. 
Mediator–Integrator 
In this role, countries attempted to play a neutral third party role in global conflicts in which 
either the US or Soviet Union were actively involved. 
Bridge 
This role has become common among many middle powers in the world. Such powers saw 
their role as one of facilitating negotiations between developing and developed countries. 
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Like the mediator-integrator role, countries that perceived the role as one of a bridge in 
international are often involved in active multilateral forums. For different reasons, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and now the post-apartheid South Africa consider themselves to be 
playing such a role. 
Isolate 
The final role within the non-aligned orientation stressed avoidance of any contact with any 
country. Although fewer countries applied this role, it was an option when policymakers 
confront what they consider as hostility from outsiders. 
2.2.3  Regionally-Oriented Role Conceptions 
Regionally-oriented role conceptions, according to Holsti, are roles regional powers enact 
within a given regional subsystem. Holsti outlined six regionally-oriented role conceptions 
and these are; a) Regional Leader, b) Liberation supporter, c) Regional Subsystem 
Collaborator, d) Developer, and; e) Exemplar. What follows is a brief description of each 
category. 
Regional Leader 
This role conception refers to duties or special responsibilities that a country considers as 
solely its own, based on the fact that it is the most powerful within the sub-system. 
Liberation Supporter 
This definition does not differ much from the one of "bastion of revolutionary liberator" 
described above. Within the Southern African sub region, for instance, Tanzania played the 
role of supporting liberation movements from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and 
Angola throughout 1960s and 1970s. In turn, these countries embarked upon diplomatic 
 29 
offensive against the apartheid regime in South Africa, in support of the liberation 
movements. All these efforts were considered by these newly decolonised countries to be 
supporting liberations struggles against racism and colonialism. 
Regional Subsystem Collaborator 
According to Holsti, this role has, "far reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with 
other states to build wider communities". The development of the European Union (EU) was 
considerably relevant in this regard. Significant efforts were taken by countries in Europe to 
build a shared norms and values as the basis of a common community. In doing so, European 
countries considered their joint efforts to build a united front against the encroaching 
communism. 
Developer 
This was a role that countries such as in Scandinavia, Canada, New Zealand, or Australia 
played. They attempted to channel developmental assistance to less developed countries. 
Internal Development 
This role also refers more or less to the previous role above. It entails the usage of foreign aid 
as diplomatic leverage. 
Exemplar 
According to Holsti, this national role conception is internally driven. A country will embark 
upon programmes within its own borders. The success of these programmes brings it national 
prestige that encourages emulation by other countries. As can be clearly seen, Holsti role 
conceptions were by and large defined within the confines of the Cold War. This does not 
however invalidate their usefulness in contemporary post-cold war global order. As will be 
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shown in this thesis, some of Holsti's role conceptions explained above remain useful. It is 
important to note at this stage that the post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policymakers 
often use loosely some of Holsti's role conceptions. The role conceptions found littered in 
post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policymakers are; bridge-builder, mediator, 
independent and non-aligned in reference to their country's role in Africa. It is within this 
context therefore that the study chose Holsti's role conceptions as the main theoretical 
framework to understand South Africa's policymakers own understanding of the role their 
country play in Africa. Before we dwell on South Africa's policymakers' usage of role 
conceptions, it is perhaps, important to follow the post-Cold War usage of Holsti's role 
conceptions framework in international relations literature. 
2.2.4 Role Conceptions in the Post-Cold War Era 
Philippe G. Le Prestre's book. Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in 
Transition captured six types of role conceptions to be critical in the reformulation of eight 
countries' role conceptions in the post-cold war.
40
 The countries covered in the book are; the 
US, Russia, Britain, France, China, German, Japan and Canada. 
President Bill Clinton was specifically quoted asking the Russians the following question: 
How will you define your role in the world as a Great Power? Will you define it in 
yesterday's terms, or tomorrow's?
41
 
Le Prestre argues that: 
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What diplomats say is often as vital as what they do. It would not be far-fetched to go 
further and declare that speech is an incisive form of action.
42
 
In yet another study Lisbeth Aggestam used the role conceptions as conceptualised by Holsti. 
The focus of Aggestam's study was Europe's three most powerful countries' foreign policies, 
(Germany, France and Britain) in the period 1990 to 1999. The question that was posed was 
how do these countries define their role conceptions? The following six role conceptions 
were found to be predominant in Europe's Big Three foreign policies; thus, a) European 
partnership, b) leader, c) Advocate/champion of wider Europe, d) NATO ally, e) Contributor 
to peace and security, and; f) Independent. 
European Partnership 
The European partnership according to Aggestam refers to the commitments foreign 
policymakers articulated towards the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It thus 
revealed the perceived quality of cooperation and integration in the making of the European 
foreign policy. 
Leader 
States are generally charged with the responsibility of providing leadership in aspects of 
security of their territories and people. However, states differ fundamentally in many respects 
when it comes to their ability to exert power. The idea of leader among states refers to one or 
more states that possess sufficient power in dealing with matters of common interest at 
regional level. For instance, leadership in the European Union (EU) involves Germany and 
France. These countries and their policymakers perceive themselves to command 
considerable influence and power in the broad integration of the Europe. 
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Advocate/Champion of Wider Europe 
This role conception encompasses commitments and duties policymakers' pledge towards the 
enlargement of the EU to the countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain. 
NATO Ally 
This category includes commitments and duties foreign policymakers that perceive 
themselves as NATO members in general, and more particularly towards the role of the US in 
European security. 
Contributor to Peace and Security 
This is a general role, expressing a commitment to work against threats to peace and security 
in Europe. It relates to duties and responsibilities policy-makers perceive in promoting 
European stability, conflict prevention, and peaceful conflict management. 
Independent 
This role involves commitments and duties to retain independence of action and an emphasis 
on the primacy of national interest in foreign policy. It should be pointed out, however, that 
this role may also be conceived in a European discourse with an emphasis on the EU as an 
independent actor in world politics.
43
 When nations undergo transitions, or are confronted by 
new challenges (as was the case with South Africa in the period 1994 to 2008) at regional and 
international levels, they often revaluate and adjust their national roles. This is often done to 
ensure that they respond adequately to the new challenges. The task of adjusting role 
conceptions was one of the main preoccupations of countries in both developed and 
developing countries at the end of the cold war. The democratic South Africa confronted 
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equally same challenges in 1994; it had to speedily redefine its role conceptions in the post- 
apartheid and post-cold war. 
Post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy -makers' grappled with this task in 1994. Having 
illustrated the importance of national role conceptions framework in general, the following 
discussion attempts to define South Africa's foreign policy role conception, specifically. 
2.2.5 Emerging National Role Conceptions in South Africa 
Following the 1994 elections, the founding leaders of post-apartheid South Africa Mandela 
and Mbeki enthusiastically seized the opportunity to promote its culture of constitutionalism 
at home and abroad. Following protracted negotiations, the South Africa's leaders defined 
their national role conceptions
44
 within the new constitution. It can be argued that South 
Africa's constitution is one of the most progressive in the world. Central to this constitution is 
the promotion of democracy, peace and security, development and stability in Africa. Any 
understanding of national role conceptions in South Africa should and must be understood, 
within the parameters of this constitution. According to Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman: 
This revitalization has not altered the country's core foreign policy principles and 
objectives; rather, the search has been for ways in which to operationalise its 
enhanced standing in an internationally recognised leadership role. In other words, its 
conception of its own role is as a global player (which includes elements of mediator–
integrator, bridge, anti-imperialist agent, developer, and regional leader and 
protector).
45
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Aware of the limits of its institutional capacity, South Africa's foreign policymakers forged 
partnerships with neighbouring countries through the SADC to advance 'collective leadership' 
on matters concerning conflict resolution, economic and political stability, democratic rule, 
and sustainable development. 
Like most other countries, the new South Africa's foreign policymakers were largely 
informed by domestic, regional, and international factors in defining their national role 
conceptions. First, South Africa's policymakers were aware that efforts to contribute 
positively to Africa's renewal were informed by the democratic values and norms enshrined 
in the new constitution. Second, they understood that South Africa's democracy would be 
secured only if peace and security was extended to the rest of the continent. Third, they knew 
that globalisation process required the competitive and effective participation of South Africa 
and the rest of the African continent, in the global economy. In all these areas, foreign 
policymakers needed to redefine, reshape and redirect the country's identity and priorities. 
They drastically shifted it from its general orientation of being solely western aligned to be 
deeply Africa rooted and developing counties aligned. 
As it will be demonstrated, South Africa's new national role conceptions under Mandela and 
Mbeki undertook similar directions as illustrated by Holsti thus; a) leader, b) African 
Partnership, c) Contributor to peace and security in Africa, d) Advocate/Champion of a wider 
Africa, and; e) Independent. 
Regional Leader 
Prior to assuming power in 1994, Mandela was unambiguous in rejecting any notion of 
hegemonic power excised by the apartheid regime in Africa. Mandela and his successor 
Mbeki, however, realised that their country was relatively developed compared to the rest of 
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the African continent. Its political, economic, and military power would therefore have to be 
put to the service of Africa's renewal. 
African Partnership 
South Africa's leadership role in Africa was perceived to be anchored within the collective 
leadership or partnership with fellow African countries. The African renaissance vision 
envisioned by President Thabo Mbeki spelled out five areas of African partnership: 
I. The recovery of the African continent; 
II. The establishment of political democracy on the continent; 
III. The need to break neo-colonial relations between Africa and the world's 
economic powers; 
IV. The mobilisation of the people of Africa to take their destiny into their own 
hands thus preventing the continent being seen as a place for the attainment of 
the geo-political and strategic interests of the world's most powerful countries; 
and 
V. The need for fast development and of people-driven and people-centred 
economic growth and development aimed at meeting the basic needs of the 
people.46 
2.2.6. Contributor to Peace and Security in Africa 
South Africa's foreign policymakers regarded peace and security as their number one priority 
on the African continent. They saw peace and security as a major prerequisite for 
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development. South Africa was and remains Africa's biggest contributor in UN peacekeeping 
missions on the continent. The promotion of human rights and democracy was identified as 
the major role of South Africa's endeavours in Africa. 
2.2.7. Advocate/Champion of a Wider Africa 
South Africa's foreign policy–makers used their country's long and well established relations 
with developed countries to champion African issues such as debt cancellation within the 
IMF and World Bank. These leaders' foreign policy priorities emphasised the imperative of 
transforming and restructuring institutions of global governance such as the UN and the 
Bretton Woods institutions. 
2.2.8 Independence 
South Africa enacted a role conception of independence to ensure that it could establish 
diplomatic relationships with countries all over the world, regardless of the western 
democracies' views. South Africa extended its diplomatic ties with countries such as Cuba, 
Iran, Libya, and even Iraq under Saddam Hussein. In the case of Libya, South Africa played a 
critical role in mediating the Lockerbie case
47
 between Britain, the US and France on one 
hand, and Libya on the other hand. 
These national role conceptions manifest themselves through different strategies, projects, 
activities, and responses. The African renaissance vision, NEPAD, mediation in African 
conflicts and peacekeeping missions are examples of ways in which South Africa has largely 
succeeded in defining the national role conceptions informing its foreign policy with regard 
to Africa. At the same time, this very role conception was used as a tool to analyse the 
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strengths and weaknesses of its interventions in African conflicts, particularly in the cases of 
Lesotho and Zimbabwe. 
Pretoria's post-apartheid policy vision towards the continent and the principles that guided 
this vision will be discussed in greater detail further on in this thesis; however it can be noted 
that throughout its history, South Africa has shown strong leadership in its interactions with 
other African states, as well as the developing and developed world. As a relatively 
developed African country with a functional economy and a stable political environment, 
South Africa has effectively used its strategic position as a leader with all countries. This was 
particularly pronounced under Mbeki's leadership, through initiatives such as the 
implementation of NEPAD, the Millennium Development Goals and Pretoria furthermore 
championed Africa's agenda in global forums. 
2.3 General Literature on South Africa's Foreign Policy in Africa 
2.3.1 South Africa's 'Power' 
Before embarking on a discussion of South Africa as an agent of soft power, it is perhaps 
useful to first define the concept of power in international relations. When foreign policy - 
makers define the role of their country in the world, they consider among many things the 
relative power of their state compared to others. There is a rich body of literature on Great 
Powers in the international system such as the ancient Greek city-states (Athens), the Roman 
Empire, and Pax Britannica. The study of state power invariably invokes the ideas of 
dominance, hegemony, and leadership. Hedley Bull's book, The Anarchical Society: A Study 
of Order in World Politics, defines these various concepts of power as follows:
48
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I. Dominance: Characterised by the habitual use of force by a great power 
against the lesser states compromising its hinterlands;49 
II. Hegemony: The great power prefers to rely upon instruments other than the 
direct use or threat of force, and will employ the latter only in situations of 
extremity;50 
III. Leadership/Primacy: A great power's preponderance in relations to a group of 
lesser states takes the form of leadership or primacy that the great power 
enjoys is freely conceded by the lesser states within the group concerned.51 
What is power, and how is it measured when states interact in the international system? There 
In defining these forms of power, Alejandro Bendana said: 
Relational power means the ability of one actor to secure desired from another by way 
of direct or indirect coercion – when those would not otherwise take place. Structural 
power, on the other hand, is not a one-time lever, but an ongoing framework within 
which one actor has the capacity to determine the overall and punishes acts of (real or 
ascribed) resistance. In the international arena, structural power extends beyond the 
traditional nexus of state-state relationships or state- economic or political institutions. 
It also embraces thought, culture, and usage.
52
 
With these definitions of power in mind, it is imperative to look at soft power concept. 
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2.3.2 The Notion of Soft Power 
Joseph S. Nye refers to the concept of 'soft power' as: 
The ability of a country to obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because 
other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring 
to its level of prosperity and openness…This aspect of power – getting others to want 
what you want.
53
 
Nye further stressed that there were dilemmas and challenges in interstate relations during the 
21st century with regards to the notion of leadership.
54
 He argued that the sources of great 
power in the international system are no longer defined solely on the basis of 'states', 'strength 
for war', 'military force', and 'conquest' as was the case in the history of former Great Powers. 
The source of great power according to Nye has widely been broadened to encompass what 
he referrers to as 'soft power'. 
Soft power can be summarised as a directing, attracting and imitating power, in other words, 
a co-opting power. Accordingly, Nye asserted that if a country's ideology and culture are 
attractive, others would like to imitate and follow it.
55
 However, soft power cannot 
necessarily be divorced from hard power (military). What Nye clearly shows, is that while 
hard power is important, it should not and must not be used as the only foreign policy option. 
The changing nature of global powers require the usage of soft power to achieve ones foreign 
policy objectives. 
Christian Wagner captures the hard-soft power dichotomy in international relations when she 
states: 
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The concepts of hard and soft power can be regarded as two poles on a continuum of 
power. They also imply different ideas, interactions and institutions for foreign policy 
when looking at the fields of politics, security, and economy.
56
 
Hard power politics encourages reliance on military interventions, coercive diplomacy, and 
economic sanctions by foreign policymakers in the conduct of foreign policy. Contrary to 
this, soft power strategies are ones that employ a non-confrontational approach. In other 
words, Wagner's definition entails the adoption of common political values, peaceful means 
for conflict management, and economic co-operation as a foreign policy strategy to achieve 
national interests.
57
 South Africa's foreign policymakers pronouncements, actions and 
inaction tend to align with the soft power concept.
58
 A classic example of the use of soft 
power was Pretoria's interventions in Lesotho, DRC, Burundi and Zimbabwe. In all these 
cases, South Africa applied soft power effectively to achieve its foreign policy strategic 
objectives. 
While hard power relies on coercive approaches, it has been well-documented that South 
Africa has employed soft power in its Africa policy in instances where coercive power may 
have been the more appropriate response to instability in the region. The following section 
looks at how South Africa's foreign policymakers have understood, and applied a very 
specific type of the soft power-power which has been informed by collective African unity, 
respect for African self-rule, and non-critics of leaders who have overthrown years of 
colonial domination. This particular type of soft power is not only embedded in states, but in 
national polity in the Southern African sub-region. South Africa's soft power, in this respect, 
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is of particular interest to the study, as this role instils certain comparative advantages which 
enable it to play a leadership role in Africa and international arena. 
2.4 What are Sources of South Africa's Power? 
2.4.1 Soft Power 
Undoubtedly South Africa has both tangible (hard) and intangible (soft) sources of power in 
Africa. The tangible sources of power are the ones traditional realist scholars highlight in 
international relations such as dominant economic resources and military capabilities. The 
intangible sources of South Africa's power comprise of the high moral ground gained in the 
struggle against apartheid. This was furthermore reinforced by the nature of South Africa's 
transitional arrangement and the adaptation of a liberal constitution.
59
 South Africa has a 
vibrant democracy. It strives to meet most of the ingredients of democracy. These are: 
I. Human rights and democracy; 
II. Rule of law; 
III. Public accountability and transparency; 
IV. Free and independent press; 
V. Decentralisation; 
VI. Vibrant civil society and robust private sector and 
VII. Political stability, peace and security.
60
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South Africa's foreign policy can be characterised as one that relies more on intangible (soft) 
rather than the tangible (hard) sources of power. 
2.4.2 South Africa's Economy in Relation to the Continent 
Dan O'Meara once wrote that the notion of regionalism in Southern Africa is skewed. He 
explained: 
The central pole of accumulation was the mining and later agriculture, industrial and 
service sectors of the South African economy. All other countries in the region, 
except that of Angola, were locked into this regional economy as suppliers of cheap 
migrant labour, certain goods and services (water, energy, transport, etc.) to the South 
African economy, and as markets for its manufactures and capital.
61
 
South Africa's economy constitutes seventy per cent of Southern Africa's total economy, and 
almost forty per cent of the entire economy of sub-Saharan Africa.
62
 Meanwhile, it has two 
distinct economies that run parallel to each other. The so-called First Economy is highly 
developed, with a largely skilled White workforce that enjoys a livelihood comparable to 
those in western societies. Post-apartheid, there was a rapidly emerging black middle class of 
professionals in and outside government who are becoming an increasingly important 
segment of the First Economy. Otherwise, this part of South Africa's economy has generated 
a phenomenon of 'jobless growth' with its wings spreading right across the African continent. 
However, its counterpart, the Second Economy, was predominantly black, underdeveloped 
with an unskilled and unemployable workforce. This has presented South Africa with a 
challenge to overcome apartheid's legacy of economic inequalities accompanied by the 
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HIV/AIDS scourge. Nonetheless, when comparisons are made between South Africa and 
most states in the rest of the continent, South Africa was at the apex. South Africa is 
relatively better positioned to deal and cope with most of its challenges. 
2.4.3 South Africa's Military Power 
South Africa has other conventional attributes of power. For instance, it has the strongest 
military capability on the continent, and is the biggest African contributor of UN 
peacekeeping presence on the continent. South Africa's industrial defence sector produces 
sophisticated, state-of-the-art weaponry, competing with the best in the world.
63
 In recent 
times, it has bought large sums of combat submarine, corvettes, tanks, fighter jets – hardware 
that no other African country can possibly afford. Although some of the armament deals 
remain a subject of political controversy with one convicted case of corruption, the arms deal 
has further boosted South Africa's military capabilities. 
When one looks at post-apartheid South Africa's political and economic status in Africa, 
there can be no doubt as to its commanding position on the continent. South Africa's foreign 
policy-makers deliberately avoided attempts to employ hegemonic relations with fellow 
African countries, as was the case under the apartheid regime. However, there are variations 
of interpretations regarding South Africa's power in Africa. When analysing the effectiveness 
of South Africa's soft power approach (quiet diplomacy and non-interference) towards its 
neighbours in Africa it is important to consider the country's reluctance to play a hegemonic 
role. 
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2.5 Literature on South Africa's Position in Africa 
There is a vast body of literature on South Africa's foreign policy. This literature can be 
divided into four broad clusters. Each cluster is in turn anchored within a theoretical 
framework. These are: a) South Africa as regional hegemony, b) South Africa as 'middle 
power,' c) South Africa as a pivotal state, d) South Africa as a sub-imperialist state. 
2.5.1 South Africa as a Regional Hegemony 
Much of the scholarship on South Africa's foreign policy refers to its pre-eminence in Africa. 
The literature locates South Africa as Africa's regional hegemony.
64
 The history of apartheid 
South Africa's relations with the rest of Southern Africa since 1960s provides sufficient 
evidence of its hegemonic tendencies in terms of coercive dominance. But, what is a regional 
hegemon? The term regional hegemony emanates from the realist school. David Myers 
simply defines regional hegemony(s) as, "states which possess power sufficient to dominate 
subordinate state systems
65
". Much of the literature on South Africa's foreign policy locates 
South Africa within this realist orientation. Deon Geldenhuys and Sam C. Nolutshungu
66
 
represent two different, often clashing approaches to the study of South Africa's foreign 
policy within this regional hegemon framework. Geldenhuys has written comprehensively 
about apartheid South Africa's foreign policy makers' perceptions of being under siege from 
unfriendly independent black-ruled countries within the Southern Africa sub-region, the rest 
of Africa, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) bloc within the UN. For instance, in a 
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paper commissioned by the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) in 1981, Geldenhuys 
suggested ways in which "South Africa (can) use its economic links for strategic purposes
67
". 
Nolutshungu on the other hand, looked at how South Africa, under apartheid, attempted to 
extend the ideology of white supremacy into Africa. According to Nolutshungu, there was a 
systematic attempt on the part of South Africa, from the era of Jan Smuts to the Verwoerd 
era, to incorporate most of Southern African sub-region, particularly the British protectorates 
Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland into a 'Greater Union of South Africa.' Verwoerd once 
said: 
…the whole of my striving has been to ensure the knitting together of the parts of 
Africa, the parts of Southern Africa which belong to each other; parts that must work 
together for a stable future on the continent of Africa.
68
 
Although these authors fundamentally differed in terms of their assessments of apartheid 
South Africa's foreign policy agenda in Africa, their work nonetheless points to the regional 
hegemonic power of South Africa. James Barber and John Barrett's authoritative book, South 
Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945 – 1988, argues that, "The 
overriding aim of South African governments in this period was the preservation of a white 
controlled state, although the means employed to maintain white power and identity changed 
as the challenges increased
69
". 
Even post-apartheid, the question of South Africa's status as a regional hegemon continues to 
preoccupy foreign policy analysts concerned about Pretoria's relations in the continent. 
Although there were expectations that South Africa, under the ANC rule, would not behave 
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in a coercively hegemonic fashion, in many public circles and scholarly quarters, South 
Africa continues to be perceived as a regional hegemony. For instance, in their article titled 
"South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemonies," Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg 
argue that: 
The idea of South Africa and Nigeria as potential hegemonies in Africa often raises 
resentment among other African actors. They challenge the notion that two countries 
can arrogate to themselves the divine right to lead Africa. In some public and 
scholarly circles, South Africa and Nigeria are often associated with 'gigantism': they 
are perceived to be political, military, and economic giants who have the potential to 
use these resources in malignant and even destructive ways to threaten other states.
70
 
Fred Ahwireng–Obeng and Patrick McGowan posed a critical question about South Africa's 
regional hegemonic power in the following way: 
Will South Africa use its influence and leadership to create public goods of benefit to 
the region, such as peacekeeping and a more liberal trade regime, or will it use its 
power selfishly to promote its own national interests by, for example, protecting its 
markets from SADC products?
71
 
Maxi Schoeman has also written extensively about South Africa's role and position in Africa. 
In 2000, she had the following to say about South Africa bid for a seat within the reformed 
UNSC: 
It is doubtful whether South Africa has shown sufficient proof of its willingness to 
shoulder regional and continental responsibilities in a bid to become a regional big 
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power. To the extent that permanent membership of the Security Council would imply 
that the country is perceived to be able to play a bigger role, but that it is reluctant to 
do so.
72
 
South Africa's economic and military might within the African context appears to be the main 
measurement of most scholars when applying the term "regional hegemony" to Pretoria's 
position in Africa. This category of scholars belongs to the realist school of thought. 
However, realism carries its own weaknesses as an analytic tool explaining the contemporary 
role of power in international relations. According to Hill, realism and neo-realism explain 
the existence of hegemony but its overall value remains unsatisfactorily comprehended in 
international relations. He further argued that this theory remains inconsistent, because it does 
not probe into decision-making and interests in domestic politics and how these factors 
influence policies that may have a bearing on a state's hegemonic posture or profile. 
One could argue therefore, that the realist theory fails to understand some of the dynamics 
that determine power. On the question of dynamics, Kegley and Wittkopf
73
 asked whether 
states were more prone to act aggressively when they are strong or weak. Realist theory aptly 
explains the nature and character of apartheid South Africa's hegemonic foreign policy, 
however it fails to adequately explain Pretoria's post-apartheid agenda. Whereas apartheid 
South Africa maximised military and economic power to dominate its and the rest of the 
African continent, during post-apartheid, it tended to derive its power through cooperation 
from the same states. 
Realism suggests that maximisation of state power is a central goal of political elites, thus 
ignoring alternative, intangible sources of power. Foreign policy decision makers in the post-
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apartheid era have relied heavily on multilateralism as a way to advance South Africa's 
foreign policy objectives. With this shift in post-apartheid foreign policy, the term of 'middle 
power' gained prevalence. 
2.5.2 South Africa as a Middle Power
74
 
South Africa played a critical role in the First and Second World Wars. It fully and actively 
participated in the formation of the United Nations (UN). As a result, the country was granted 
one of the territories under German colonial control, (South West Africa/Namibia), to occupy 
on behalf of both the League of Nations and UN in recognition of South Africa's special role 
in global politics as well as within Africa. However, this international recognition underwent 
radical change with the onset of decolonisation and discrediting of racially discriminatory 
regimes and notions of 'white supremacy'. Increasingly, as a result of apartheid policy, South 
Africa lacked sufficient credibility required within global multilateral structures to qualify as 
a middle power in the leadership sense of the term – responsibility that such states in this 
category are expected to undertake in the international system. 
'Middle power' tends, however, to be one of the most-used concepts in referring to post-
apartheid South Africa's position in world politics. Philip Nel, Ian Taylor, and Janis van der 
Westhuizen for instance asserted that, "South Africa can conveniently be termed a middle 
power, in terms of both its position in a hierarchy of power and influence in world affairs and 
the specific nature of its diplomacy
75
". The middle power concept is rooted in the writings of 
Andrew F. Cooper, John Holmes, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal. These 
authors refer to middle power(s) as state(s) that immerse their foreign policy within 
multilateral fora. Robert O. Keohane states that, "A middle power is a state whose leaders 
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consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systematic impact in a 
small group or through an international institution
76
". 
Countries such as Canada, New Zealand, and Australia were traditionally perceived as middle 
powers in the post 1945 world order. The historic transition from apartheid to multiracial 
democracy in South Africa in 1994, witnessed concerted efforts by foreign policy decision 
makers to use multilateralism as a useful tool to leverage their foreign policy objectives. For 
scholars of South Africa's foreign policy, this was seen as the major qualification for the 
country's middle power status in global affairs. In their view, South Africa enjoys the status 
of a middle power because it has become "a global citizen". It follows and respects the 
principle of multilateralism. This, according to the proponents of the middle power 
conception is a useful analytical tool for understanding the role of states in international 
relations where accent is placed on the spirit of multilateralism (co-operation) instead of 
unilateralism on numerous matters concerning global peace and security. 
It is also important to stress that the term 'middle power' derives from liberal international 
thought that gained increasing prominence in the post-WWI period. This school of thought 
encouraged the building of international institutions and the rule of law instead of power. 
Strongly influenced by it, 'Idealism' stressed the pursuit of objectives such as world peace. 
Liberal idealism came up with different ways of reforming the global system as the best 
means of stopping wars. The four main tenets of this school of thought are focused on 
international institutions, legal processes, disarmament and self-determination. These 
propositions are based on the following set of beliefs (assumptions) relating to human nature, 
war, ethics and democracy. They are: 
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I. The anarchic nature of the international system and the absence of a 
supranational authority - Like realism, liberal idealism accepts this archaic 
nature, however, it does not believe in the reliance or maximisation of power 
by states as the best means of self-preservation. Liberal internationalist 
idealism believes that increased state interaction and interdependence enhance 
harmony between and among states in international relations. Therefore, 
liberal democracies compete with but do not go to war against one another. 
They would rather form a pacific union, since more is gained through 
cooperation than conflict. 
II. Liberal idealism believes that states cooperate on various matters to attain 
what is considered as rule based global order. While states are considered as 
important actors in international relations, the school acknowledges the 
existence of non-state actors. Multi-National Corporations (MNC), individuals 
and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are some of the non-state 
actors' active in the international arena. These actors may work with 
governments to promote global cooperation, peace and security along with 
states. Additionally, 
III. Liberalism believes that the establishment of international institutions, codes, 
norms, and values such human rights are a manifestation of the role of 
morality in the definition of relationships between and among states.77 
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2.5.3 South Africa as a Pivotal State 
Much of scholarship in this category tends to move from a US 'spheres of influence' thesis. 
The pivotal states in this thinking are states considered critical within Washington's 
Containment Policy during the Cold War. For instance, Ronald Steel wrote that: 
Regional disturbances that do not threaten the world power balance should be dealt 
with by the major powers of the region, ideally with the endorsement of the 
international community. Instead of seeking an ephemeral global security, we should, 
as Charles Williams Maynes has argued in Foreign Affairs, encourage a policy of 
"regional self-reliance [that] would recognise that certain powerful states in each will 
inevitably play a special security role. In other words, we must accept the reality of 
the longstanding tradition of spheres of influence – a tradition that we scrupulously 
insist upon in the Western Hemisphere under our unilaterally imposed Monroe 
Doctrine.
78
 
In terms of this 'sphere of influence', the post-Cold War world brought uneasiness on the part 
of the US, especially towards regional conflicts in Africa. The US intervention in Somalia's 
intra-state conflict left eighteen US troops dead. The high human and capital cost for such 
interventions, in turn, triggered some public backlash, and there was general hesitance on the 
part of the US to intervene in Africa's civil wars – especially since Africa, post-Cold War, 
was fast declining in its geo-strategic importance for the US It is within this setting that the 
pivotal state thesis re-gained ascendance within US scholarly circles. South Africa became 
one of the few African countries that were considered to be of pivotal importance to US 
interest in Africa (along with Nigeria). 
Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kenneth define a pivotal state as one: 
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So important that its collapse would spell trans boundary mayhem: migration, 
communal violence, pollution, disease, and so on. A pivotal state's steady economic 
progress and stability, on the other hand, would bolster [its] region's economic vitality 
and political soundness and benefit American trade and investment.
79
 
In a paper published in Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Edwin S. Cochran 
placed post-apartheid South Africa in the pivotal state category. He argues that "South 
Africa's emergence as Sub-Saharan Africa's pivotal state is of strategic importance for the 
United States
80
". Other scholars such as Garth Le Pere, Adam Habib
81
, Chris Landsberg and 
Jeffrey Herbst
82
 have, in varying degrees, also identified the post-apartheid South Africa 
within the context of the pivotal state thesis. Radical scholars of South Africa's foreign 
policy, however, fundamentally differ with all of these forgoing conceptualisations of South 
Africa's status: regional hegemony, middle power, and pivotal state. Instead, they see South 
Africa nothing less than a sub-regional 'imperialist' state. 
2.5.4 South Africa as a Sub-Imperialist Power
83
 
Scholars leaning towards Marxism-Leninism view and analyse international relations 
differently from realists and liberal internationalists. Their starting point lies on what they 
consider as the negative aspects of capitalist production. Workers are exploited by the 
dominant class that own and control the means of production. These forms of relations exist 
among states. The nature and character of the global economy inherently produces unequal 
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relations between states. Marxist-Leninist theory argues, therefore, that individual gain is 
prioritised over equity within and between nation states. There are rich states often described 
as imperialist, which occupy the core, sub-imperialist states occupying the semi-periphery 
and the poorest states stuck along the periphery of the world system. While imperialists' 
states exploit semi-peripheries and peripheries, the sub- imperialists exploit their peripheral. 
Assumptions of the radical school of thought further examine this exploitation chain. For 
instance: 
I. There is an inherent struggle between countries at the core and peripheral 
states. This struggle often results in conflict. Therefore, the relationship 
between core states (North) and peripheral states (South) is one defined by 
conflicts over the means of production and natural resources situated in the 
periphery; 
II. Structural economic power determines which state(s) control and dominate 
relations among states; 
III. They acknowledge that non states actors such as MNCs are important players 
in international relations; and 
IV. There are semi peripheral states that stand like a "middle class" working with 
or for core states in the exploitation of the peripheral states. These countries 
are sub regional imperialists as they maximise their power to exploit poor 
states both for themselves and for the imperialist core. 
This school of thought gained currency during the cold war era when some countries 
followed the dependency theory carrying with it notions of "autarky" or "de-linking" which 
meant that developing countries can only secure development if they disengage from the 
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global economy shaped and dominated by the core states. There are many scholars that adopt 
the radical school of thought to define South Africa's role and position in Africa, particularly 
in Southern Africa, namely, Patrick J. McGowan, Patrick Bond, John Saul, Dale McKinley, 
and Hein Marais to name a few. The relative high level of South Africa's economy in 
comparison with the rest of Africa "provides it with a structural power
84
". 
The distribution of power within the Southern Africa subsystem has been the focus of the 
radical school.
85
 The demise of the apartheid system, according to this system, does not 
necessarily change the exploitative nature and character of South African business in Africa. 
These companies have invested aggressively across the African continent threatening local 
and foreign business ventures. Dale McKinley
86
, for example, perceives a direct linkage 
between South Africa's "quiet diplomacy" towards Zimbabwe and Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE). In his view, there is unity between the new black and old white capital, 
which colludes with the South African government in Zimbabwe. In short, South Africa's 
failure to rein in the dictatorial regime of President Robert Mugabe can be best explained by a 
South African sub-imperialist logic. 
Manuel Castells succinctly explains post-apartheid South Africa's sub-imperialistic 
connection: 
"The end of apartheid in South Africa, and the potential linkage between a 
democratic, black majority-ruled South Africa and African countries, at least those in 
eastern/Southern Africa, allow us to examine the hypothesis of the incorporation of 
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Africa into global capitalism under new, more conditions via the South African 
connection.
87
 
For a nation emerging from apartheid, the determination to consolidate democracy at home 
and abroad was uppermost in the minds of the South Africa's foreign policy-makers. 
However, the country's apartheid history of coercive hegemonic tendencies in the region was 
widely perceived as an obstacle in rekindling new partnerships with countries. The 
establishment of a liberal ethos of interstate rules, norms and values of engagement with 
fellow states in the region became a priority. The ANC was also cognisant of the potential 
negative perceptions that this could generate. Promoting democracy throughout the region 
would, in some instances, undercut the principles of territorial sovereignty and Pan-African 
solidarity, acknowledging that, these differing points of views understandably generate 
tension. Our hope is that this can be creatively settled within recognised regional and 
international fora.
88
 
Over the years, as these interests have competed in foreign policy, the multiple elite voices 
coalescing around the decision-making process has guaranteed a tenuous, but manageable 
balance among them. It is in this context that South Africa started to think carefully about 
finding creative means to encourage the democratisation of Southern African countries. Here, 
South Africa's approach to soft power is not openly declared, but it appears to be a major 
driving force in its Africa policy in the first decade of South Africa's democracy. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In summary, extending Holsti's work on national role conceptions through theories such as 
social learning theory, Marxism, neoliberalism and other theories becomes especially 
important in understanding the evolution of South Africa's foreign policy. The arguments in 
this chapter have examined the nature, evolution and origins of role conceptions, and has 
covered key aspects of the concept that are largely ignored in a literature obsessed with the 
quest for immediate relevance – that of the need to formulate 'identity'. The adoption of this 
analytical framework is relevant because, in addition to helping assess the importance of 
identity in national role conceptions, the framework can also explain a country's need to 
highlight potential conflicts arising from the clash of roles masquerading as interests, because 
it accepts existing contradictions in prevailing roles. Since 1994, South Africa, has tirelessly 
demonstrated the ability to transform its foreign policy identity and national roles with regard 
to the rest of Africa. Pretoria's attempt to build a common consensus on matters of foreign 
policy objectives means that it has moved foreign policy decision-making toward an Afro-
centric direction in line with the vision of an African renaissance guiding its Africa policy. 
In understanding this shift to an African renaissance-guided approach to foreign policy, it is 
useful to process-trace the line of events that South Africa underwent in this transition to its 
approach. Holsti and Nye's frameworks are relevant in the sense that they help explain how 
South Africa's foreign policymakers conceptualised the country's changing and yet 
'contradictory' roles in Africa. South Africa's quest for formulation of a national role 
conception also explains much concerning its intervention in Lesotho and Zimbabwe. While 
these issues will be elaborated fully in the case studies chapters. It can be noted here that, 
while these two cases raise questions about South Africa's leadership in Africa, they 
nonetheless demonstrate the reasons why a country might shift from the use of hard power to 
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soft power in the history of its foreign policy. Holsti's and Nye's works are imminently 
relevant and will be applied throughout the thesis to gain further insight into Pretoria's 
understanding of its varied roles, the nature of power useful to it in the country, and the most 
relevant type of power it needed to apply in the Southern African sub region. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
FROM AFRICAN PARIAH TO CONTINENTAL LEADER: SOUTH 
AFRICA'S JOURNEY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH AFRICA 
 
"Considering South Africa's position of relative strength on the continent and in international 
affairs, the country has a responsibility to play a leadership role in Africa's socio-economic 
development agenda in terms of developing policy, correctly channelling resources, 
supporting implementation and directing NEPAD, as well as to play a role in international 
arena in negotiating a new partnership paradigm and ending Africa's marginalisation in the 
global community.
89
" 
 
3.1 Introduction 
South Africa's foreign policymakers have always grappled with the notion of national role 
conceptions. Throughout its history, South Africa's leaders both black and white from Smuts, 
Malan, Verwoerd, Botha, Mandela and Mbeki toyed with the idea of national role 
conceptions. 
This chapter is essentially historical in its focus, and it aims to set the stage for the remaining 
chapters that follow by providing historical and contemporary background to the evolution of 
South African foreign policy. From apartheid, to the post-apartheid era, with particular focus 
on South Africa's intra-African relations on the continent. South Africa's Africa policy finds 
expression in the ANC and ANC government's commitment to advancing 'The African 
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Agenda'.
90
 In many respects, this commitment reflected South Africa's post-apartheid agenda 
of integrating South Africa into the Inter-African state system as a leading actor on the 
continent devoted to transforming that system in a manner that promotes Africa's 
development.
91
 This is a radical departure from the apartheid era that set South Africa apart 
from and in opposition to most of the rest of Africa. Yet, here again, South Africa, in its own 
national interest of survival under an apartheid regime of minority racial dominance defined 
by Afrikaner nationalist ascendancy, deemed it necessary to interact with the rest of the 
continent as well.
92
 
The concern then, in this chapter, is to explore how South Africa's inter-African relations on 
the continent have evolved from this defensive, survivalist period of apartheid rule to the 
post-apartheid contemporary period of the country's integration into the inter-African system. 
At the same time the chapter intends to identify change and continuity in South Africa's 
relationship with the rest of the continent, especially given the constant of South Africa's 
overwhelming dominance under both black majority as well as white minority regimes. This 
variable does not change and therefore, it is constantly operative in the way the rest of the 
continent perceives South Africa
93
 which, in turn, conditions South Africa's sensitivities in 
how it relates to the rest of Africa. At present, South Africa's inter-African relations are 
predicated on the belief that the consolidation of its democracy and overall national interests 
are intimately intertwined with the continent's prospects for achieving peace, security and 
stability as preconditions for advancing Africa's sustainable development. 
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Advancing Africa's sustainable development occupies the heart of post-apartheid South 
Africa's 'African Agenda'.
94
 This, however, was not always the case. The historical journey 
that South Africa has travelled from apartheid to its current post-liberation dispensation is the 
story of how South Africa's Africa policy, as a reflection of its relations with the rest of the 
continent, has undergone radical transformation. South Africa's Africa policy transformation 
continues to be accompanied by ambivalence between South Africa and its fellow African 
states as a function of the continuing reality of South Africa's overwhelming dominance on 
the continent. The remainder of this chapter, therefore is devoted to exploring the history of 
South Africa's inter-African relations, first under successive regimes of white domination 
both before and after the advent of Afrikaner nationalist ascendancy in 1948; secondly under 
the post-liberation regimes of African National Congress (ANC) governments led by Nelson 
Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. 
3.2 The Historical Background of South Africa's Africa Policy 
In exploring South Africa's international relations, it will initially survey both the 'formal' 
(apartheid foreign policy), and the 'informal' (anti-apartheid diplomacy) foreign policy 
struggles waged between the apartheid regime and the country's liberation movement(s) with 
a particular focus on the African political 'battlefield.' This pre-1994 history lays the ground 
for examining South Africa's post-apartheid Africa policy transition toward the African 
Renaissance era that begins to emerge in the Mandela administration with Thabo Mbeki as 
deputy president, coming into full elaboration when Mbeki succeeds Mandela. In the process 
of this historical survey, four key research areas are examined. These involve, first, an initial 
over-viewing of the formative years of South Africa's foreign policy, from 1910 to 1948 
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followed by the attempted 'outreach' strategies of successive Afrikaner regimes – notably 
those of B.J. Vorster and P.W. Botha in particular – and the ensuing clash at the international 
level between Afrikanerdom and the anti-apartheid international relations of the liberation 
movements. 
The third area looks at the transition toward a genuinely post-apartheid foreign policy under 
the leadership of Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk as they guided South Africa into its 
power-sharing government of national unity, which fundamentally changed the terms of 
South Africa's relations with its and the continent as a whole. This transition, in turn, lays the 
foundation for the Mbeki era in foreign policy with its Africa- focus on building stability in 
the region and further afield as necessary preconditions for advancing Africa's developmental 
and governance agenda. Here, it should be noted that while the national unity government of 
Nelson Mandela ended South Africa's legacy of racial supremacy and aggressive hegemony 
in its Africa policy, Mandela nevertheless created new problems. Chief among them was the 
dilemma of how South Africa could lead in constructing new partnerships with other 
countries in the Southern Africa without feeding perceptions or suspicions of continuing 
hegemony as a legacy of the apartheid era. Of overriding concern to South Africa's new 
foreign policy mandarins was how they could earn the trust of the Southern African region. 
3.3 The Foreign Policies of 'White' South Africa: 1910-1994 
South Africa's foreign policy under white leadership between Union in 1910 and the end of 
white rule in 1990 can be broken down into two periods. The 'Commonwealth Period' from 
1910 to 1961, overlapping with the Afrikaner nationalist ascendency beginning in 1948, and, 
once South Africa withdraws from the Commonwealth
95
, the 'Republican Period' and 
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growing international isolation, which effectively ends in 1990 with the unbanning of the 
African liberation movements which begins the reversal of South Africa's isolation in the 
international community. In a formal, official sense, the Republican era under white rule ends 
and the post-apartheid foreign policy era begins in 1994 with the election of the first 
democratic government.
96
 During the Commonwealth period, the hallmark of South Africa's 
formative foreign policy was its subordination to and alignment with Britain. The main 
reason for this development, captured by James Barber was, "…the old 'imperial factor' in 
South Africa's history. Britain was the major colonial power in the continent, the central 
member of the Commonwealth, and the mother of many white South Africans
97
". South 
Africa's status within the British Commonwealth was sealed with the post-Anglo-Boer war 
settlement binding the British and Afrikaner colonies into the 1910 Union of South Africa, 
consolidating white minority domination over the region's African majority. Importantly, 
however, the Anglo-Boer or 'South African war' (1899-1902) was also seen as the beginning 
of the end of Pax Britannica and British hegemony over South Africa had to concede to Boer 
ascendancy albeit under a leadership that paid nominal tribute to the British crown.
98
 During 
this early Commonwealth period, the pro-imperialist liberal internationalist leadership of Jan 
Smuts emerged as the distinguishing feature of South African foreign policy. 
3.4 The Commonwealth Era 
The country's mineral wealth and geographical positioning astride the Cape of Good Hope 
enhanced its strategic importance within the Commonwealth and made it the centre of the 
Southern African mining economy and a cheap migratory system. Yet the limit of this 
hegemony from a political standpoint was the regime's failure to incorporate the British 
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Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland
99
 into a greater South Africa and 
their eventual decolonisation into Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland respectively.
100
 These 
limits foreshadowed the longer-term failure of successive white regimes to fashion diplomacy 
persuasive enough to overcome the racial supremacist fundamentals of white domination in 
South Africa itself with the aim of advancing the country's inter-African relations. The fact of 
the subcontinent's economic inter-dependence revolving around the Union's emerging mining 
sector, with its need for migratory from colonies – and eventually independent states – did 
not translate into political and diplomatic interdependence in terms of advancing early 
Commonwealth South Africa's regional diplomacy. South Africa's racial system was 
anathema to its and Britain was loathing facilitating the expansion of Anglo-Boer racial 
policies into its Protectorates. This failure in its immediate neighbourhood contradicted the 
growing international stature of South Africa under the leadership of General Jan Smuts. 
Smuts elevated South Africa's global standing during and after the Second World War 
(WWII). However, his main priority, as far as Africa was concerned, was to continue a 
collaborative and friendly European colonial agenda in Africa.
101
 This was based on the 
assumption that, over the long- term, South Africa's development and security rested on the 
European colonial 'civilising' mission in Africa. Due to his willingness to assist the 
Commonwealth in Britain's war with Germany, Japan, and Italy, General Smuts was 
appointed to sit in Britain's Imperial Cabinet. This was the highest form of recognition of 
Smuts and South Africa. Coupled with the management of South West Africa after WWI, this 
was seen as providing South Africa with a "quasi-colonial power status" in Africa.
102
 It was 
within the context of this diplomatic ascendance that South Africa attempted to reinforce 
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such a notion of status by incorporating Southern Rhodesia as well as and the British High 
Commission Territories into a 'Greater Union of South Africa'.
103
 The watershed elections of 
1948 changed all of this, eclipsing Smuts' brand of proxy imperialism to the rest of Africa. 
The year 1948 saw Smuts' ruling United Party (UP) lose the elections to the National Party 
(NP), a small Afrikaans-speaking ethnic party, ushering the system of apartheid.
104
 As South 
Africa embarked on forty years of apartheid, it increasingly became a pariah state in the 
international arena, totally transforming the liberal internationalist imperialism that had 
erstwhile bound it to the West. White South Africa began to inexorably lose its respectability. 
The world had been taken by a surprise by the NP's victory and more importantly, the 
apartheid policy, which formed part of its electoral manifesto. Sobering from witnessing the 
WWII horrors of the holocaust, the global mood of the time was in of institutionalising a 
global consensus on matters of conflict prevention and common security.
105
 The irony of 
NP's victory in 1948 was that member states of the UN signed the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights into effect during that same year.
106
 This document obliged all member states, 
South Africa included, to protect the human rights of individuals and minorities within their 
jurisdiction.
107
 Apartheid, however, offered a policy institutionalised racism - one that moved 
against the global grain protections for individual rights regardless of colour, gender, class, 
and creed. The early Afrikaner nationalist regimes, however, tended to be inward looking 
rather than preoccupied with foreign affairs. However, under the D.F. Malan and Johannes 
Strydom premierships, three trends significantly changed and shaped their world outlooks: a) 
South Africa's rapid industrialisation; b) the imperial powers' desire to withdraw from 
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Southern Africa; and c) with the gathering force of decolonisation, the threat of the emerging 
global cold war.
108
 
In the first decade since the Nationalists assumed power, the South African economy 
boomed. Large State Corporations such as Eskom, Iscor, and Telkom were established during 
this time as giants in key strategic economic sectors. This 'Boer Boom' peaked in the mid-
Sixties in what has been depicted as "The Apartheid Dream State," lasting from about 1964 to 
1972.
109
  
Six years of sustained economic growth of 7 percent per annum, high capital inflows, 
a passive African population that appeared to have acquiesced in its own 
powerlessness, secure borders, reliable allies in the West (who used its vehement anti-
Communist propaganda for its own purposes), and a growing rapprochement between 
Afrikaners and English-speaking whites.
110
  
The economy required massive which, in turn, drove an accelerating process of black 
urbanisation in the emergence of townships that began to ring white urban-industrial centres. 
In turn, these processes attracted more foreign investors, skilled, and the general expansion of 
national infrastructure amid the growth in manufacturing and relative decline in the mining 
sector.
111
 On the one hand, the NP wanted to restrict blacks from settling in urban areas as 
this could increase the competition for jobs for the poor Afrikaners, its main constituency. On 
the other hand, the demand for cheap overrode the logic of apartheid with long-term 
consequences for white rule, especially as the priority shifted to internal as opposed to 
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external sources of. Massive industrialisation and urbanisation provided the ANC fertile 
ground for recruiting members, particularly within the force.
112
 
Due to the increasingly repressive nature of the Afrikaner regimes, collective energies began 
mounting against the apartheid state in 1950s. At the United Nations meeting in… Malan and 
Strydom came under enormous pressure. Even countries in Asia such as India had attained 
independence. Indeed, India challenged South Africa's apartheid system openly in the UN 
General Assembly. This large, newly independent country opposed the ill treatment of people 
of Indian descent in South Africa, and became one of the first countries in the world to raise 
concerns about apartheid South Africa's violation of human rights, generally.
113
 Under this 
fear of solidarity for previously oppressed groups, Malan and Strydom feared that the close 
ties of the South African Communist Party's (SACP) with the Soviet Union posed a security 
threat to South Africa. In 1950, the SACP was banned, and by 1956, Soviet Union's embassy 
in Pretoria had been forced to close.
114
 Thus was set the basic template of Afrikanerdom's 
response to the gathering momentum of African nationalism as it began to find increasingly 
more militant expression in South Africa. African nationalism and various and sundry 
challenges to the racist edifice erected by the Nationalist regime were conflated with the 
threat of communism, propelling an increasingly elaborate anti-communist mobilisation as an 
emerging ideological feature of foreign policy articulation. The communist threat perception 
was, in part, fed by the European colonial retreat. 
When Ghana became the first African country to attain independence from Britain, South 
Africa attempted to open up a diplomatic mission in Accra but this mission was soon 
aborted.
115
 The immediate reaction to Ghana's independence was the move to strengthen 
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relationships with white governments occupying the British and Portuguese colonies in 
Southern Africa. Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah's eagerness for pan African unity was 
linked to anti-apartheid as well as anti-colonial campaigns. This only reinforced the fear of 
radicalism emanating from the ANC at home. The successor to Malan and Strydom, Hendrik 
Verwoerd further elaborated apartheid into a fully-fledged, institutionalised totalitarian 
system while laying the foundation for Afrikanerdom's foreign policy offensive in defence of 
apartheid based on the NP's response to African nationalism cantering on the ideology of 
Separate Development and the promotion of African ethno-linguistic homelands or 
'Bantustans'.
116
 On this basis, in foreign affairs, Verwoerd tried to convince the international 
community to accept apartheid as a legitimate response to African nationalism and 
decolonisation. In response, the liberation movements intensified their struggle against the 
apartheid regime. At first, these movements used passive resistance, however, when the 
Verwoerd government massacred peaceful demonstrators at a police station in Sharpeville in 
1960, ANC leaders Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, and Olivier Tambo were 
motivated to embark on the armed struggle along with the breakaway Pan-Africanist 
Congress of Azania (PAC) which was the initiator of the Sharpeville protest.
117
 The ANC 
sent Oliver Tambo to London to open an external office to launch a diplomatic offensive 
against the apartheid regime. These leaders were stopped in their tracks, however, when the 
Verwoerd government arrested the critical mass of the top leadership, crippling the ANC's 
ability to counter the government's offensive. 
Tambo and a few others escaped from the country and started to reorganise the movement in 
exile.
118
 The same fate befell the PAC, however it never seemed to recover fully following 
                                                          
116
 Geldenhuys, D. Op. cit. 260. 
117
 Kasrils, R. Armed and Dangerous-From undercover struggle to freedom. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 
1998. 22-46. 
118
 Callincicos, L. Oliver Tambo-Beyond the Engeli Mountains. Claremont: David Philip Publishers, 2004. 277-278.
  
 68 
Pretoria's onslaught. This signalled the weakest moment of the ANC as it was 
organisationally destabilised and failed to operate within South African borders for many 
years. Opposition to apartheid was effectively silenced internally through the intimidation, 
torture and killing of those asking for basic human rights. Mandela and others were 
incarcerated on Robben Island. The forcing into exile of the ANC and PAC political 
leadership, while reflecting the nadir of African nationalism internally, nevertheless, marked 
the beginning of the liberation struggle's development of its own counter-diplomacy of 
mobilising international opposition to apartheid aimed at isolating the apartheid regime.
119
 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's "Wind of Change" speech
120
 in the South African 
Parliament in Cape Town marked an historical watershed for South Africa in its relations, not 
only with Britain, but also with the West in general.
121
 Telling the regime what it did not 
want to hear, Macmillan emphasised three major issues that South Africa needed to 
recognise. Firstly that its racial policy of apartheid could not be supported, especially by 
Britain. Secondly that there was an urgent need to accommodate blacks in South Africa's 
political system. And finally that the "wind of change" which was blowing in the rest of 
Africa, wherein African nationalist movements were gaining political power in a momentum 
that was sweeping across the continent. South Africa would not be spared this trend. 
Verwoerd, however, having embarked South Africa onto its own home-grown notion of 
'decolonisation,' was not about to be persuaded by Macmillan's 'winds of change.' And with 
the momentum of decolonisation transforming the Commonwealth itself, it became 
increasingly clear to Pretoria that South Africa would face increasing pressure and isolation 
within what was becoming a post-imperial body of former African, Asian and Caribbean 
British colonies. This predictably led to South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth 
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in 1961. On the verge of expulsion, Verwoerd withdrew South Africa's membership.
122
 Not 
only did this signal the first diplomatic attempts aimed at isolating the apartheid regime, it 
also the end of white South Africa's Commonwealth foreign policy governed by Britain and a 
'White Commonwealth' including Canada, Australia and New Zealand. White South African 
foreign policy – and policy toward the rest of Africa – would now enter its Republican phase 
as South Africa, outside the Commonwealth, ceased being the Union of South Africa and was 
reborn, under Afrikaner nationalism, as the 'Republic of South Africa'.
123
 Thus, just as other 
African states were declaring their independence, South Africa, under Afrikaner nationalist 
hegemony, declared its independence as well – from the British Commonwealth. 
3.5 The Republican Era 
As South Africa exited the Commonwealth and became a republic
124
 amid the gathering 
momentum of decolonisation on the continent, internally, it intensified its defensive strategy 
of increasing its state capacity to counter perceived security threats. This strategy would 
ultimately take on an external dimension as well, both within Africa and internationally as the 
banned liberation movements, the ANC and PAC, took their resistance to the apartheid 
regime into the international arena and Pretoria faced growing isolation.
125
 Thus, both 
movements' representatives in exiles attended the opening of the founding summit of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on May 25 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The 
struggle against apartheid and white minority rule was openly declared by the OAU as one of 
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its premier objectives. The ANC and PAC meanwhile began attracting international financial 
assistance to advance their struggle, thereby widening the scope of Pretoria's enemies.
126
 
Anti-African nationalist as the Afrikaner regime was, the radical change in its international 
fortunes forced South Africa to develop a foreign policy and national security strategy aimed 
at countering its growing isolation, with Africa unavoidably at the centre of its diplomacy. 
With Verwoerd's assassination in 1966, it would be left up to the successive regimes of B.J. 
Vorster, P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk to execute Pretoria's defensive outreach within Africa 
and the world with the immediate Southern African neighbourhood as the staging ground. 
After all, the overwhelming economic dependence of states on the white-dominated republic 
offered an obvious opportunity for Pretoria to leverage its dominance into African diplomatic 
and political gains. But this was easier said than done in as much as all states, in varying but 
unmistakable fashion, politically and diplomatically supported the ANC and PAC although 
they were in no position to offer open military support.
127
 
Caught between Pretoria and the liberation movements, South Africa's would be caught in the 
middle of the rival diplomacies of both forces. This would increasingly exact great sacrifices 
upon them, leaving a legacy of distrust of South African power that would follow the country 
into its post-apartheid era. Confronted by the political threat of an expanding number of 
African states, South Africa pursued two interrelated foreign policy objectives aimed at 
achieving its strategic objectives within the Southern African region and beyond. The first 
was the 'Outward-Looking' policy or (outward policy),
128
 extending well beyond the region, 
targeting especially such obliging West African states as Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. Here, 
South Africa's confidence in its economic prowess on the strength of the 1964-72 'Boer 
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Boom' was on display. As francophone leaders in particular, such as Abidjan's life-president 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny and to a lesser extent Senegal's Leopold Sedar Senghor, an 
openness for 'dialogue' (which, in turn, coincided notably with the US Richard Nixon 
administration's 'dialogue for change' policy toward South Africa, under the influence of 
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger). Closer to home, this policy facilitated the 
establishment of Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU), incorporating the newly 
independent British Protectorates, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BLS) into South 
Africa's economic sphere of influence. This was followed by attempts to establish close 
diplomatic relations with Malawi's Kamuzu Banda and other African states
129
 to prevent 
them from providing sanctuaries for ANC and PAC exiles. 
John Vorster's period in power from 1966 to 1978 – following Verwoerd's assassination -- 
brought with it, its own challenges. Prime Minister Vorster oversaw the beginnings of a 
sustained military build-up and strengthening of the South African Defence Force (SADF), 
coupled with the expansion and activation of intelligence and covert action capabilities.
130
 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the arm wing of the ANC meanwhile, had joined forces with the 
Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) – and ZAPU's armed wing, the Zimbabwe 
People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) -- under Joshua Nkomo in fighting against Ian Smith's 
Rhodesian settler regime.
131
 This spurred Vorster to prepare for anticipated regional conflicts 
and to institute proactive, pre-emptive strategies. South Africa was also trying to shore up 
white colonial regimes in Portuguese-ruled Angola and Mozambique as well as Rhodesia in 
their respective counter-insurgencies against African nationalist movements.
132
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When the Portuguese finally decolonised their Southern African 'overseas provinces' of 
Mozambique and Angola in 1974 and 1975 respectively, Pretoria began shifting its regional 
strategy. Its 'Outward Looking' diplomacy was not reaping major overt political 
breakthroughs in the continent at large.
133
 In Southern Africa, Pretoria was having only 
limited success at best in persuasively engaging states to accept apartheid. Hence, it began to 
increasingly rely on more coercive political, diplomatic and military means to achieve these 
objectives. Not that elements of its 'Outward Looking' diplomacy were abandoned altogether 
as aspects of this strategy would be employed tactically in a dual approach to arriving at 
accommodations aimed at denying sanctuary to liberation movements. Destabilisation 
directed toward covert military support to dissident movements against incumbent regimes in 
states to foment civil wars could be employed as pressure to arrive at peace settlements of 
which the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique became a signature 
example.
134
 
During the Vorster period, the SADF made its first military incursions into Angola in 1974 to 
assist Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in confronting Augustino Neto's MPLA during their post-
independence power struggle. This Angolan civil war attracted other global players as the 
frontiers of the cold war were shifting from Indo-China to Africa.
135
 The moment of panic 
had begun. Vorster did not succeed in negotiating a truce with Zambian President Kenneth 
Kaunda, a staunch supporter of the ANC. Zambia had openly welcomed the exiled ANC on 
its soil with a potential of receiving more financial and military assistance from other parts of 
the world. On the other hand, President Kaunda also gave strong backing to efforts at finding 
negotiated settlements to conflicts between the region's white minority regimes and liberation 
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movements.
136
 Nevertheless, as Lusaka emerged as a major outpost for the ANC and other 
movements, Pretoria began to escalate its regional destabilisation offensive against states, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe – once it achieved independence in 1980 – included. The Minister of 
Defence at the time, and subsequent Prime Minister, P. W. Botha took over when Vorster 
was forced to step down because of corruption allegations emerging out of 'Infogate', the 
information scandal which, indeed, was a reflection on Pretoria's defensive diplomacy to buy 
acceptance of its apartheid policies.
137
 
The twelve years of P. W. Botha accelerated South Africa's aggressive regional policy. As 
former Defence Minister, Botha aka 'Pete the Gun,' joined government in 1978 to implement 
the Defence White paper that he had had a leading role in writing. It was called the Total 
National Strategy of 1977. This defence document argued that "The mobilisation of 
economic, political, and psycho-social resources, as well as military resources, was necessary 
to defend and advance the interests of South Africa at the internal and regional levels.
138
" 
Perceiving South Africa to be under a 'total onslaught' by 'Soviet expansionism,' what was 
required of South Africa was a 'total strategy' of integrated internal and external 
dimensions.
139
 On assuming the premiership, the Botha regime instituted both domestic 
reforms to the apartheid political edifice wherein he became 'State President' over a white-
dominated 'tricameral' system of white-coloured-Asian parliaments complemented by the 
Bantustans and a still to be worked out arrangement for 'urban blacks' while installing a 
'National Security Management System' (NSMS) presided over by a State Security Council 
(SSC).
140
 
                                                          
136
 Ibid. 29-31. 
137
 Davenport, T. Op. cit. 435. 
138
 Davies, R. "South African Regional Policy Before and After Cuito Cuanavale." Moss and Obery. 1989. 
139
 Ibid. 
140
 Ibid. 
 74 
The SSC coordinated both external destabilisation in states as well as internal repression 
against a gathering momentum of black resistance post-1976. However, the survival of the 
apartheid status-quo also dictated a diplomatic negotiations tact. Hence, the Botha regimes' 
orchestration of the Rhodesia-to-Zimbabwe transition between 1976 and the Lancaster House 
agreement in 1980 where Botha forced Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front UDI regime (and its 
puppet 'Zimbabwe Rhodesia' rendition) to negotiate itself out of power,
141
 thereby facilitating 
the emergence of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front majority-ruled 
regime led by Robert Mugabe; a development that made Mugabe the de facto leader of the 
Southern African Front-Line States (FLS).
142
 Pretoria also attempted to counteract with its 
own counter-alignment of compliant states. The Botha regime confronted a united Southern 
Africa led by Zimbabwe under the 1979-established Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC). 
SADCC was established as an "economic liberation" vehicle in the region to foster: a) 
regional economic cooperation and a lessening of economic dependence on South Africa; and 
b) the mobilising of a united African regional voice to rally global support against South 
Africa. While Botha wasted no time in effecting a militarising destabilisation response to the 
FLS/SADCC, he coupled this with a political counter-concept as well: his notion of a 
'Constellation of Southern African States' as a development cooperation elaboration of SACU 
and the fictionally 'independent' Bantustans backed up by a Development Bank of Southern 
Africa (DBSA). Thus, the new structure of antagonistic inter-state relations in Southern 
Africa became characterised by the Harare-led FLS/SADCC versus the Pretoria-led 
Constellation of Southern African States.
143
 What featured most prominently, however, was 
Pretoria's coercive diplomacy. These included direct military interventions and 'proxy wars' 
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aimed, especially, against Mozambique, Angola, and Lesotho: Renamo against the Frelimo 
regime in Mozambique; UNITA against the MPLA government in Angola; and economic 
pressure on Lesotho propelling it into an era of unstable regimes in the Kingdom.
144
 In this 
regard, the sudden end of the cold war had a direct impact on South Africa and Southern 
African politics, particularly in conflicts in countries like Mozambique and Angola. As the 
cold war's ending began giving way to democratic transitions across the globe in 1989, P. W. 
Botha was manoeuvred out in of F.W. de Klerk within the ruling NP as negotiations over 
Namibia led to South Africa's withdrawal of troops from both Angola and Namibia and to the 
latter's independence.
145
 The internal political dynamics within the NP that led to the change 
of power from Botha to de Klerk coincided with secret negotiations begun several years 
earlier with the ANC in exile and with Mandela on Robben Island. 
With these events, South Africa entered into its transition from apartheid to democracy 
which, in turn, began laying the foundations for a new relationship that would emerge 
between South Africa and its in the region and farther afield in the rest of Africa.
146
 When F. 
W. de Klerk took over as the leader of both the NP and government in 1989, the Berlin Wall 
had fallen. It was within this context of international support in overcoming political 
oppression that the NP leadership realised that there was an urgent need for a peaceful 
resolution to the racial conflict. Behind de Klerk's move was fear that anti- apartheid forces at 
home and abroad were gaining irreversible momentum in strength, credibility and support as 
the South African economy was beginning to feel the impact of international sanctions, 
disinvestment and isolation. South Africa had become completely isolated as a pariah state 
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globally.
147
 Indeed, the country was literally coming to a halt due to internal unrest directed at 
the government and aimed at making the country ungovernable. Where the externally-based 
exiled liberation movements were unable to gain the same degree of momentum in South 
Africa that their counterparts had achieved in Zimbabwe, the internal resistance led by the 
ANC-allied United Democratic Front (UDF) managed to place the white government under 
sustained siege. This was achieved through the assistance of a plethora of anti-apartheid civil 
society forces such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), students' 
organisations and other civil movements. The use of force was no longer feasible against this 
momentum interacting with the white regime's increasing international isolation. Isolation 
was reinforced by the collapse of communism, robbing the ruling Nationalists of their main 
ideological raison d'être, the 'Total Onslaught' of Soviet 'expansionism' in Southern Africa. 
As articulated by de Klerk: 
[T]he first few months of my presidency coincided with the disintegration of 
Communism in Eastern Europe which reached its historic climax with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in November 1989. Within the scope of a few months, one of our main 
strategic concerns for decades – the Soviet Union's role in Southern Africa and its 
strong influence on the ANC and SACP – had all but disappeared. A window had 
suddenly opened which created an opportunity for a much more adventurous 
approach than had previously been conceivable.
148
 
3.6 The Post-Apartheid Era 
Effectively, the transition to a post-apartheid South African foreign policy and an end to 
South Africa's isolation in the rest of Africa is ushered in with de Klerk's 1990 unbanning of 
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the liberation movements and the stepping onto the political stage of the movement's leaders 
as they were set free from Robben Island and/or returned from exile. Officially, this era gets 
under way with the electoral transition to democracy in 1994, which continues to transition 
toward a post-apartheid foreign policy under the Government of National Unity. This 
complicated process required the inter-meshing of what had been two diametrically opposed 
foreign policy political traditions. Firstly a defensive strategy informed by an anti-
communist, pro-Western agenda of containing African nationalism and 'third world 
revolution' accompanied by coercive overt and covert pressures on states and complemented 
by a private sector anti-sanctions campaign directed at counteracting South Africa's isolation 
via such institutions as the South Africa Foundation. The liberation counter to this strategy 
involving an alignment with the Soviet bloc, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement 
complimented by a broad anti-apartheid campaign aimed at promoting sanctions against 
South Africa along with its international isolation. 
Moreover, whereas, the apartheid regime and South Africa's private sector were avowedly 
pro-Western and Eurocentric in outlook, the ANC, PAC, SACP and black consciousness 
tendencies reflected foreign policy commitments informed by an anti-imperialist posture that 
was highly critical of the West if not anti-Western in actuality. Yet, the moral high ground 
occupied by what had become a global anti-apartheid campaign gave the liberation 
movements and their leaderships an international political legitimacy and entre in foreign 
capitals the world-over that was denied the apartheid government. Yet the 'apartheid regime' 
enjoyed the capacity of an entrenched diplomatic bureaucracy that awaited the new regime-
to-be. 
In terms of South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa, the early post-1994 period could 
be likened to one of trial and error. As the Mandela administration sought to find its footing 
in dealing with a continent where heads-of-state and government tended to self-protectively 
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close-ranks behind one another in instances where an OAU member state found itself the 
target of international pressure and criticism. This was on full display in President Mandela's 
experience of being brought up short in his public attacks on the brutal military regime of 
Sani Abacha in Nigeria, creating a 'lesson learned' that would be stored away by Deputy 
President Mbeki as a guide to his post-Mandela diplomatic forays in the continent and 
especially in Southern Africa. At the same time, however, South Africa's 'miracle' status and 
iconic leadership personified by Mandela gave it the political capital and international 
backing to increasingly assume a leadership role. Specifically in advancing a conflict 
resolution agenda on the continent, especially in the Great Lakes, starting with its diplomatic 
initiative aimed at easing out Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire's transition to becoming the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). South Africa's transition heightened international 
expectations of its leadership potential on the continent, especially in the West. 
Conversely, these very expectations generated suspicions and uneasiness among Africans on 
the continent, especially in Southern Africa where the former Front-Lines States would have 
to adjust to a new South Africa that would still remain the overwhelmingly dominant force in 
the region. This ambivalence was underlined in the case of South Africa's military 
intervention in Lesotho and the tug-of-war between Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe 
over the structural terms of reference of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation (OPDSC), within SADCC's successor, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). It was against this background that Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki 
would fashion an African Renaissance strategy that would enshrine South Africa's continental 
leadership in conflict resolution within a broader African developmental agenda in which 
peace and security became acknowledged as a precondition to the continent's development 
under the terms of a new 'partnership' strategy that came to reside in the New Partnership for 
Africa's Development. This evolution of Tshwane-Pretoria's Africa policy under Mbeki 
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would form the backdrop of South Africa's difficult and protracted settlement diplomacy 
conflict resolution initiatives in Burundi, the DRC, and in Zimbabwe. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In summary, the post-apartheid era in South African diplomacy can be differentiated between 
a transitional phase overlapping the effective end of the 'republican era' in 1990 and the 
emergence of what might be defined as the contemporary 'African Renaissance era' of 
African Agenda promotion. Hence, the forgoing should be approached from the vantage point 
of setting the historical backdrop for exploring the case studies that follow in the remaining 
chapters of this thesis. In exploring this historical background, what this chapter has sought to 
establish is a context for distinguishing aspects of 'continuity and change' in South Africa's 
foreign relations spanning those periods of rule under white minority regimes and those 
regimes under African majority-rule. Whereas the periods under white rule – 
'Commonwealth' and 'republican' – shared a basic commonality of commitment to defending 
the interests of 'Western civilization' in Africa, they differed in the challenges they had to 
face. The 'republican' period of Afrikaner nationalist dominance, in the Commonwealth and 
the early UN, had to increasingly respond to the dual pressures of African nationalism and the 
Cold War ideological struggle of US/Western-Soviet bloc competition, aligning the country 
in the anti-communist Western camp. The gathering momentum of African nationalism in the 
early 1960s forced an end to the 'Commonwealth era' as the Commonwealth became one 
more arena of opposition to apartheid driving South Africa into isolation. 
While successive apartheid regimes, especially under Vorster and Botha, tried to 
accommodate post-independent Africa with 'outward looking' and 'constellation' strategies 
aimed at leveraging the Republic's economic might as an enticement for engagement with 
states in Southern Africa and farther afield, these attempts only encouraged counter-
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mobilisations against such enticements of dependency in efforts to lessen dependence on 
South Africa. Independent African states would, under no circumstances, subordinate 
themselves voluntarily under a white-dominated South African system. The post-apartheid 
democratic transition beginning in 1990, formally installed in 1994, marked a sharp 
discontinuity in South Africa's diplomacy overall and relationship with the rest of Africa. The 
post-apartheid foreign policy era that began taking shape in earnest during the Mandela years 
reflected much of the initial international euphoric optimism and wishful thinking attached to 
South Africa. A country that was emerging as Africa's 'natural leader' embodying a human 
rights foreign policy grounded in its moral example as a 'Rainbow Nation' accompanied by 
universal engagement with North and South alike as well as with the West and the former 
communist bloc. The early Mandela foreign policy reflected an almost naïve idealism based 
on South Africa's experience of negotiated change and reconciliation as an exportable 
commodity. 
But beneath the surface of this idealism a tug-of-war was being waged at the bureaucratic 
level of the Department of Foreign Affairs now DIRCO. This cold battle was between the 
pro-Western biases of the 'republican era' (and outside government, the 'Commonwealth era' 
residing in elements of the English-speaking business community tied to Anglo-American 
institutions in Britain and the US) and the decidedly anti-imperialist proclivities of the 
liberation movement-turned ruling party. South Africa's early post-apartheid foreign policy 
under Mandela, therefore, was something of a hybrid. However, as Deputy President, Thabo 
Mbeki began to systematically recast this hybrid into an increasingly more Afro-centric, pro-
South expression of South Africa's identity as an African power situated in the global South 
while endeavouring to act as a 'bridging' power between North and South in advancing, not 
just South Africa's agenda, but the continent's agenda as well. With Africa as the centrepiece 
of South Africa's foreign policy, the Mbeki period of the post-apartheid foreign policy era can 
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aptly be described as the ushering in of the 'African Renaissance' with its revisionist focus on 
recasting the inter-African system. 
As radical a break with the past as the Mandela and especially the Mbeki periods appear to be 
in historical terms, there has nevertheless remained one constant of continuity within these 
changes that remains a dilemma for South Africa: its ambivalent relations with its and the rest 
of the continent defined by its overwhelming economic power and industrial might. Under 
the white regimes of the 'Commonwealth' and 'republican' eras, this ambivalence was of a 
polarising magnitude due to the white supremacist racial challenge presented by a rich white-
rule industrial power on an African continent populated by poor, underdeveloped and weak 
states. Yet the fact that South Africa made its much fought for transition to black rule did not 
end this ambivalence. It muted it into lower level expressions of envy, resistance and 
suspicion concerning how the new South Africa's power would be used and became an 
inhibiting bone of contention aimed at blunting South Africa's leadership. South Africa's 
leaders became obsessed with not allowing the country to come across as the hegemony of 
the region and the continent. It is this continuity of ambivalence interacting with the change 
from white to black rule that informs the comparative analysis of how South Africa has 
interacted with the rest of the continent in the experiences of engagement in Lesotho, the 
DRC, Burundi and Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
LEARNING TO LEAD: SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION IN 
LESOTHO IN 1998 AS A CASE STUDY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
South Africa entered the second decade of its freedom with much vigour to rebuild and 
strengthen its relation with countries in the Southern Africa sub-region. The first fourteen 
years of South Africa's freedom from colonialism and apartheid, 1994 - 2008 witnessed a 
profound transformation of its own domestic policy. The defining features of this remarkable 
transformation were the anchoring of democratic norms, institutions, and organisational 
processes, policies and practices.
149
 The greatest challenge for post-apartheid South Africa, 
however, was how best to effectively engage and work collectively with others towards the 
integration of the Southern African sub-region. This task required the reformulation of an 
unambiguous regional foreign policy. In other words, South Africa realised that for it to be 
accepted in a, where it once played the role of a 'bully', it had to categorically reject regional 
hegemonic ambitions.
150
 Using various regional platforms, South Africa maintained that it 
would rely on the collective leadership approach to matters concerning the region. Given its 
relative economic strength, Pretoria was however conscious that it would need to contribute 
'more' in terms of resources to the achievement of regional peace and security.
151
 Throughout 
the first fourteen years under Mandela and Mbeki, there were often tensions between the 
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expected national role conceptions defined by foreign policymakers and the international 
community expected role the country should play in Africa. To borrow from Psychological 
concepts: South Africa had a 'canned role', meaning that while SADC expected non 
hegemonic and responses. South Africa, at times, wanted to drive its goals through their 
leadership - representing an internalised role on their part. This 'canned role' approach created 
paradoxical outcomes. Nevertheless, South Africa continuously assured its immediate about 
its honourable intentions to seek solutions that would be mutually beneficial for itself and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
A similar example can be found in the nature and character of regional schemes such as 
SADC. Although necessary, they are generally not harmonious, and are often fraught with 
power politics. This further complicated their relationship building ability, making it difficult 
to create trust between and among member states. This is particularly true in a region where 
one country is viewed as an 'outsider' or is physically isolated in terms of its political, 
economic, and social environment. The governing party, the African National Congress 
(ANC), describes South Africa's position within the broader African continent in the 
following way: 
The ANC has correctly placed the African continent very high in its international policy and 
international relations. Such a priority is informed by the following considerations: 
I. The fact that South Africa is part of the African continent, and that its 
economic development is linked to what happens on the continent as a whole; 
II. The fact that South Africa has an important role to play in the economic and 
political revival of the continent; 
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III. The fact that the economic development of the African continent as a whole 
will be a significant step in overcoming the North-South divide.152 
4.2 The Background of the Lesotho Intervention 
The following historical overview sets the scene for a more detailed account and analysis of 
apartheid South Africa's regional foreign policy approach towards the Southern African sub-
region, paying particular attention to its engagement with neighbouring Lesotho. South 
Africa has always been at the heart of the evolution of Southern Africa's modern state and 
capitalist systems. These processes were, of course, more advantageous to South Africa. To 
fully understand South Africa's role(s) within the development of the Southern Africa sub-
region, one has to locate it within the development of capitalism and colonialism in Southern 
Africa. In this way, South Africa played different roles in Southern Africa throughout its 
history. These roles were not necessary all negative. They varied with each stage of the 
region's development. South Africa's role in the region, therefore, cannot be understood in 
vacuity. It was a role largely informed and influenced by global political and economic 
environments. South Africa's elites during the colonial and apartheid era used the country's 
economic advantages vis-à-vis its as a major source of their hegemonic ambitions. It is within 
this context that the post-apartheid South Africa rejected any form of hegemonic designs in 
its interactions with the region.
153
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4.3 South Africa's Lesotho Intervention 
Lesotho is uniquely located within South Africa's geographical setting. It is a landlocked 
country surrounded by South Africa on all sides. The history between these two countries has 
produced one of the greatest dependent interstate relationships in international relations.
154
 In 
1998, junior military officers were on the verge of assuming political power in Lesotho's 
capital, Maseru in an unconstitutional manner. South Africa intervened under the banner of 
SADC alongside Botswana to prevent the coup from occurring.
155
 Upon their arrival in 
Lesotho, South Africa's troops expected little resistance. Instead, Basotho junior troops 
opened fire from a strategic position in defiance of the South African-led SADC intervention. 
This resulted in scores of unnecessary deaths and massive destruction of property and public 
infrastructure.
156
 
The crisis in Lesotho started in the early 1990s. Much of the challenges faced by this tiny 
country emanated from its extreme poverty and a lack of an industrial base. It had always 
depended on South Africa as it has no any other neighbour. Thirteen per cent of Lesotho's 
land is arable and the rest remains mountainous. There is a rich history between the two 
countries.
157
 Cultural links between the Basotho people in South Africa and those in Lesotho 
run deep. They share the same language and cultural royalty and their interactions have been 
active regardless of the colonial and apartheid drawn geographical separation. Ever since 
Lesotho attained independence from Britain, apartheid leaders have wanted to incorporate it 
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into South Africa. These hegemonic aims failed as the Basotho people defended their right to 
sovereignty.
158
 
4.4 Post-Apartheid South Africa Relations with Lesotho 
Lesotho falls within Pretoria's foreign policy strategy and priorities in the region. When 
South Africa was undergoing its transition, Lesotho was experiencing its own political 
upheavals. There was a serious constitutional crisis surrounding the role and functions of the 
monarchy. Into the political vortex created by this crisis were drawn the military and the 
political parties creating a generalised ungovernable environment.
159
 Moreover, the Lesotho 
crisis was unfolding against a regional backdrop of major migratory flows of professionals 
and industries from SADC countries to South Africa.
160
 This 'de-industrialising' trend was 
denying poor countries such as Lesotho access to capital, skilled and, indeed, financial 
investments. Coupled with the downturn in the global economy at the time, the Lesotho state 
was increasingly incapable of creating sufficient jobs to alleviate poverty. While South Africa 
was celebrating the birth of a new democracy and rejoining the international community, 
Lesotho was on the brink of falling apart.
161
 
In this environment, King Letsie III staged what became known as a 'royal coup.' This event 
was caused by the military demanding a pay rise while making a bid for power. A petition 
had also been signed by the opposition in cooperation with the monarch calling for the 
restoration of King Moshoeshoe II to the throne and a convening of a National Dialogue 
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conference to forge a national consensus on numerous of issues affecting the government, 
opposition and civil society.
162
 However, the government of Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle 
failed to respond to these demands. Consequently, the King dissolved the government and 
instituted a provisional government on August 17, 1997.
163
 As can be expected, the entire 
country was thrown into serious political instability characterised by major civil unrest and 
matching use of military force to quell the dissent, resulting in at least five deaths. In 
response, local civil society groups banged together to form an 'Alliance for Democracy', and 
held a national strike for two days from August 22, and another three-day strike from 7 
September.
164
 
Attempts to contain the situation led to intervention by the then South African Foreign 
Minister Pik Botha, who flew to the Lesotho capital Maseru to hold a series of talks with the 
government, the opposition, and the two-army factions, respectively. South Africa's concerns 
were later communicated to countries Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and 
Swaziland and to the various multilateral bodies; the UN, OAU, and Commonwealth. Upon 
South African appeals, the UN and the Commonwealth dispatched envoys to Maseru. These 
missions, according to Nthakeng Selinyane, were pursued on grounds that any 
unconstitutional change of government would not be countenanced.
165
 
Subsequently, under SADC auspices, South African President Nelson Mandela and his 
Zimbabwean and Botswana counterparts; Robert Mugabe and Quette Masire banded together 
to form what later became dubbed as the 'SADC Troika' to assuage tensions and oversee the 
development of the Mountain Kingdom. Their main aim was to deal with the three major 
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political constituencies in the kingdom, namely the monarchy, the political parties and the 
military. After some arm-twisting and horse-trading the then Director General of Foreign 
Affairs of South Africa, Rusty Evans was able to secure an agreement on the restoration of 
the government. Pretoria's resolve on peaceful negotiation to the constitutional crisis was 
therefore able to prevent a military intervention, which was reportedly favoured by President 
Mugabe and Lesotho's Prime Minister Mokhehle.
166
 
The eight-point memorandum thus made the 'troika' guarantors of the agreement, which in 
turn gave them authorization to intervene in the country's internal affairs, and therefore 
"effectively reduced the country to a trustee state". However, Selinyane maintains that there 
was an implicit understanding that "such intervention could be subject to the initiative and 
permission of the government
167
". 
For Pretoria, the pursuit of a multilateral approach in dealing with Lesotho's constitutional 
crisis was critical in allaying fears of South African regional hegemony and unilateralism, a 
perception that was a major concern of Pretoria. Between 1995 and 1997, the 'Troika' dealt 
with a host of political issues. These ranged from the powers of the monarchy and the 
military to the need for fresh elections to be held in Lesotho.
168
 Throughout this entire 
process, Pretoria remained committed to the finding lasting solutions to the crisis in Lesotho 
and to these ends South Africa facilitated numerous internal peace talks among the Basotho. 
Notwithstanding all its diplomatic efforts, critics of Pretoria's foreign policy argue that the 
'Quiet Diplomacy' in Lesotho produced only limited dividends. 
In August 1998, Lesotho found itself in the midst of a second constitutional crisis, following 
cries by indignant opposition allies for the High Court to declare the May elections results 
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null and void and dismiss the government. This would subsequently culminate on the 10 
August, after a weeklong protests and vigil outside the royal palace, with a stranglehold of 
the capital by allied opposition parties forcibly closing down government offices and 
impounding government vehicles.
169
 As a consequence, South Africa sent a mediation 
delegation led by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, accompanied by Foreign Affairs 
Minister Alfred Nzo and Defence Minister, Joe Modise to engage with representatives from 
both government and opposition.
170
 An agreement was subsequently reached, calling for the 
formation of a commission to investigate the legitimacy of the election results and the 
authenticity of opposition claims that the elections had been rigged. The commission was to 
be chaired by South African Justice Pius Langa and its members drawn from the Troika of 
guarantors of the 1994 agreement.
171
 
The Commission, however, was not as effective, as was initially intended and thus 
"proceeded at a painstakingly slow pace", which caused delays in the submission of the final 
report. The delays of Justice Langa's controversial findings fuelled unrest in the Kingdom, 
which culminated in small-scale armed conflicts between the supporters of the belligerent 
parties leading to deaths and injuries.
172
 This also fed into suspicions that South Africa's 
Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki (the main negotiator) was doctoring the report in of the 
government. There was a major contestation concerning the prolonged period before the 
report's release. The main reason given for this delay was that the report needed to be 
presented to the SADC leadership before it could be given legitimacy and endorsement. 
In the interim, the opposition parties went on a crusade of destabilising the government and 
rendering the country ungovernable. In pursuit of these objectives, the opposition instigated 
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'stay away' campaigns, resorting to terrorism, vandalism, road blockades and looting as a 
means to these ends. Compounding the situation was the series of violent confrontations in 
the capital between the armed youth gangs from both sides of warring parties, which led to 
the loss of lives and caused damage to property. The army's failure to curb the escalating 
instability only proved to make matters worse, as it presented the contending political elites 
the opportunity to manipulate the situation to further their political objectives.
173
 
When the Langa report was finally released on September 17, it rejected the opposition's 
reputed view that the elections were fraudulent. It however, did, point to anomalies that had 
occurred in the run up to the elections. But it emphasised that they did not sufficiently 
necessitate an electoral re-run. According to the report, the elections represented the "will of 
the people", stating that: 
We are unable to state that the validity of the elections has been conclusively 
established. We point out, however, that some of the apparent irregularities and 
discrepancies are sufficiently serious concerns. We cannot, however, postulate that 
the result does not reflect the will of the Lesotho electorate. We merely point out that 
the means for checking this have been compromised and have created much room for 
doubt.
174
 
The ambiguity of the report's findings therefore failed, as argued by Matlosa, to "give the 
electoral process a clean bill of health, but at the same time not making a definitive case for 
the opposition parties
175
". Matlosa further argues that the "Langa Commission thus played an 
insignificant role as a conflict management tool for its outcome did not bring the parties 
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together to some mutually acceptable political settlement
176
". Consequently, the report only 
served as an impetus to the escalation of conflict and opened the floodgates to anarchy. The 
military and opposition parties openly challenged the authority of the government, thereby 
rendering it ineffective. Junior military officials arrested their seniors and it was increasingly 
becoming clear that the Basotho police had lost control of the situation, and thus provided 
clear signals that a coup was in the making.
177
 
This led to Prime Minister Mosisili calling for help from fellow SADC members to stop the 
unconstitutional political power take-over in Lesotho. The SADC's response to Lesotho's 
constitutional crisis was propelled by the urgency in the Prime Minister's request that 
expressed in a letter as follows: 
The most serious tragedy is that the police, and in particular the army, are at best, 
spectators. The mutiny in the LDF (Lesotho Defence Force) is taking root. The 
brigadier who has been forced to be commander, has had to go into hiding because the 
mutineers have attempted forcing him to announce a coup. He has so far refused and 
fears for his life. In this instance, we have a coup on our hands (Author's emphasis). 
Concerns of a looming civil war invoked Article 5, section 2 (ib) of SADC's draft protocol on 
PDS, which states that "one of the intra-state conflicts that could warrant a regional 
intervention is a threat to the legitimate authority of the government (such as a military coup 
by the armed or para-military forces)
178
". The need to intervene by SADC was also informed 
by the 1994 Agreement, which made the 'Troika' the guarantors of peace and stability in 
Lesotho. Article 1 of the Memorandum states that "the guarantors commit themselves to 
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remain directly involved in this understanding, and shall take all necessary measures to 
oversee the process to its successful implementation
179
". 
On this basis, on September 22 1998, South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
deployed 600 troops in Lesotho. The main objectives of this mission "were to prevent a 
military coup, to disarm the mutineers and to create a safe and stable environment for the 
diplomatic initiatives to find a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Lesotho
180
". They 
were backed by another 200 troops from the Botswana National Defence Force (BNDF), 
forming a SADC mission. The main targeted areas were the Makoanyane and Ratjomose 
barracks in Maseru, the royal palace and the Katse Dam. In a matter of hours, the capital 
Maseru was reduced to a ghost town, a result of massive looting and arson. 
The situation quickly spread to the neighbouring towns in the south; Mafeteng and Mohale's 
Hoek also falling prey to the 'raids'. Although this mission was Pretoria's first direct 
intervention in SADC militarily to deal with conflicts, it raised eyebrows, with Pretoria being 
severely criticised for using massive force instead of the usual diplomatic channels and that a 
military solution was easily opted for before all avenues to finding a negotiated settlement 
had been exhausted. For many, the operation was reminiscent of apartheid South Africa's 
'destabilisation' policy in the region and did not in any way "reflect an approach that elevates 
persuasion, conciliation, and nonviolent coercion above the use of force
181
". 
Moreover, the operation was seen as a failure because the troops of the SANDF had 
"inadequate intelligence, orders and objective, with the result that angry protestors were not 
prevented from burning down South African-related and government buildings in the capital 
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Maseru
182
". Some contended that this operation was taken without the UN approval. Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter states that no enforcement action can be undertaken by regional 
bodies, such as SADC, without prior approval by the UN Security Council. Accordingly, 
South Africa, Botswana and SADC failed to obtain prior authorization from the UN Security 
Council as required in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
183
 
The South African government dismissed these claims, however, insisting that the 
intervention in Lesotho did not constitute an invasion. Rather, that the intervention was 
justified in that it was carried out under the auspices of SADC on request by Lesotho's Prime 
Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, and that such actions were mandated by the Agreement of 1994 
and that all attempts at peacefully resolving the dispute had failed and therefore military 
intervention was opted for as a last resort.
184
 
Most importantly, however, one can argue that this operation seems to have changed the way 
South Africa was perceived on the continent. One of the reasons behind this was the SADC 
response which saw this operation as an "apartheid-style military adventurism aimed at 
serving South Africa's economic interests", which includes securing the US$4 billion Katse 
Dam Project constructed to supply water to the industrial heartland of South Africa.
185
 
Pretoria's intervention in this relatively poor country gave credence to perceptions that South 
Africa seeks to play the role of regional hegemony, thereby fuelling the possibility of 
isolation within the continent. However, for Pretoria, the developments in Lesotho were of 
great significance and not merely the actions of a "bully" exerting its dominance on a 
defenceless neighbour for furthering its aims of regional hegemony and economic interests. 
                                                          
182
 "South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa." Conference Proceedings. Ed. R. 
Southall. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006. 21. 
183
 Cilliers, J. "Lesotho Intervention Wasn't Strictly Legal." The Sunday Independent, 4 October 1998. 11. 
184
 Neethling, T. Op. cit. 
185
 Loc. cit.  
 94 
Instead, the Lesotho crisis and subsequent intervention constituted a milestone in South 
Africa's foreign policy. Not only was this the first time the post-apartheid government ever 
deployed troops on foreign soil in a conflict situation, but also that it imparted very important 
lessons for future engagements and interventions within the SADC sub-region and the greater 
continent. 
The importance of the Lesotho crisis in the evolution of South Africa's policy towards 
regional conflict and its management can best be appreciated in Pretoria's involvement in the 
Basotho Kingdom in the post-conflict period. Post-intervention, South Africa showed its 
resolve to promote constitutionalism in Lesotho as the guarantor of peace and security. 
4.5 The Promotion of Constitutionalism in Lesotho 
For South Africa, the military coup in Lesotho was viewed as being located right on its 
doorstep, not only threatening peace and stability at home but for the entire Southern Africa 
region. This was the major basis on which military intervention was pursued and justified. 
However, the Lesotho intervention, as controversial as it was, ironically produced one of the 
most successful examples of South Africa's diplomacy tactic in the region and in the 
continent. Initially, Pretoria entered into an intensive and inclusive Lesotho political dialogue. 
This brought on board the majority of the stakeholders into the negotiations, enabling a much 
needed overhaul of Lesotho's constitution and electoral laws. Subsequently, South Africa 
embarked on delivering financial assistance to Lesotho's development. 
Although South Africa undoubtedly lacked diplomatic tact initially, it later managed to 
achieve credibility and legitimacy as a regional custodian of peace and security in spite of the 
sham of diplomatic military intervention. What scholars of South Africa's foreign policy 
often ignore are many examples of skilful diplomatic missions that Pretoria pursued to bring 
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peace and security in Lesotho. There were many South African negotiators, mediators, 
election experts and technical specialist teams assigned to Lesotho by the Mandela 
government. Chief among these were Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, the Minister of Safety 
and Security, Sydney Mufamadi, experts in civil society and constitutional gurus. 
The first move by South African diplomats in Lesotho's peace process was to ensure that the 
Basotho agreed on the formation of an Interim Political Authority (IPA). According to 
Thomas Mathoma: 
The IPA is a compromise agreement in that the ruling Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD) agreed to the holding of fresh elections within 18 months, while 
the opposition alliance recognised the legitimacy of the LCD government in the 
period leading to new elections. The IPA is made up of two members from each of the 
12 political parties in Lesotho. Its primary purpose is to ensure the holding of free and 
fair elections in Lesotho by creating and promoting conducive conditions band 
levelling the political playing field.
186
 
Pretoria's diplomacy in Lesotho accelerated the moment the Basotho agreed to the IPA. The 
relevant stakeholders in the peace process took yet another bold step to rewrite their 
constitution with a special focus on changing certain aspects of the electoral laws. Lesotho's 
electoral processes and systems were inherited from their colonial power Britain at 
Independence in 1966. The 'winner takes all' system prevailed throughout elections in 1965, 
1970, 1990, 1993, and 1998. In all these elections losers claimed that the elections had been 
unfair.
187
 This was a major obstacle to stabilising Lesotho's democratic dispensation. South 
Africa's Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi chaired the negotiations. 
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Various changes were made to the electoral laws. Members of the IPA agreed to create space 
for smaller political parties in Parliament, including the Senate. A system of proportional 
representation quite close to South Africa's electoral laws was instituted. The other 
fundamental agreement reached was on elections management. An Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) was formed. These electoral reforms became a strong factor in facilitating 
confidence building and trust in Lesotho's body politic.
188
 
The third phase of South Africa's Lesotho strategy was to financially underwrite the cost of 
the peace process as well as campaign for the international community to assist the Mountain 
Kingdom. South Africa enhanced peace in Lesotho in three areas. First, it granted Lesotho 
aid and a loan to rebuild its infrastructure. Second, it encouraged the IMF and World Bank to 
lend Lesotho financial assistance on terms. This meant Pretoria became the guarantor of those 
loans. Third, South Africa encouraged global investments in Lesotho. 
In 2001, Lesotho went to the polls in what was considered by international observer teams as 
representing the will of the people. These elections were widely judged "free and fair." Peace 
had returned to Lesotho. The constitutional culture has been central in accommodating losers 
in the elections. These changes have extended freedoms to Basotho women and other sectors 
of society previously on the margins of politics in Lesotho. Today, Lesotho boasts a 
significant number of women in Parliament, civil society organisations and other important 
centres of power in their country. Lesotho has also benefited from the international 
community's support. 
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4.6 Lesotho and its Road to Economic Development 
The Gleneagles G8 Summit held in Great Britain in 2005 focused on poor African countries 
like Lesotho. Although the Basotho people deserve praise and admiration for the positive 
change they had achieved, it would be unfair and short sighted to discount and overlook the 
role Pretoria played in building a fledgling culture of constitutionalism in the kingdom. It was 
evident from the Lesotho crisis that the British electoral system and constitution were 
designed by the colonial power as a debilitating strategy. Especially given the pressures that 
the Apartheid regime had also exerted on the kingdom, which in turn exacerbated 
destabilising political polarisation. The system itself was inherently flawed. 
The inclusive nature of the new constitution written by global constitutional experts, 
including South Africans, managed to accommodate a broad sector of stakeholders in 
Lesotho. Traditional leaders, especially the monarchy, were given ceremonial powers in what 
became a constitutional monarchy. The military was retrained and kept under civil control, 
limiting their chance to mount coups. These changes were possible because South Africa was 
able and willing to underwrite the cost of peace, help secure loans for the country, invest in 
its institution-rebuilding while assisting state capacity to manage the new constitutional 
mandate, most importantly in the conducting run of national elections. 
Beyond its involvement in Lesotho's processes of the political transition and in the promotion 
of the rule of law and the establishment of institutions that buttress democracy, South Africa 
also made an undertaking to aid Lesotho in its reconstruction and development initiatives 
with the aims of securing a positive peace for the Basotho. To these ends, South Africa 
initiated talks that culminated in the establishment of a Joint Bilateral Commission for Co-
operation (JBCC) at the 2001 inauguration, which saw President Mbeki pledging to pull 
Lesotho out of its status of least developed countries in a space of five years. 
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Through the JBCC Pretoria was also able to reopened talks for the next phase of the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project, and laid the foundation for future engagement in the and 
commencement of Phase B of the project, which has since been concluded. In addition, the 
JBCC has also identified possible areas of co-operation in an Entrepreneurship Development 
Project, where the South African government has made a commitment to create an enabling 
environment for direct cooperation with the relevant institution in South Africa and also to 
provide expert advice on improving local cooperative capacity and capability.
189
 
With regard to capital, it was agreed that new financing schemes based on best practices are 
to be sought and put in place. As such, Pretoria will provide the necessary expertise within 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), including information and successful 
experiences in South Africa or concepts being pioneered. Furthermore, it was agreed that 
there was to be government-to-government facilitation and or promotion of collaboration 
between the DTI and MITM with respect to development financing for Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs). This would entail providing pertinent information regarding the 
experiences of the DTI in promoting SMEs including success stories that can motivate 
improvements in Lesotho. A possibility of collaboration with regard to the extension of SME 
financing into Lesotho, is also being considered.
190
 
Another area of possible engagement was the development of institutional support that made 
provision for the establishment of a marketing, Research and Development (R&D) institute in 
Lesotho to promote a marketing culture, sectoral product development and diversification and 
promotion of export capacities and capabilities. This led to an agreement to cooperate in 
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providing wholly or partially, funding of the required studies and provide provision in the 
institution to work for both countries but located in Lesotho.
191
 
The other project of cooperation between Maseru and Pretoria involved setting up the 
administration of Entrepreneurship and Industrial Development. This administration proposes 
the establishment of an umbrella organisation to oversee and coordinate this development. 
This was a necessary development in order to make the described three-pillar approach to 
work effectively in the long term. To these ends, South Africa provided expertise in the 
establishment of such organisation and assist with funding where necessary and appropriate. 
The facilitation of these projects was critical in assisting Lesotho in achieving its goals of 
poverty reduction and improvement of the trade balance through industrial and 
entrepreneurship development. 
The BNC has also led to the establishment of the Technology Innovation and Business Hub 
Project. Lesotho has a wide range of raw materials, which were either unexplored or exported 
without any value added. The Technology Business Hub was seen as a useful tool to process 
these raw materials for maximum benefit. 80% of the population relies on agriculture 
production, but the state of food processing and preservation is not encouraging due to low 
level of technological capability. Hence a need to establish Technology Business Hub and 
Entrepreneurship Centre to build a competitive food industry at all levels. Some of the 
intended benefits include: the establishment and manufacture products for local consumption 
and export; technological transfer and provision of funds for supporting local entrepreneurs 
residing in both urban and rural areas; and value will be added to locally available materials 
and business products will be provided for commercialization purposes.
192
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It has also been established that energy provision in adequate amounts and at an affordable 
price was central to the improved performance of important sectors of the economy, as well 
as upliftment of people's standard of living. Therefore the availability of energy supply 
options to rural communities for income-generating activities, remained a major challenge in 
the country. 
While regional cooperation in the energy sector already exists in prosperous petroleum 
(through SACU, the Southern African Custom Union, and electricity sectors ESKOM and 
SAPP, the Southern African Power Pool), bilateral cooperation between South Africa and 
Lesotho must remain on-going for much-needed electrification of neighbouring rural 
communities. In order to meet the national electrification target of 13% by the year 2010, it 
was estimated that an annual electrification budget of LSL52.5 million will be required.
193
 
Furthermore, the current developments in power sector reform clearly indicates that 
Government was still to play a major role in the electrifying the rural communities, an 
intensive rural electrification programme which involved various actors will only be possible, 
among others, within the framework of bilateral cooperation with South Africa. The long-
term objectives were: encourage economic development in the country; improve the 
livelihoods of people in the rural areas; foster economic development in the rural areas; and 
to reduce the urban population influx. 
Closely related was the establishment of the Joint Hydro-Power Development and 
Management Agreement. The hydropower potential of the country is estimated at 450MW. 
Even though there were various sites identified for hydropower development, only four mini-
hydro plants have been developed. In order to meet the growing electricity demand in both 
countries, Pretoria should consider Maseru for its future expansion of electricity. The 
government needs both financial and technical assistance for future Electricity Generation 
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Options by Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and the export market, (including the SAPP) 
and also the domestic market. The long-term goals of the project are to foster economic 
development in the country and aid access to regional electricity trade.
194
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated how South Africa's battled to bring peace and security in Lesotho. 
It became abundantly clear to South Africa's foreign policymakers that clearly articulated 
national conceptions such as leader, peacemaker, bridge builder and African partnership were 
difficult to be accepted by all in the Southern Africa region. South Africa was forced by 
circumstances on the ground in Lesotho to temporarily abandon peace negotiation in for a 
military intervention. The clearest lesson learned in Lesotho was that reliance on soft power 
without hard power was not sufficient to bring peace and security in Africa. The thesis now 
turns to its second case study (South Africa's interventions in Burundi and the DRC) in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTIONS IN THE GREAT LAKES 
REGION: THE CASE STUDIES OF BURUNDI AND THE DRC
195
 
 
"The Southern African region expects a positive contribution from South Africa in terms of 
their own development. They expect that we interact with them as a partner and ally not as a 
regional super power, so that what we achieve, in terms of political, security and economic 
relations, is balanced and mutually beneficial…" 
Thabo Mbeki
196
 
 
"In our current geopolitical terrain, we are confronted with the brutal coercion of unilateral 
force and subtle coercion of globalising co-optation. In these exchanges, "soft power" only 
seems weak. Our experience in South Africa, however, has taught us the "soft power" of 
recognising our diversity, negotiating through our difference, and imagining a common 
ground as no illusion that the resolution of our conflict in South Africa provides a model for 
the region, for Africa, or the world." 
Professor Kader Asmal
197
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5.1 Introduction 
The Great Lakes region has always been synonymous with phrases such as 'trouble spot', 
'flash point', and littered with dysfunctional and failed states. Burundi and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) present a classical example of crises coming to head in post-
colonial African states. The epicentre of the Great Lakes region's conflicts was Rwanda. In a 
dramatic twist of events, this low intensity ethnic conflict, led to an unprecedented genocide 
that claimed almost one million mainly Tutsi and moderate Hutu, in 1994.
198
 This event 
triggered a domino effect that ushered in unprecedented waves of interstate conflicts making 
the Great Lakes an exceptionally unstable and violent region. 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate, firstly the importance of South Africa's leadership role in 
Africa. It will argue that Pretoria played a significant leadership role in Burundi and the DRC 
peace processes. Although these countries battled to fully stabilise they nonetheless signed 
peace deals. The main task of the chapter therefore will be to provide an account of South 
Africa's diplomatic strategies of conflict resolution in Burundi and DRC peace processes. 
Secondly, the chapter will argue that what made Pretoria's diplomatic formula succeed where 
others failed in the Burundi and the DRC was its inclusive approach to African foreign 
diplomacy. The chapter will also show how Pretoria's post conflict state reconstruction 
strategy in Burundi and the DRC gained considerable support (albeit slowly), and 
guaranteeing sustainable peace. 
In Rwanda,
199
 Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) made considerable 
military gains in July 1994 that ended the genocidal state's rule. Rwanda's civil war, however 
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'continued extraterritorially
200
' into states. As is the case with bad anywhere in the world, 
their internal problems will often affect the. In the case of the Great Lakes region, the 
instability, and civil strife created Hobbes' state of anarchy, where life becomes 'short and 
brutal' and the strong and armed prey on the weak. 
Conflicts ignited in Burundi and the DRC. In many quarters, the war in the DRC was 
considered to be post-colonial Africa's 'First World War', which involved Angola, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda. South Africa refused to intervene alongside SADC 
members Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe that had come to the aid of the embattled Laurent 
Kabila's government.
201
 
At the time, Pretoria argued that it preferred diplomatic instead of military intervention as the 
best means to resolve the conflict in the DRC. When South Africa intervened in Lesotho in 
1998 (see the previous chapter), it was criticised for applying double standards, mainly by 
Zimbabwe.
202
 The cause of disagreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe on the war in 
the DRC revolved around the question of SADC's evolving security architecture and 
leadership. Scholars wanted to know at what point SADC could justify intervening militarily 
in the internal affairs of fellow member states. There were questions over what constitutes 
legitimate reason for intervention, and whether SADC interventions should protect the state 
sovereignty or its citizens. 
The major outcome of the civil war in the DRC was the division it caused among SADC 
members states. South Africa's calculated intentions to avoid direct involvement in the 
military caused major suspicions of its diplomatic motives and actions within SADC. The 
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charge levelled against Pretoria was that of advancing the interests of the western colonial 
and imperialist powers in the DRC.
203
 
As a result of the war in Burundi and the DRC, floods of refugee flowed into many countries 
far beyond the Great Lakes, with some reaching as far as the southern tip of Africa, Cape 
Town, South Africa.
204
 At the time, the western countries demonstrated a great deal of 
indifference; African leaders were in a state of confusion. They were both unprepared to deal 
with the situation as well as incapable of acting due to the UN and the OAU's principles of 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of a fellow member state. This was one of the worse 
moments of the postcolonial African international relations. Lake and Rothchild noted: 
The promise of the post-Cold War world is that the great powers, freed from the 
shackles of superpowers competition, can now intervene to mitigate ethnic conflicts 
by providing external guarantees of social order… [T]he paradox of the post-Cold 
War world, however, is in the absence of the bipolar competition that drove them into 
the far reaches of the globe, the United States and other powers now lack the political 
will necessary to make a sustainable commitment to this role.
205
 
The dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994 presented numerous expectations and 
opportunities for the prevention and resolution of conflicts on the African continent. These 
expectations were mainly based on the relative power (hard and soft) South Africa possessed 
in relation to the rest of the continent.
206
 The ANC-led government expressed in various 
policy documents that peace and security in Africa was its central foreign policy objective. 
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This newly found enthusiasm to abandon the apartheid regime's aggressive hegemonic in of 
building mutually beneficiary partnership with the rest of the African continent encouraged 
the international community that Pretoria would assume a responsible leadership role in 
Africa. For instance, the US made its expectations clear for Pretoria to play a pivotal role in 
Africa's conflict resolutions much earlier.
207
 
Vice President Al Gore, who led the US delegation to South Africa to celebrate Nelson 
Mandela's inauguration on May 10 1994, made a slight commotion. He asked Mandela, "Mr. 
President, will you intervene in Rwanda"? Gore was unaware that the microphone next to 
him was on. The dignitaries present on this occasion were surprised to hear how desperate the 
US was to ask this of Mandela, who had hardly spent a full month at the Union Buildings,
208
 
or familiarised himself with matters of state diplomacy. 
Patricia Daley describes peace as: 
An end of war, reconciliation and the establishment of civil order…. A peaceful 
society is presented as one in which conflict is resolved through debate and 
compromise and where the rule of law is effective, thus providing the conditions for 
stability.
209
 
5.2 South Africa: The Makings of an African Peacemaker 
President Thabo Mbeki devised a multi-pronged diplomatic strategy for conflict resolution in 
Burundi and the DRC that maintained peace through consensus building between internal and 
external stakeholders. Secondly, South Africa's foreign policymakers' fully understood the 
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limits of their country's power in Africa, and the world. Henceforth, they capitalised on the 
high moral statue of Nelson Mandela, and South Africa's transitional arrangements as the 
basis in which to end the old, 'zero-sum game', in the region.
210
 
South Africa's sustained involvements in these countries enabled various warlords to enjoy 
political space in their national polity. Thirdly, Pretoria managed to win the confidence of 
Africa as well as the developed western powers.
211
 
In doing all of these things, South Africa's policymakers played a bridge - builder role that 
enabled massive resources, technical expertise, and logistics, to aid peace and security in 
Burundi and the DRC. What made South Africa's diplomatic strategy in conflict resolution in 
Burundi and the DRC successful, was its ability to draw its own resources and manpower, 
and to go beyond the signing of the peace deals and elections. Even though, South Africa was 
widely perceived to be the regional hegemony, Kuseni Dlamini argued that it ought to be 
exceedingly caution. For instance, he asserted: 
Pretoria needs to asserts its hegemony tactically … (it) must lead SADC and the new 
African Union in providing direction for the resolution of regional conflicts.
212
 
Although there was unwillingness, or for some, disinterestedness on part of the democratic 
South Africa, to intervene in the Great Lakes region's conflicts, President Mandela and his 
successor Thabo Mbeki were aware that their national interest would be well served by a 
peaceful and prosperous African continent.
213
 In the first four years of the Mandela 
government, from 1994 to 1999 South Africa was forced to balance competing imperatives; 
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on the one hand to unite a racially fragmented nation and state (through reconciliation and 
economic empowerment of the previously disadvantaged black majority) at home; while on 
the other, to build mutually beneficial relations with fellow African countries after many 
years of apartheid's policy of destabilisation.
214
 
The Southern African sub-region, identified as its major foreign policy priority area; thus the 
Great Lakes region did not feature as a major foreign policy priority area in 1994. First, the 
Great Lakes region is geographically located far away from South Africa's shores. Second, 
Burundi and the DRC in particular were colonised by Germany, France, and France,
215
 falling 
outside the familiar Anglophone zones. Due to colonial and apartheid, South Africa was not 
as culturally and politically connected to the Great Lakes region as it was to English speaking 
countries or those that assisted the liberation movements (Mozambique and Angola) during 
its struggle against apartheid. These factors, however, did not provide sufficient ground for 
South Africa to turn its back on this vital African region. Indeed, the African renaissance 
vision was informed by the thought that South Africa's strategic interest lay in a stable Africa. 
The importance of a stable African continent was also noted by Francis Fukuyama, who 
believed that, "weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world's serious 
problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism.
216
 South Africa's active 
involvement in Burundi and the DRC received wide global support in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in America. Chris Patterns argued that for America: 
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Events of September 11 brought home to us that the existence of failed states 
something which contributes to both regional and global instability; that is a problem 
to which we must devote more time, more political energy and more money.
217
 
Joschka Fischer the former German Foreign Minister echoed Patterns when he asserted that: 
Investments in peace are now more essential than ever in light of the threat from 
murderous international terrorists' network. That has to mean greater commitment to 
… the construction of civil societies.218 
Fischer's view clearly demonstrated that conflicts in Africa had a direct bearing on global 
peace and security. This was the major idea Mbeki conveyed to the international community 
in 'selling' the African renaissance vision underpinning South Africa's Africa policy. This 
idea found further support continentally through NEPAD and the restructured AU. South 
Africa under Mbeki positioned itself as an African peacemaker and there was no place where 
it could have proved this better than in resolving the conflict in Burundi and the DRC.
219
 
Pretoria has made great strides to shed the paternalistic foreign policy tendencies of the 
apartheid regime. There has also been significant transformation in its Africa policy since 
1994, which saw a shift from a unilateral oriented policy to a more Africa- one dedicated to 
multilateral engagement with its. This change in policy is more in line with the continent's 
African Renaissance project, and promotion of NEPAD, which is premised on the assumption 
that 'peace' and 'good governance' are a fundamental requisite for the attraction of investment, 
domestic and foreign, that Africa needs.
220
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The promotion of the twin goals of democracy and peace across the continent is a core 
aspiration of South Africa's (particularly African) foreign policy, but it is acknowledged- as 
suggested above- that these goals cannot come to fruition without peace and security. The 
centrality of these aims also finds expression in the DIRCO's 2005-2008 Strategic Plan which 
asserted that: 
Our vision is of an African continent that is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-
racial, non-sexist, and united and which contributes to a world that is just and 
equitable.
221
 
Pretoria was also mindful of the fact that the achievement of the above-mentioned objectives 
was highly dependent upon the promotion of multilateralism. This was, founded on 
construction of meaningful partnerships with both African and developing countries, regional 
cooperation and the strengthening of multilateral structures such as the AU and the SADC 
and supporting the implementation of the NEPAD programme. For Kagwanja,
222
 South 
Africa's adoption of a 'soft power' approach, "through the instruments of persuasion, 
mediation, negotiation and peer pressure, compared with 'hard power' (was) represented 
notably by the use of military might
223
" in tackling continental challenges such as conflict 
and the reconstruction of societies has stood it in good stead in its aspirations of continental 
leadership. 
This emerging activism on continental issues, lent South Africa 'continental weight'. Its 
growing influence, economic and military power, and experience negotiating of its own 
"miraculous", peaceful transition equipped South Africa to take a central role in conflict 
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resolution, peace building and peacekeeping in other African countries. Consequently, 
various South African role players have been involved in different conflict theatres across the 
continent including the Ivory Coast, the DRC, Burundi, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Comoros, Nigeria, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe. While some scholars argue that the last three 
countries were not really theatres of conflict, South Africa was, however now seen as a 
respected mediator that could be used to prevent breakout of protracted conflict. Its military 
has also swiftly become one of the world's fastest growing troops within the United Nations' 
peacekeeping missions, particularly in Africa. 
5.3 Background of the Great Lakes Crisis 
The Great Lakes region, in the five decades following the attainment of political 
independence in 1960s from colonial rule, has been the centre of genocide, civil wars, coups, 
counter-coups, mal-governance, plunder and population upheavals. It was for these reasons 
that the region has in many years fallen under the spotlight and galvanised international 
action. Mediations, negotiations, peace building and peacekeeping by a multiplicity of actors 
and institutions (domestic and foreign) have become an integral part of the region in the hope 
of finding solutions to the ongoing crisis in the Great Lakes.
224
 For South Africa's foreign 
policymakers, the Great Lakes region's conflicts were understood to be a result of: 
A complex and interconnected set of interacting and accumulated problem. These 
include bad governance, lack of democracy, monopolisation of political power by an 
individual or ethnic group, a policy of exclusion, widespread corruption, nepotism, 
violation of basic human rights and ever deepening poverty.
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'Multilateralism' summarises South Africa's strategy of engagement and management of the 
Great Lakes crisis. The promotion of constitutionalism through mediation has been a central 
part of Pretoria's strategy in dealing with both the situation in the DRC and Burundi which 
were largely influenced by the experience of its own negotiated transition. The goal 
according to Curtis "is to get everyone around the same table to compromise and agree on 
inclusive transitional political arrangements as part of a peace agreement
226
". 
This approach to peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention has not been without criticism, 
as it is perceived by many (especially by African counterparts) as indecisiveness on South 
Africa's part. Landsberg and Masiza point out that many African states have been critical of 
Pretoria's stance on state intervention, as it was seen as being very quick in seizing economic 
opportunities that are presented by African markets, but does not display the same vigour 
when it was presented with political and strategic challenges on the continent, showing 
reluctance instead. 
How then, in light of these perceptions and accusations can one explain South Africa's ever-
increasing role and prominence in the continent's crisis management processes and centrality 
in the Great Lakes region? Naison Ngoma argues that, South Africa's superior economic, 
industrial, and military capacity, almost guarantees its involvement in continental issues. 
Furthermore, Landsberg and Masiza suggest that South Africa's political transition has led 
Pretoria to "being singled out by western powers and other African states as candidate to 
enforce peace where there is none: western powers believe South Africa is best placed to play 
the role of firemen in central and Southern Africa
227
". Indeed, the United States has long 
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identified South Africa as the primary candidate for burden shift in its post-Somalia foreign 
policy. 
In as much as diplomatic pressure has influenced South Africa's response, it was not the only 
rationale. The security crisis in the Great Lakes region has the potential of turning into 
another Rwanda, which comes with dire consequences, including "spilling over into regional 
battles, generating hundreds of thousands of refugees, shattering states, and prompting 
economic dislocation, ethnic cleansing, and lawlessness
228
". As a result, Landsberg and 
Masiza argued that "South Africa cannot indefinitely assume that these consequences will 
remain far from its borders; it will have to accept greater responsibility for restoring stability 
in Africa
229
". 
5.4 Burundi's Road to Peace and Democracy: Arusha Accords 
Burundi was plunged into civil war in October 1993, following the assassination of its first 
democratically elected president, Melchoir Ndandaye. The conflict in Burundi was said to be 
rooted in politics of identity, as Ndandaye had been the country's first Hutu to serve as head 
of state following years of political dominance by the Tutsi minority.
230
 Since then this 
Central African country has been the centre of conflict resolution processes by regional actors 
and the international community. Having said this, it was the African leadership that assumed 
the central role in brokering a peace in Burundi, notably Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and 
Nelson Mandela of South Africa who laid the foundations for peace and democracy in the 
signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2002.
231
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The death in October 1999 of Julius Nyerere, who had been mandated by the United Nation's 
Security Council to broker peace and promote national reconciliation in Burundi, presented 
an opportunity for a new mediator "who could rise above the suspicions of the different 
participants
232
". Nyerere had been seen by some of the parties as lacking the necessary 
neutrality for such a role because of his regional connections and long-standing relations with 
some of the Burundian politicians. Nelson Mandela who had stepped down as the President 
of South Africa was chosen to take over the role of mediator in Burundi's peace process. 
For South Africa, Mandela's appointment was seen as an indication of the world's confidence 
in its ability to settle the region's conflicts.
233
 South Africa's newly awarded status as a 
principal actor in Burundi, presented it with the perfect opportunity to implement its 
continental diplomacy policy, premised on newly elected president Thabo Mbeki's vision of 
an African Renaissance. The latter, as was argued earlier in the chapter, saw an inextricable 
link between the continent's development prospects and the achievement of continental peace 
and security - which was being compromised by Africa's continuous conflicts. It is upon this 
basis that President Mbeki stated that, "South Africa would 'do everything' to assist Mandela 
in bringing an end to the conflict in Burundi
234
". 
Mandela's appointment as Burundi's new mediator was welcomed by all the key stakeholders 
in the process -- regional leaders and different parties in Burundi alike, with the exception of 
the Hutu rebel groups. The latter rejected Mandela's mediation on the grounds that South 
Africa was supplying military assistance to the government of Burundi.
235
 Mandela's general 
acceptance as new mediator can be attributed to a number of factors. Chief amongst these, 
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Southall suggested, was the fact that not only was he a "regional outsider, but was also famed 
as a reconciler of opposites as demonstrated by his key role in negotiating the South African 
settlement (1990–1994)236". Secondly, South Africa's personal experience having just 
emerged out of apartheid would provide important lessons that could be drawn upon, but also 
would act as a yardstick where progress could be gauged. Lastly, the government of Burundi 
also saw South Africa, as a much needed source of economic assistance. 
Therefore both South Africa and Burundi alike had vested interests in working side-by-side 
and making a success of the process. Moreover, Mandela had a strong desire to conclude the 
negotiations and to the surprise of many Burundians, took a more heavy-handed approach 
toward the involved parties in comparison to his predecessor, and was blunt in openly 
criticising the different factions for squabbling in the face of such a humanitarian crisis. In an 
address delivered to the Burundian delegates, Mandela said, 
Why do you allow yourselves to be regarded as leaders without talent, leaders without 
a vision? ... The fact that women, children and the aged are being slaughtered every 
day is an indictment against all of you.
237
 
Mandela's candidness soon gained him the respect of Burundians which in turn helped in 
legitimising the peace process in their eyes. Mandela was also insistent, borrowing from 
South Africa's experience, that there was a need for renewed efforts of re-engaging and 
including the excluded rebel groups in the ongoing peace process, as a lack of participation 
and agreement on their part would obscure the cease-fire.
238
 This resulted in early talks with 
both the CNDD-FDD and FNL which paved the way for more talks later between Buyoya 
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and these rebel groups in South Africa in March 2000. Mandela's efforts however would not 
yield immediate success as "constant prevarications" proved to be a major delaying factor.
239
 
Mandela working against time, resolved to continue the negotiations in their absence. 
Mandela's efforts did not prove futile however as his determination to include the excluded 
rebels in the peace process greatly enhanced the legitimacy of the subsequent Arusha Accord, 
and weakened the standing of the rebels internationally.
240
 
While cautious in borrowing too much from South Africa's negotiation process, Mandela 
introduced the notion of 'sufficient consensuses'; a strategy that was utilised during CODESA 
negotiations in South Africa. It basically entailed in the event of stalemate, engaging with the 
major parties (FRODEBU, UPRONA and the military) in reaching a consensus "then 
presenting the agreement to the smaller parties as a fait accompli
241
" and thereby depriving 
the latter of the ability to block progress in committees. Mandela, unlike Nyerere was also 
more prepared to analyse the Burundian conflict along ethnic lines. Mandela was openly 
critical of the Tutsi minority elite's power domination and as such maintained that as long as 
the minority dominates politically, economically, and militarily, there can be no peace.
242
 
Furthermore, using his international stature, Mandela also stressed the importance of 
involving the international community in the peace process at a conference held in Paris in 
December 2000. Using the "carrot and stick strategy", he placed emphasis on the need and 
importance of international financial assistance for addressing the country's humanitarian and 
development needs, while also impressing upon Burundian delegations the prospects for a 
better future.
243
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In yet another bid to accelerate the negotiations Mandela imposed a deadline of 28 August 
2000 for signing the Arusha agreement, albeit tactics devised by various groups, notably the 
Tutsi hardliners, to stall the process.
244
 On the set date, only 13 of the 19 delegates acceded to 
the Accord at a ceremony attended by regional heads of states; General Secretary of the 
OAU, Salim Salim, South Africa's Deputy President Jacob Zuma and US President Bill 
Clinton. As expected the six parties that did not partake were the Tutsi- dominated ones. 
However after being subjected to enormous regional pressure and condemnation from 
Mandela, they submitted and added their signatures at a summit in Nairobi on 20 September 
of the same year.
245
 
The Accord provided for a 30-month power-sharing period, but many of the details of a 
transitional constitution were not decided until after it had been signed. After a series of 
negotiations, arm twisting and persuasion, an agreement was reached that the army general 
Buyoya would act as the interim president for 18 months from 1 November 2002, with 
Domitien Ndayizeye of FRODEBU serving as vice-president and then succeeding him on 1 
May 2003.
246
 
Following the signing of the Accord, Mandela sought to secure a ceasefire while preparing 
the ground for the establishment of the transitional government. It was during this period that 
the South African government took a more active role in the Burundian peace process. In 
that, whilst Mandela had enjoyed the full cooperation of Pretoria, he had undertaken the role 
of mediator in Burundi in his personal capacity. Hereafter, Pretoria was to take a central 
position in the Burundian peace process. South Africa's first major involvement came in 
October 2001, when President Thabo Mbeki announced that the country would deploy two of 
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its battalions (1 500 troops) to Burundi, which were to form a key component of the 
international military force.
247
 
This gesture was significant in that, no other African countries had either the capacity or 
willingness to undertake this key role. (Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana had all declined to 
participate in the absence of a ceasefire).
248
 Pretoria's official engagement in Burundi was 
also a calculated policy move. Mbeki saw the peace process as a key component to the 
achievement of a peace in the DRC, which South Africa was also party to. Thus, the 
establishment of a lasting peace in Burundi and the neutralisation of its domestic politics 
would go a long way in the establishment of security for the greater Great Lakes region.
249
 
The first detachment of South African troops arrived in Bujumbura in 
November 2001. Their mandate was to provide protection for returning political exiles that 
were to take part in the transitional government, as provided for in the Accords. A mandate as 
limited as such meant that South Africa could not play a major peacekeeping role as yet even 
though its stabilising role was a critical one. However one of the stipulations of the Accord 
was that the South African contingent was to be reinforced by troops from Ethiopia and 
Mozambique, which were to form the core of the African Union's (AU) African Mission in 
Burundi (AMIB), which in time would assume responsibility for preserving peace between 
the army and the militias, and oversee the restructuring of the military.
250
 
Mandela stepped down in 2001, which saw (then) Deputy President Jacob Zuma take over 
the reins as new facilitator of the Burundi peace process. Upon taking over the reins Zuma 
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was faced with three daunting tasks according to Ajulu, namely; "1) ensuring that the Arusha 
agreements were implemented; 2) ensuring that the rebels signed an agreement to join the 
transitional government; and 3) securing a permanent cease-fire
251
". "Moreover, Zuma was 
also tasked with the mammoth task of ensuring that the transition does not collapse
252
". 
He together with regional leaders who had regained their prominence in the process and thus 
began playing more active role following the departure of Mandela "whose international 
stature had dominate the process and unintentionally sidelined the regional leaders
253
" shared 
no illusions about the signing of the Accord. They were very conscious of the fact that it 
would not lead to any miracles, only that it would merely lay the foundations of the real work 
that lay ahead. These leaders were also aware of the importance of bringing the rebel groups 
to the negotiating table, as the possibility of reaching any settlement depended on their 
participation.
254
 
What followed is best captured by Southall who states that "the subsequent peace process 
was one of bewildering complexity characterised by broken promises, violated ceasefires and 
continuing war between the rebel groups and the transitional government, which continued to 
bring untold misery to the population.
255
" A more pressing task for Zuma and his team at this 
point was to address the failure of the rebel groups to join the peace process. Conscious of the 
complexity of the task at hand and regional dynamics, Zuma used Museveni and Makapa's 
influence to hold talks and put much needed pressure on the rebels in order to fast track the 
process. These attempts were not in vain as they did yield some results, for one, that the talks 
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with Buyoya laid the foundation for future engagement between the predominantly Hutu 
rebel groups and the government.
256
 
Further, Zuma and President Omar Bongo of Gabon also took the initiative to identify key 
players within the rebel groups. This was aimed at establishing further avenues of 
engagement and dialogue with other influential actors within these groups, so as to convince 
them to accept the terms of the peace agreement and also aid in the legitimization of the 
whole process. Subsequently, two meetings in January and April 2001 were held with Bongo 
as facilitation between the CNDD-FDD and the transitional government. The aims were to 
outline the agenda for negotiations, which was further discussed at the summit in Pretoria in 
October 2001.
257
 
These efforts, however, would soon be complicated by divisions amongst the rebels 
themselves. For instance a dissident faction led by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza in a summit held 
in Pretoria in October 2002, rejected the Original CNDD-FDD-- led by Jean-Bosco 
Ndayikengurukiye, claiming that they were the legitimate CNDD-FDD. Further to this they 
argued that they could only conclude a peace deal with the army, as they perceived it to be 
the power behind the transitional government. 
Another example was the major faction of the FNL under Agathon Rwasa, comprising of 
various religious elements. This group was the most stubborn of the lot and highly opposed to 
being part of the agreement, as it held strongly to the belief that the Tutsi dominated the 
transitional government. They accused those Hutu parties that had joined the government of 
being sell-outs and that it would only negotiate with the Burundian army.
258
 As result of these 
splits and irreconcilable differences amongst the different factions, the government was left 
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with no choice but go ahead and sign a ceasefire in September 2002 with Ndayikengurukiye 
(CNDD-FDD) and Mugabarabona (FNL), leaving out the Rwasa's FNL and Nkurunziza's 
CNDD-FDD, who remained at war with Bujumbura for over two years after the ceasefire had 
been reached. It is for these very reasons that Pretoria and regional leaders insisted on the 
urgency of the implementation of the transitional process in Burundi.
259
 
The transition period from Buyoya, who had been in power since November 2002, to 
Ndayizeye was not a smooth one. Instead it was clouded by fears that the army would 
intervene to prevent the scheduled transfer of power. Consequently in the lead-up to the hand 
over, symbolising the dawn of a new era of power-sharing for Burundi, enormous pressure 
was placed on Buyoya by no less than South Africa, regional heads of states, the AU, UN and 
the US urging him to ignore calls by those in the military and Tutsi political for him to retain 
his position. 
This uncertainty resulted in an increase in the levels of violence around the country with 
major assaults being launched by the rebel movements, notably the FNL, upon the capital. 
Recognising the gravity of the situation and its potential of getting out of hand and therefore 
reversing the gains that had been won, Buyoya made a public announcements and gestures of 
assurance to the Tutsis that he would indeed step down.
260
 Amidst an air of mistrust and 
tensions, Ndayizeye ascended to the presidency as scheduled. 
On 27 January 2003 a meeting was held in Pretoria, an outcome of regional and international 
pressure and negotiations. With the assistance of Mbeki, the team of mediators was 
successful in coaxing the Burundian government and the three rebel groups into signing a 
memorandum of understanding and establishing a Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC). 
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Crucially, they also agreed that an AU peacekeeping force would be deployed.
261
 The series 
of negotiations facilitated by Zuma and Mbeki in Pretoria culminated with a momentous 
victory on the 8th of October 2003 when the government and the CNDD-FDD agreed to 
implement the ceasefire of December 2002 and also signed the Pretoria protocol on Political, 
Defence and Security power sharing in Burundi.
262
 
A new constitution has since been drafted by Burundian politicians with the help of 
the Presidents of South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda. The new constitution includes 
quotas for both ethnic and gender representation. Initially, there were disagreements 
over the text of the constitution, which in turn delayed the constitutional referendum 
that was mandated by the Arusha Agreement. The referendum was finally held on 
February 28, 2005 and Burundians across the country voted overwhelmingly in of the 
new constitution.
263
 Communal legislative and presidential elections were held later in 
the year. 
The Burundian intervention demonstrated that South Africa's self-perceived and defined roles 
of peace and security guarantor in Africa gained enormous momentum and confidence for 
foreign policymakers. This success attained in Burundi by South Africa brought more trust in 
the country's ability to mobilise continental and global support for peace in Africa. It was in 
this context therefore that encouraged South Africa to step in DRC's peace negotiation as a 
mediator when the opportunity allowed. 
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5.5 Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A Step Towards Peace and Democracy for the 
DRC? 
The crisis in the DRC dates back to the rebellion of 1996, which led to the ousting of 
President Mobutu Sese Seko from his 32-year authoritarian regime.
264
 Ironically, on 2 August 
1998 Laurent-Desire Kabila, who had succeeded Mobutu, would be dealt a similar fate only 
two years in office by Banyamulenge leaders who had brought him to power. They accused 
him of authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism and tribalism. These developments would 
subsequently lead to an unprecedented interstate conflict involving about eight African states: 
Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Libya,
265
 International 
efforts by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), AU and the UN to settle 
the Congolese conflict culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Agreement and the holding of 
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue; the political negotiations that ended with the adoption of the 
Global Agreement and an interim constitution for the DRC.
266
 
South Africa became increasingly involved in the process in 2002, when the inter-Congolese 
dialogue resumed in Sun City, South Africa from February to April. By this time there were 
360 delegates participating in the process which included the DRC government, 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), Mouvement pour la Liberation du 
Congo (MLC), Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-National (RCD-N), 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie- Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), the Mai-
Mai (Congolese militia), unarmed political opposition, and civil society representatives 
(Forces vives). South Africa became, "a constant diplomatic presence" and a principal 
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mediator in the DRC peace process, following its initial reluctance to get involved in the 
DRC crisis.
267
 
Pretoria's earlier reluctance was informed by the fact that it did not want to be drawn into 
further military intervention following its disastrous intervention in Lesotho in 1998. 
Mandela, who was then the chairman of SADC was against the use of force in the DRC, 
advocating instead for dialogue and a negotiated settlement to the conflict. He insisted that 
SADC troops could only intervene in the DRC under the auspices of UN-sanctioned 
multilateral peace-keeping force.
268
 His stance put him at loggerheads with then chairman of 
the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC), President 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who was determined to defend Kabila's regime with military forces.
269
 
South Africa's caution on the SADC's use of force can also be best understood from a 
historical perspective. Patrick Lekota, the then country's Minister of Defence, referred to the 
SADC defence pact, arguing that such a pact "provides guidelines to protect legitimate 
governments in the region from foreign armed forces". But that he did not envisage South 
Africa "behaving like a bull in a China shop rushing as the old South African Defence Force 
did
270
". South Africa's insistence on diplomatic solutions for the Congo created major 
tensions amongst SADC leaders, who criticised South Africa for being "rather removed from 
the region- a region that not only sweated but also bled for it South Africa prior to 1994
271
". 
It is upon this basis that South Africa's involvement and subsequent prominence as a peace 
broker in the DRC was viewed with great suspicion. The view was that Pretoria was paving 
its way for deeper penetration of this enormously resource-rich country by its mining 
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companies and other corporations within South Africa. The idea that South Africa may be 
driven by realpolitik, as opposed to its usual moralist tendencies cannot be dismissed all 
together. Pretoria does indeed stand to benefit from a more stable and secure DRC. The latter, 
as suggested by Kuseni Dlamini was an important trading partner for South Africa and vice 
versa. He stated that, 25% of the DRC's imports come from South Africa, while the latter 
receives 9% of the DRC's exports, thus making it the third biggest importer of DRC products 
after the Benelux countries and the US.
272
 
Having said "South Africa's intervention in the DRC must be seen in the context of Mbeki's 
wider vision of an 'African Renaissance'" of ending Africa's violent conflicts and the 
promotion of 'good governance', so as to realise the continental twin goals of economic 
growth and sustainable development.
273
 Besides that, the geopolitical ramifications of the 
DRC conflict, like those of previous case study, have significant implications for durable 
peace and security, not only in the Great Lakes region but also in Southern Africa. Much like 
the crisis in Burundi South Africa could not afford to take a backseat in the hopes that the 
central African leadership will deal with it, as there are no guarantees that this conflict may 
have a domino effect throughout the continent and that it would emerge unscathed. 
Pursuant to the Lusaka Agreement, Congolese parties of the ICD resumed talks in Sun City, 
South Africa, having been revived by the new leader Joseph Kabila following his father's 
(Laurent Kabila's) assassination.
274
 Under the guidance of Sir Ketumile Masire the former 
President of Botswana, who was appointed as mediator of the Congo crisis in December 
1999, 37 resolutions were adopted. Despite this, no agreement had been reached on the 
critical issue of the establishment of a consensual political dispensation for the country during 
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the transitional period. This created major tensions and delayed the negotiations and 
subsequently led to a granting of an extension of the negotiations for a further seven days. To 
break the deadlock, the Congolese parties and Masire requested President Thabo Mbeki of 
South Africa to assist in the process of reaching an agreement. 
Being the host country, South Africa had a vested interest in the success of the dialogue and 
failure would reflect negatively on its reputation as a successful peace broker. Through 
various tactics of international pressure and skilful negotiations Mbeki was able to put the 
negotiations back on track.
275
 Upon recommencement, Mbeki then suggested two plans for 
power-sharing during the transition in the DRC. The first proposed a presidency to be held by 
Joseph Kabila and a second executive organ to be named the High Council of the Republic 
consisting of the president, the RCD and MLC leaders, and a Prime Minister to be appointed 
by the political opposition. Civil society was offered the presidency of Parliament, which was 
to act both as the legislative and the constitutional assembly during the transition.
276
 
Furthermore, it was suggested that provisions should be made during the transition for the 
establishment of autonomous of institutions that would buttress; namely a Constitutional 
Court, Human Rights Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, National Electoral 
Commission, and High Authority of the Media.
277
 The defence, police, security and 
intelligence services and the Reserve Bank were also to be apolitical and autonomous. 
However, the RCD and Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), the leading 
political party, accused this plan of the Kabila government. 
In response to the shortcoming of the first plan, the second arrangement gave vice-presidency 
positions to MLC and RCD leaders, who were to also hold important ministerial portfolios. 
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The first vice-president would be in charge of the economy and finances, while the second 
was to be responsible for defence, internal affairs and elections. However, discussions of the 
second plan were interrupted by the discovery that the DRC government and the MLC had 
concluded a bilateral deal between themselves. Kabila would remain president while the 
MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, would become prime minister and head of the transitional 
government.
278
 Needless to say, this agreement received major criticism and was opposed by 
the RCD, UDPS and some other parties, on the grounds that it was concluded outside the ICD 
and violated both the spirit and letter of the Lusaka agreement. Whatever gains that had been 
won during 52 long days of negations were reversed and no agreement was reached on the 
scheduled day of adjournment, Friday 19 April 2001. 
On Masire's recommendation and with Mbeki's backing, a follow-up committee was set up to 
remain in South Africa and continue negotiations on the formation of the transitional 
government of national unity.
279
 Subsequently, a meeting was held in Sun City on 22 April 
2002 to set up the Alliance for the Defence of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ASD). 
According to its constitutive act, the main aim of the Alliance was "to undertake anything 
possible to bring the DRC government and the MLC back to the negotiating table to achieve 
an inclusive and consensual agreement on the transitional government
280
". 
Mangu asserted that "there was no alternative to the ICD, whatever form it took. An inclusive 
and sincere political dialogue resulting in power-sharing based on a constitutional act that 
protects and promotes human rights remained the best way to address the crisis of 
constitutionalism and democracy in the DRC
281
". This initiative was supplemented by 
pressure from the Congolese people and international community within SADC, the AU and 
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the UN also for the Congolese parties to return to the negotiating table. In the meantime, the 
DRC government and the MLC failed to implement their own agreement, as Kabila had come 
to realise that he had conceded too much and did not want to be a figurehead president.
282
 It 
was the failure of the DRC government – MLC agreement that would pave the way for a 
return to the negotiating table and the reopening of the ICD. 
Subsequently, an amended Mbeki plan for power-sharing during the transitional period was 
presented to the Congolese parties in August 2002. The plan provided for a presidency, 
consisting of President Joseph Kabila (PPDR), and four Vice-Presidents from different 
groups and factions: Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC), Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (PPRD), 
Azarias Ruberwa (RCD-G), and Z'Ahidi Ngoma (the civilian opposition). Ministerial 
portfolios were divided proportionally between the armed groups, the unarmed opposition, 
civil society and the Mai-Mai. The plan also made provisions for a bicameral Parliament 
(National Assembly and Senate), an independent judiciary and a number of institutions that 
buttress democracy.
 283
 The revised plan was accepted by the DRC government and endorsed 
by the RCD, MLC and the political opposition, subject to a number of amendments. 
At the same time, there were diplomatic attempts to resolve the question of the withdrawal of 
foreign forces. This led to the signing of a landmark agreement between Rwanda and the 
DRC in July 2002. In September 2002, Uganda and Rwanda reached a similar agreement 
where they established a 100-day timetable for the withdrawal of Uganda's forces and the 
establishment of the Ituri Pacification Committee in north-eastern DRC. Subsequently, 
Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe reached bilateral agreements with the DRC government 
calling for troop withdrawal in October 2002.
284
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The laborious months of consultations, shuttle diplomacy and negotiations culminated on 
December 17, 2002 with the signing of a global and inclusive peace agreement by all 
Congolese parties in Pretoria. These momentous talks were facilitated by Mbeki and UN 
Special Envoy Moustapha Niasse.
285
 The Agreement consisted of eight parts, and the 
foremost concern that was addressed first was the cessation of hostilities. The parties renewed 
their commitment to ceasing hostilities and seeking a peaceful and fair solution to the crisis 
facing their country in accordance with the Lusaka agreement, various disengagement plans 
and relevant Security Council resolutions.
286
 
The parties with fighting forces agreed to commit themselves to the process of forming a 
national, restructured and integrated army in line with a resolution adopted during the ICD on 
April 10, 2002.
287
 All the parties agreed to combine their efforts in the implementation of the 
UN Security Council resolutions on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC, the 
disarmament of the armed groups and militia, and safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the DRC. They also committed to taking the necessary measures to ensure the 
security of the population and the transitional leaders. 
On 2 April 2003, the Congolese parties adopted a draft constitution for the transition, in line 
with the Pretoria agreement. Article 204 of the constitution provided that it would enter into 
force "on its promulgation by the President of the Republic within the three clear days that 
follow its adoption". Accordingly, President Joseph Kabila promulgated the transitional 
constitution on 4 April 2003.
288
 
On the 7th of April, Kabila was sworn in as president for the transitional period, while the 
transitional government was inaugurated in May 2003 and was scheduled to govern for two 
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years. Furthermore, the country's first elections since 1965 were scheduled for March 2005, 
but would be delayed till 2006. The adoption of the transitional constitution concluded the 
ICD and marked the formal end of the Congolese conflict.
289
 
Of particular concern was the lack of progress on establishing the five institutions that 
buttress democracy envisaged in the agreement. These included Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, the National Human Rights Observatory, the high authority for media the 
national Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Ethics and the Fight Against 
Corruption.
290
 In addition to that, the ongoing conflict in Ituri between Lendu and the Lema 
ethnic groups has also raised fears about the sturdiness of the peace process. 
5.6 Post-Conflict Engagement in the Great Lakes Region 
The grand continental vision of an African Renaissance has linked the achievement of 
Africa's prospects of sustainable development to continental peace and stability. Mindful of 
this reality African leaders have gone about their ways to find means of conflict prevention 
and resolution. Substantial gains have been achieved in this regard, the resolution of conflicts 
in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Burundi and DRC, amongst others, is 
a testimony of these achievements. However, President Mbeki was adamant that "silencing 
guns by signing peace agreements was not enough to ensure countries emerging from armed 
conflicts enjoyed stable and durable peace
291
", speaking at the second General Assembly of 
the African Forum he expressed this concern saying: "I have a sense that as we deal with 
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peace issues, we don't go all the way to ensure countries emerging from conflicts do not 
revert to violence
292
". 
Mbeki further stated that when conflicts broke out, efforts tended to focus on finding a way 
back to peace by sending in peacekeeping troops, installing a transitional government and 
organising elections, pointing out that "once this has been achieved, many think that it is 
over
293
". He was, of the view that more should be done to heal the scars of war and to have 
Africa look beyond relative peace and go to the roots of the conflict to find lasting solutions 
that will reinforce reconstruction.
294
 
Mbeki's call for a new approach for healing Africa's conflict scars underlines the importance 
of the establishment of 'positive peace' in the continent. Such an approach goes beyond the 
mere signing of ceasefire and peace agreements, but rather necessitating for continued 
commitment to achieving sustainable peace by all major stakeholders by adopting both 
structural and non-structural measures to advance these aims. The structural measures make 
reference to political democratisation, social and economic reconstruction.
295
 On the other 
hand, non-structural measures centre on strategies towards national reconciliation, such as the 
granting of amnesty, reconciling of values, and fostering of trust and national unity.
296
 This 
suggests that, as pointed out by Hussein Solomon, "Peacemakers need to approach the issue 
of conflict resolution far more strategically, where the peace agreement is intimately related 
processes of democratisation, economic development and nation-building
297
". 
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Pursuant to its Africa policy objectives and the advancement of the goals of NEPAD, Pretoria 
has been preoccupied with the resolution of the continent's conflicts and peacekeeping 
initiatives. South Africa also recognises that an end to Africa's conflicts does not end with 
ceasefires but rather as suggested in the foregoing sections that it is in the process far beyond 
the transitional period. Thus South Africa has sought to play a meaningful and prominent role 
in assisting in the re-building those societies that have destroyed by these ongoing conflicts. 
5.7 South Africa and Post-Conflict Stabilisation and Nation-Building in 
Burundi 
Burundi has been ravaged by years of conflict and whilst the country has scored a resounding 
victory in holding what were deemed to be 'free and fair' elections in 2005, this 
accomplishment is not sufficient in itself to solve the country's problems.
298
 A review of 
Burundian history from a historical perspective reveals that elections were held on three 
different occasions (1961, 1965, 1993), and in each case were followed by unrest, which 
Marc Manirakiza attributes to the fact that "most of the political actors were not mature 
enough to accept the democratic culture
299
". 
It was against this backdrop, that the international community that played a pivotal role in 
brokering peace in Burundi continues playing a central role in the post-transition period. This 
has been done by in seeing to the establishment of a sustainable peace and a successful 
project of national reconstruction.
300
 South Africa's continued presence in Burundi was of 
paramount importance in guarding against possible failure of the newly elected government 
and any destabilisation attempts by negative forces within the region. This, too, highlights the 
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importance of Pretoria's concurrent peace project in the DRC, as continued violence in this 
country poses a threat to Burundian peace and security, and thus exposes it to the possibilities 
of backsliding. It was therefore paramount that the crisis in the DRC is resolved if sustainable 
peace was to be realised in the Great Lakes region.
301
 
In recognition of the fragility of the peace South Africa deployed its own 1 511 troops under 
the banner of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which was recapped at the time as the 
United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB). The main aim of these troops among many 
was to protect politicians who had abandoned armed struggle. 
The significance of Pretoria's role in peacemaking in Africa emanated from its past 
experience, as South Africa was also a transitioning state, no so long ago and its democracy is 
still in its infancy. South Africa can therefore provide critical lessons for its Burundian 
counterparts on how to manage the various aspects of transition and those of a fledgling 
democracy. Critical to this was the process of reconciliation, economic recovery and post-
conflict reconstruction.
302
 
Based on its own experience of political transition and nation-building, South Africa has 
advanced the issue of national reconciliation between the disaffected groups as one that 
requires urgent attention.
303
 Any possibilities towards a sustainable peace and the 
achievement of social justice for the Burundian masses could only come about through 
tolerance, unity and a commitment to a better future, which is consistent with the Arusha 
Agreement. Manirakiza was of the view that the project of reconciliation was not an 
impossible one when taking into consideration the fact that, historically the Burundian 
problem is actually political and economic. It would largely be dependent on the nurturing of 
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an enlightened leadership that was committed to the effective and efficient administering of 
distributive, impartial and repairing justice for this democracy to succeed.
304
 
One of the mechanisms identified for the purposes of national reconciliation was a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. However, progress in setting up the commission has been slow. 
Commissioners were only nominated in early January 2004, and the institution has been 
described as still being in the 'embryonic stage'. Furthermore, the commission does not yet 
have a mandate, and consequently it is unclear as to how it might address competing claims 
for both justice and reconciliation.
305
 
Political reconstruction was also of paramount importance. This makes reference to the 
above-mentioned structural measures that are advanced towards the establishment of the rule 
of law that are crucial for the project of national reconstruction. These included 
democratisation of institutions, support for parliament, civil society and the media, reforming 
the judiciary, and popular participation—with a particular emphasis on the empowerment of 
the previously marginalised groups (i.e. the advancement of women).
306
 
It was against this backdrop that the South African government came up with a 
comprehensive reconstruction programme that was in line with the Arusha Peace Accords 
and had since made fundamental strides in pursuit of these objectives. The first major step in 
this regard, has been the establishment of bilateral cooperation between Pretoria and 
Bujumbura. This follows a series of talks that were held in the DRC between the 13 and 15 of 
February 2004 that would subsequently lead to the signing of a Joint Cooperation Agreement 
by the Congolese and South African government.
307
 The latter Agreement would make 
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provisions for: Mutual Protection of Investments; MOU on Economic Cooperation; 
Agreement on Enhancement of Capacity; Agreement on Defence and Police Cooperation; 
MOU on Judicial Cooperation; and Review of the Agreement of Civil Aviation signed in 
1992.
308
 
The security sector of Burundi presented a key challenge for Burundian government, 
especially since the success of the peace settlement reconstruction projects and much desired 
economic development are dependent on the maintenance of peace and stability for the 
country.
309
 As such the transformation and capacitating of the police was seen as a matter of 
urgency. The police force both in its structure and organisation will need significant 
transformation if it is to become a police service, more so since it has in the past been geared 
towards inculcating fear and intimidating the general populace. To this end, South Africa has 
offered to share information on issues of doctrine and policy with the Burundi counterparts 
with the aims of setting up a new police force.
310
 
Pretoria committed itself to trilateral cooperation with Burundi and Belgium with the aims of 
developing projects to revamp and capacitate Burundi's government sector, as enshrined in 
the Arusha Accords that speaks to the principles of democratic and civil liberties, as its 
current state has been identified as an impediment to the government's ability to coordinate 
development assistance in a strategic and focused manner.
311
 To these ends, the following 
areas of involvement have been identified cooperation between the three governments: 
Organisational development; Institution building and training in development and strategic 
planning as well as policy formulation.
312
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South Africa also committed itself to provide training in the following areas: good 
governance and anti-corruption; training of trainers; monitoring and evaluation; human 
resource management; HIV/AIDS training for managers; and gender training. The 
Department Public Service and Administration (DPSA) and Statistics South Africa conducted 
a Census of the Burundian public service and also assisted in setting up an E-data base 
governance system to manage records and archives in Burundi.
313
 
Economic development was also key in the sustainability of peace and security in Burundi. 
South Africa's engagement in the country's different projects was aimed at economic 
development and at equipping Burundi with whatever means necessary, so that it becomes 
self-reliant and less dependent on South Africa and thus steer its own processes of economic 
and political development.
314
 The attainment and sustainability of the above-mentioned twin 
goals of economic and political development were central to nation-building in Rwanda was 
highly depend on the Burundian government and those instrumental in the brokering of peace 
in that country.
315
 This was essential in that it will address the skewed nature of the country's 
wealth that has been concentrated in the hands of one ethnic group at the expense of the other 
and thus creating ethnic cleavages that are making the country more susceptible to protracted 
conflict.
316
 
Ensuring equal access to wealth and resources that translates into to equal access to political 
power and participation in the day-to-day functioning of the state, will contribute to the 
general state security. To this end, Stavenhagen forwards the notion of 'ethno-development', 
which he describes as "redefining the nature of nation-building and enriching the complex, 
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multi-cultural fabric of many modern states, by recognising the legitimate aspirations of the 
culturally distinct ethics that make up the national whole
317
". 
Article 16 of the Arusha Accords sets out certain guidelines for governing economic 
development that include: macro-economic stability; solving the problem of external and 
domestic debt; structural reform of social sectors; creating an environment conducive to 
private investment; efforts to create new jobs and compliance with criteria of equity and 
transparency in employment; and promotion of the role of youth and women in 
development.
318
 
In response, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) on behalf of the South African 
government and the DRC government, jointly produced a strategic framework for 
accelerating economic growth and poverty reduction. The IDC evaluated the viability of three 
projects identified by the government of Burundi that includes the Verundi glass 
manufacturing project, development of a port and Cement project.
319
 The development of the 
agricultural sector was given primacy as the main engine of economic growth. However, 
numbers of challenges have been identified and need to be addressed if the desired economic 
growth and development are to be achieved, such as the need to bolster secondary sectors. 
There was also a need to strengthen the tourism industry, which could also become a 
significant source of revenue. In addition, South Africa has also offered its assistance in the 
development of an Investment code in Burundi, which was currently under construction with 
the aims of increasing the revenue base for the government that was very low.
320
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5.8 South Africa and the Reconstruction of the State in the DRC 
The situation in the DRC in the aftermath of signing of the ceasefire remained tenuous. The 
transition was susceptible to collapse, largely due to "spoiler elements" which act as a 
deterrence to a successful peace implementation.
321
 These included, "state collapse, the 
existence of more than two belligerent groups, the presence of armed combatants that number 
over 50, 000 soldiers, the presence of hostile states or regional networks, and the existence of 
disposable natural resources
322
". Further compounding the instability that has become 
characteristic of the post-conflict environment in the DRC was the fact that many ordinary 
citizens became dependent on the war economy. The ongoing insecurity in the DRC therefore 
posed a threat to the established peace accords, but also for the peace and stability of the 
greater Great Lakes region. 
Reconstruction therefore was a critical task for the future peace and prosperity of the DRC, 
and efforts to date have achieved some major successes. Reconstruction efforts have been 
multi-pronged, involving a multiplicity of international players and different projects. At the 
top of the agenda there has been the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, 
Repatriation and Resettlement (DDRRR) and the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and 
Reintegration (DDR) programmes by the MONUC and the UNDP respectively. By March 
2005 MONUC had seen the disarmament of 9 012 belligerents, which a sizable number of 
whom were able to make use of reintegration programmes and jobs promised to them.
323
 
However, more still needs to be done in this regard, so as to ensure that all combatants were 
disarmed and reintegrated into Congolese society. Within the SADC context, South Africa 
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was also been instrumental, in collaboration with the DRC and Belgian governments to create 
a new Congolese army. 
Beyond conflict resolution efforts, Pretoria had forged new partnerships and engages with 
Kinshasa through the South Africa-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC). The commission 
came into being after the signing of a General Co-operation Agreement on January 14, 2004, 
in Kinshasa aimed at the promotion of political, economic and social cooperation between the 
two governments. In accordance with the General Co-operation Agreement, sectoral 
commissions, namely Politics and Governance, Defence and Security, Humanitarian and 
Social Affairs, and Finance, Economy and Infrastructure were established with technical 
committees.
324
 
These developments have since yielded a number of successes towards the advancement of 
the goals of national reconstruction for the Congo. On the 15-16 March the Third Session of 
the BNC was convened in Kinshasa between South Africa and the DRC where three 
agreements were signed: the Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Maritime Transport, 
Agreement on Decentralisation and the Memorandum of Understanding on Education Co-
operation.
325
 
The Agreement between South Africa's Department of Transport and the Transport and 
Communication in the DRC, led to a number contributions by the South African ministry 
towards the election mechanism effort, some of these include: a commitment by the DOT to 
assist its counterpart in the rehabilitation of five airports in the Congo that were to provide 
linkages and access to remote areas during the elections, these including amongst others, 
Lubumbashi and Ndjili International Airports. A substantial donation to the value of R 
7million was pledged by the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA), towards 
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repairs for 9 vessels and 3 barges that are to be used for improvement of mobility and access 
through the Congo River. Spoornet has also agreed to transfer ownership of 100 passenger 
coaches to the Congolese rail agency, La Sociale Nationale des Chemins De Fer Du Congo 
(SNCC) scheduled for completion by March 2006 and also committed to provide the latter 
with spares to the value of R 2.5 million.
326
 
The MOU on decentralisation which was signed by Ministers Sydney Mufumadi (SA) and 
Theophile Mbemba (DRC) identified the following areas of cooperation between the two 
ministries: the development of an organic law dealing with Decentralised Administrative 
Entities and support with capacity building and setting up of appropriate organisations, 
equipment, information technology systems and infrastructure. The aims of this project are to 
assist in the reformation of systems of governing institutions and the promotion of good 
leadership in the DRC.
327
 
The signing of the MOU by the Ministries of Education (SA) and Higher Education (DRC) 
led to several initiatives by South African institutions. The University of KwaZulu-Natal 
(UKZN) made progress in the establishment of partnerships with the University of 
Lubumbashi and the University of Liege in Belgium. The University of South Africa 
(UNISA) and the Education Foundation Trust have also expressed interests in developing 
relations with the DRC and considering possibilities of establishing education centres in the 
DRC. In turn and, in cooperation with the Education Ministry the DRC, developed an 
Education Management Information Systems (EMIS), support training and research to 
facilitate policy development, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation through 
the use of EMIS.
328
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Other achievements included the DIRCO initiative of capacity-building for the DRC's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation which took place in April, 2005. 
The aims of this project were to reform the ministry, provide diplomatic training for senior 
diplomats and administrators, and the development of information and communication 
systems.
329
 
The DPSA was instrumental in the setting up of a public service census project in the DRC. 
Progress was also made with the conducting and timely completion of the Kinshasa census of 
public servants. An initial head count of all ministries with the exception of EPSP and ESU, 
Health and Research has been completed and data is currently being captured on database. 
The second headcount, where biometrical information will be captured is currently underway. 
The second phase of the census—provincial—began at the end of May 2005 and census 
forms for the Bandundu and Bas-Congo provinces are currently being captured. The census 
for the other eight remaining provinces is also scheduled to take place very shortly, as census 
forms and sorting has begun.
330
 
The DPSA was also involved in the development of the Anti-corruption project. The latter 
was made up of two sub-projects; equipping the DRC's Observatory for Professional Ethics 
(OCEP) to roll out the Code of Conduct for public officials; and a tri-lateral memorandum of 
understanding has been signed by South Africa, the DRC and the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime to facilitate the establishment of an anti-corruption framework for the DRC.
331
 
Pretoria made significant strides in the establishment of economic programmes in the DRC, 
which emanate from the Agreement of Economic Co-operation entered into by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the DRC's Ministry of Industry; Small and 
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Medium Enterprises. Following a BNC held in Pretoria in April last year, the two 
governments have agreed to set up a Regional Spatial Development Initiative Programme in 
the DRC, which was targeted at the promotion of large-scale infrastructure development and 
sectoral economic investment projects. 
One of the most momentous projects to come out of SDI is the Bas Congo Scoping Study. 
The significance of this SDI rests on the fact that the Inga Hydroelectric project was Africa's 
and possibly the world's largest hydro-electric power potential. This led to the current 
projects aimed at the rehabilitation of Inga I and Inga II and ones aimed at the development 
of Inga III which stand to generate power capacity to the excess of 40 000 megawatts.
332
 
The success of a project of this magnitude will open up a world of other possibilities that 
stand to benefit a wider range of sectors, for instance this project provides the basis for 
possible minerals exploitation and processing in the SDI area as well as the export power to a 
number of major demand centres across the African continent and the rest of the world. 
Through the link between the potential availability of very cheap electricity from Inga, an 
opportunity was created for a series of mining and minerals processing projects within the 
Bas-Congo SDI. A number of possible initiatives of this nature have since been identified: an 
aluminium smelter mooted for Matadi based on large bauxite deposits in the DRC, a 
magnesium smelter at Point Noire based on mineral deposits at Kouilou in the Republic of 
Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) and a possible aluminium smelter in northern Angola. The cross-
border nature of the economic linkages between elements of the Bas-Congo SDI suggests that 
it be promoted as a three-country initiative between the DRC, Congo and Angola. In so 
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doing, the SDI has the potential to serve as a catalyst for improved regional integration 
consistent with the objectives of NEPAD.
333
 
A sub-committee was established to promote joint mining ventures between South African 
and Congolese companies. A number of possible projects were identified by both parties, 
such as the mining of copper, cobalt, zinc and lead, amongst others. The DRC government 
has also asked South Africa to assist (both financially and in technical expertise) in the 
promotion of the country's new mining legislation, supporting the development of the Mining 
Cadastre (Unit working in the granting of mining and quarries tittles), and supporting the 
DRC in mining environment issue. 
The revitalization of the natural resource sector was seen as key to the reconstruction project, 
as issues on the war economy have been a major challenge for both the attainment and 
maintenance of peace in the DRC, thus necessitating for improved regulation and 
management of that sector. This has subsequently led to the establishment of a new 
investment code for the mining industry and a National Investment Promotion Agency that 
was "designed to be a one-stop window for processing investment applications and 
information.
334
" 
Also in the energy sector, a MOU was signed between the DRC's SENEL and South Africa's 
Eskom. The project will facilitate the Kimbanseke Electrification project, which was aimed at 
connecting 10 000 new customers at an estimated 10MW and it was estimated to come at a 
cost of approximately US$ 14 million. 
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5.9 Final Thoughts and Lessons Learnt for South Africa. 
Pretoria has played a critical role in the restoration of peace and security in the conflict ridden 
region of the Great Lakes. South Africa steered the peace processes in Burundi and the DRC 
from December 1999 and February 2002, respectively. Mandela's mediation in the Burundi 
process led to the historic signing of the Arusha Agreement on August 28, 2000 (Bentley & 
Southall 2005). Another milestone for South Africa in the peace process was witnessed when, 
under the guidance of then Deputy President Jacob Zuma, the Burundians held a referendum 
on the new power-sharing constitution on 28 February 2005. 
In the case of the DRC, South Africa secured a peace agreement between the government and 
the various warring factions when the Global and Inclusive Accord was signed in Pretoria on 
the 17 December 2002. The agreement made provisions for a transitional constitution and a 
power-sharing government. This paved the way for the drafting of a new constitution in the 
DRC, which was unanimously adopted by the National Assembly in May 2005. Whilst there 
were initial delays, leading to the postponement of the presidential and parliamentary 
elections that had been scheduled for June 2005, in August 2006 the country held its first 
national election in 40 years. 
Pretoria's involvement in these two Great Lakes nations has provided it with important 
lessons. Perhaps the most important was that the peace processes are for the long haul and 
cannot be achieved overnight. They require patience and will by all parties concerned, as 
Southall (2006) rightly puts it, "a kind of painstaking 'babysitting' is necessary if most of 
Africa's deadly and protracted conflicts are to be successfully resolved". 
Similarly, while there can be no doubt on the fundamental contribution South Africa and 
other external actors have played in the brokering of peace and the move towards the 
establishment of constitutionalism within Burundi and the DRC, however the importance of 
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local ownership of the transition and reconstruction processes cannot be overemphasised. 
Parties to the conflict need to actively participate in ensuring that these projects are 
successfully realised, however, this is subject to the external actors taking a step back, so as 
to provide them with the necessary ground to do so. 
Another lesson learnt has been that, whilst very useful as a guiding tool, there are dangers in 
transposing external transition and peacekeeping models, which South Africa is guilty of, 
especially in Burundi. Whilst Mandela tried not to impose South Africa's transition model on 
the Burundians, but there were instances when he "stuck too narrowly to the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) model" (Southall, 2006:), and as such failed to 
acknowledge local "complexities and specificities" particularly the resource base of the 
conflict. The DRC model had a similar shortcoming in that it also failed to reconcile the 
economic dimensions of the conflict with the imperatives of peacemaking 
With regard to the promotion of constitutionalism in the Great Lakes region, the transition 
and peace processes have culminated with the hosting of elections in Burundi and the DRC, 
with Burundi being more successful at it. These developments were hailed as having marked 
an important step on the road to a more secure and democratic Great Lakes region. However, 
it was not that simple; anyone familiar with the history of the region can understand that the 
Great Lakes region has certain complexities and challenges facing it when it comes to 
building a stable democratic apparatus. 
Some of these challenges are specific to Burundi and the DRC, and the region in general, 
while others are typical of most aspiring democracies. It is generally accepted that in 
transitioning from one governmental system to another, there are almost unavoidable 
conflicts, as recent events in the DRC have shown us mainly various interest groups 
competing for the control of political power and economic resources. 
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Whilst both these nations have hosted democratic elections, one more successful than the 
other, what needs to be kept in mind is that elections in themselves do not produce 
democracies as our own continent's history clearly demonstrates. A number of our African 
counterparts have held elections in the last decade and yet democracy has remained an 
unattainable dream. Thus, the sustainability of the democracy in Burundi and that which was 
proposed for the DRC, including the envisioned democratic revolution in the Great Lakes 
was dependent on a number of things being taken into consideration. 
The first relates to the promotion of a political culture, which was seemingly lacking in the 
DRC. Such a culture is characterised by, amongst other things; a commitment to moderate 
political participation and a belief in the legitimacy of officialdom, which in turn influences 
political actions. This however has more to do with broad attitudes towards political 
institutions, authorities and processes in society that is imperative for the development and 
maintenance of a secure democracy. Equally important and closely related was, the 
empowerment of the civil society which in the case of Africa has to be strengthened, as it has 
been weakened by colonialism and authoritarianism which became a feature in the post-
independence era but will also lead to the motivation of civil servants and the recognition that 
they are the most important stakeholder in the process of reconstruction. 
Another major concern for South Africa and international community was that of establishing 
and ensuring security within the DRC and its monitoring of peace in Burundi in order to 
prevent the country from sliding back into conflict. To this end, South Africa has made great 
strides in Burundi through its insistence on the necessity for what it refers to as 
"developmental peacekeeping". This entails the deployment of peacekeepers together with 
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multidisciplinary teams of development economists, civil engineers, public development 
managers and policy developers, in support of the post-conflict reconstruction.
335
 
The DRC would also greatly benefit from the creation of a credible, multi-year plan of 
reconstruction, which has struggled to take effect due to the continuing of conflict in other 
provinces in the country. Thus, as suggested above, the termination of conflict and 
consolidation of peace becomes of critical importance. Such a mammoth task requires for as 
a prerequisite the disarmament of all armed forces, as they are a major impediment in the 
peace process and constitute a major threat to national security. Related to this, was the need 
for the formation of a new national army that will serve and protect all the Congolese 
irrespective of political affiliation. In addition, its existence will secure the DRC sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, which has been eroded by the constant presence of foreign rebel  
5.10 Conclusion 
Finally, any real solution regarding the political future of Burundi and the DRC, and the 
greater Great Lakes region, cannot lay solely on the shoulders of South Africa—it requires 
the participation of the entire global community. Therefore, the onus was on Pretoria to 
involve other global actors and multilateral institutions such as the UN, AU and the regional 
leadership in the funding and administering of the reconstruction projects. This involvement 
by the other players would also help in the altering of Congolese perceptions and the 
legitimization of the process, so that it is not viewed merely as a project of South African 
expansion. 
More importantly, South Africa's foreign policymakers registered successes in both Burundi 
and the DRC. Due to relative peace gains in the Great Lakes region, South Africa won 
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accolades globally. The major lesson learned by Pretoria was that the more it collaborates 
with the international community the more it realises its national role conceptions. 
Increasingly, South Africa was identified by the US, the European Union, Japan, China and 
numerous multilateral fora as an African leader to enter into strategic partnership with on 
matters concerning Africa. Hence, South Africa's national roles especially 'peacekeeper', 
'developer, 'bridge builder' and 'African partnership' proved to be useful in its interventions in 
Great Lakes region. The next chapter covers South Africa's intervention in Zimbabwe as our 
final case study for the thesis. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
SOUTH AFRICA'S ZIMBABWE QUAGMIRE: 2000 - 2008 
 
"Whatever the setbacks of the moment, nothing can stop us now! Whatever the difficulties, 
Africa shall be at peace! However improbable it may sound to the sceptics, Africa will 
prosper!" 
Thabo Mbeki
336
 
 
"Africa must rebel against the tyrants and the dictators, those who seek to corrupt our 
societies and steal the wealth that belongs to the people." 
Thabo Mbeki
337
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The post-apartheid South Africa's governing elite have long recognised the direct interplay or 
link between peace and security (as popularly referred to as democracy) on one hand, and 
development on the other hand. Thabo Mbeki's Presidency came into effect on the 16th of 
June 1999, on the banner of an African renaissance vision
338
. This vision epitomised a rather 
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rhetorical attempt at giving South African foreign policy a new Afro-centric posture. In 
essence, the African renaissance idea sought to achieve, "democracy, good political and 
corporate governance, and respect for the rule of law.
339
" South Africa's Africa policy under 
Mbeki assumed a much larger leadership role on the continent. This was particularly true in 
the area of peace and security.
340
 South Africa worked tirelessly within Africa's multilateral 
structures such as SADC and the AU to respond decisively on matters of peace and security. 
Furthermore, Pretoria reached out to the international community through structures such as 
the United Nations (UN), Group of Eight developed countries (G8), the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), and the Commonwealth to assist Africa in attempts to resolve escalating 
conflicts and underdevelopment.
341
 This Afro-centric policy approach raised wide support for 
South Africa to assume a leading role in Africa. It was expected that Pretoria's leadership 
would largely be underpinned by the African renaissance vision reflected in the continental 
programme of the New Partnership for Africa's Development NEPAD. In these documents, 
Africa's leadership pledged to respect human rights and the democratic form of governance. 
When Mbeki was confronted by Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis, he chose what has 
been widely, and redundantly (since diplomacy is inherently 'behind-the-scenes and out of the 
public glare), billed as 'Quiet Diplomacy' as South Africa's preferred foreign policy option. In 
so many ways, this approach seemed fundamentally at odds with post-apartheid South 
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Africa's African renaissance vision
342
. Indeed, setbacks and inconsistencies of President 
Mbeki's 'Quiet Diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe illuminated two important aspects for 
purposes of analysing of South Africa's foreign policy. This chapter seeks to critically assess 
and analyse the aims and rationale of Pretoria's Zimbabwean diplomacy. It asks: 'to what 
extent has 'Quiet Diplomacy' advanced or hindered South Africa's Africa policy in the period 
1999 – 2008 articulated as promoted Africa's renaissance within the context of NEPAD?' and 
'what are the lessons learnt from South Africa's diplomacy towards Zimbabwe?' To fully 
appreciate this strategy towards Harare, one should and must, put the nature and character of 
the country's political, economic, and social ills into its historical perspective. 
6.2 Defining Quiet Diplomacy 
For Mbeki and his lieutenants, South Africa was expected to play a critical role in Africa's 
regeneration. Mbeki defined the country's role conception
343
 (See Kalevi Holsti in Chapter 
Two) as one of a 'midwife in the rebirth of the African continent'. This meant South Africa 
was poised to play a leadership role in achieving democracy and development on the 
continent. Central to this objective was the idea of building 'partnerships' with both the 
northern and southern countries, particularly those in Africa.
344
 South Africa's national role 
conceptions envisioned by Mbeki required Holsti's foreign policy options such as persuasion, 
the offer of rewards, the granting of rewards, the threat of punishment (which can be divided 
into two types: positive threats and threats of deprivation), the infliction of non-violent 
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punishment and finally force.
345
 Holsti's foreign policy option of persuasion (commonly 
known as Quiet Diplomacy) appeared to be the defining feature of South Africa's Africa 
policy thrust. It is within this context that the chapter critically looks at Mbeki's 'Quiet 
Diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe.
346
 
It's perhaps important to provide a brief historical context in which the term quiet diplomacy 
arose. Henry Kissinger asserts that, 
Those who seek eagerly for a diplomacy victory will invariably lose since a unilateral 
victory has no hope of being maintained, as no country will want to adhere to an 
agreement that is against its own interests.
347
 
Henceforth, moderation and pragmatism in diplomatic practice can be termed 'quiet 
diplomacy'. In simple terms, Collin defines quiet diplomacy as, "discussing problems with 
officials of another country in a calm way.
348
" Additionally, quiet diplomacy can be seen as 
an essentially behind-the-scenes process; one that eschews public diplomacy. The two can be 
complementary wherein the one leverages the other. 
'Quiet diplomacy' can be traced to many global incidents which helped to define and shape 
the current international order. One such major event that raised heated debates surrounds the 
causes of the Second World War (WWII). There are numerous terms that are often used in 
scholarly circles with meanings almost similar to 'quiet diplomacy. For instance, criticisms 
against 'quiet diplomacy' largely stems from British Prime Minister Chamberlain's responses 
to Hitler's hegemonic ambitions in Europe.
349
 Chamberlain's attempts to engage Hitler 
'constructively' to avoid war, however, was perceived to be 'appeasement.' Chamberlain was 
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seen as too 'soft'. What has not been fully resolved in international relations was the question 
of when a country should deviate from quiet diplomacy.
350
 Oftentimes it was more 
appropriate to not take a high visibility public approach to problem-solving in international 
relations. Further to this, how and under what circumstances can discrete, quiet diplomatic 
engagement interact in complementary fashion with public diplomacy? 
Quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe was widely associated with the customary approach of 
African leaders toward political problems on the continent. However, South Africa's modern 
self-identity as a bridge-builder between the developed world and developing countries, 
(particularly Africa), soon became a defining feature of its Africa policy conundrum – 
otherwise known as the crisis in Zimbabwe. In the post-Cold War and post-apartheid era, 
South Africa successfully reshaped and redefined the content and identity of its foreign 
policy.
351
 Thus, Pretoria, according to the architect of its post-apartheid Africa policy – 
Thabo Mbeki – was supposed to, 'walk on two legs', one in the developed world, and other in 
the developing world.
352
 This role definition required Pretoria to play a leadership role on the 
African continent with the assistance of developed countries, while trying to assert its 
independence vis-a-vis on the continent as well as the western states. In other words, South 
Africa found itself caught between the demands for human rights and democracy enshrined in 
its own constitution and enforced by developed countries - and an increasingly dictatorial 
President Robert Mugabe, former liberation champion and Pan-African hero.
353
 In walking 
this tight-rope and bridging the African and Western diplomatic divides, South Africa, under 
Mbeki, chose to pursue its own national interest (pragmatism) at the expense of emphasising 
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the normative values of democracy. Values that have been instilled in its African Agenda, 
African Renaissance and NEPAD. 
As a leader of the African developing world, Pretoria moralistically insists it could never 
exploit weaker states.
354
 As its power and wealth grew, however, South Africa was 
increasingly judged for its actions than its foreign policy rhetoric. South Africa wanted to 
play a constructive role in Africa and provide a useful model for the successful modernization 
of a developing country, (including military–to-military contacts), and long-standing 
relationship with many nations on the continent. Like South Africa, Zimbabwe political 
dispensation came about through negotiation which produced the Lancaster Agreement 
signed among the warring parties in London in 1979. The thorny issue in the Lancaster 
Agreement was the land question, a matter that haunted the county thirty years in freedom 
from colonialism. 
6.3 The Land Question 
Zimbabwe's political crisis and economic meltdown was by and large rooted in the Zanu-PF 
regime's fast-tracked land redistribution policy. The land crisis in Zimbabwe had its roots in 
the country's colonial history.
355
 The land question was a source of great political conflict 
both within indigenous black communities and the so-called white settlers. The colonialists, 
first under British colonial rule and later under the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) regime, seized control of the vast mass of good agricultural land, leaving black 
peasants to scrape a living from marginal tribal reserves.
356
 The land issue would 
subsequently become the inheritance of the independence government, which, as suggested 
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above, came into power after a protracted war of liberation; one in which land was a critical 
issue of major contestation. This would subsequently lead to a settlement known as Lancaster 
House Agreement (1979), and would, in turn, lead to the elections of 1980.
357
 
Whilst the land question had been successfully negotiated, and allowed for a ceasefire and 
elections, this was only a temporary measure for it did not solve the land question. Robert 
Mugabe's government was bound by the "sunset clause" in the Lancaster House Agreement 
that gave special protections to white Zimbabweans for the first ten years of independence.
358
 
Due to the provisions of the clause, Moyo suggested that land reform in Zimbabwe, at least 
until 1996, had to be pursued within a state-centre but market-based approach.
359
 According 
to the provisions, the new government would not engage in any compulsory land acquisition 
and when land was acquired the government would "pay promptly adequate compensation" 
for the property. Additionally, land distribution would also take place in terms of "willing 
buyer, willing seller".
360
 Thus, from 1985 every vendor of land was required to obtain from 
the government, a "certificate of no present interest" in the acquisition of the land concerned 
before going ahead with the sale.
361
 
About 65% of the land acquired on the market was procured by 1985, through the Normal 
Intensive Resettlement programme. In support of this initiative Britain provided grants worth 
approximately £33 million (US$44 million) during the 1980's for market land acquisition as 
well as for various resettlement inputs.
362
 This money was viewed as aid rather than 
reparations and provided as a matching grant to Government of Zimbabwe's own inputs. 
                                                          
357
 Loc. cit. Human Rights Watch. 2002. 
358
 http://www.Unhcr.org/reform/topic.459e72982 
359
 Moyo, S. The Land and agrarian Question in Zimbabwe. 
http://networkideas.org/feather/dec2004/conference_papers/land_agrarian_question_zimbabwe_sm.pdf 
  
360
 Adams, H. "Redistributive land reform in Southern Africa." Natural Resource Perspectives, 64. 2001. 4. 
361
 Loc. cit. Human Rights Watch. 2002. 
362
 Moyo, S. Land reform in South Africa: constructive aims and positive outcomes. 2004. 62. 
http://wwikas.de/wf/doc/kas_18654_544-1-30 pdf. 
 156 
Nonetheless, there were many challenges associated with this programme. The primary 
problem was that many of the farms purchased on the market included those which had been 
illegally occupied by peasants though an official programme, then called 'the Accelerated 
Land Resettlement Programme', aimed at complementing the 'normal' programme. As a 
result, this initiative was met with severe opposition.
363
 
Furthermore, the market-based land acquisition approach did not meet up with expectations, 
as land reform in the period 1980 and 1986 was very slow. During this time about 430,000 
hectares were acquired each year, including land abandoned by white farmers in the liberated 
zones during the war. This land was resettled to about 70,000 families, but failed to reach the 
set target of 162,000 families for resettlement.
364
 This shortfall can largely be attributed to 
government policy, as it tended to place greater emphasis on agrarian reforms and rural 
development within the peasant sector. Thus agricultural research, extension services, roads, 
and marketing depots, education and health became the focus, as opposed to land 
redistribution and national agrarian restructuring.
365
 
When the Zanu-PF government was finally released from the constraints of the Lancaster 
House Agreement in 1990, it amended the provisions of the constitution concerning property 
rights, thus creating opportunity for the compulsory acquisition of land for redistribution and 
resettlement. The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 further strengthened governmental powers to 
acquire land for resettlement, subject to the payment of 'fair' compensation.
366
 This was fixed 
by a committee using set non-market guidelines, and included powers to limit the size of 
farms and introduce a land tax. A 1994 land tenure commission also recommended that the 
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best way to achieve vital redistribution was through a land tax, although no tax was in fact 
put in place.
367
 
Despite the new laws, the government land acquisition and resettlement in practice, like in 
the first decade after independence, was fairly limited. Moyo argued that by the end of the 
second decade of independence, the pace of land reform had declined; pointing to the fact 
that less than one million hectares was acquired for distribution during the 1990s and fewer 
than 20,000 families were resettled.
368
 Thus by the end of what was referred to as 'phase one' 
of the land reform and resettlement programme in 1997, the government had resettled 71,000 
families, instead of the set target of 162,000 on almost 3.5 million hectares of land. As a 
result, more than one million families still eked out an existence on sixteen million hectares 
of poor land, thus making Zimbabwe one of the most unequal countries in the world.
369
 
6.4 The International Dimension of the Zimbabwe Land Crisis 
However, we cannot downplay the role of the international community in, initially, creating 
or aggravating the situation in Zimbabwe, and subsequently in its failure to change the 
racially skewed nature of the country's land ownership. Moyo argued that the major gap in 
the international relations and development assistance cooperation between the government 
of Zimbabwe and the international community since 1980 has always been their limited 
collaboration over and funding of land reform.
370
 As such, land acquisition and infrastructure 
were thus under-funded by both Harare and the donor community. Another contributing 
factor has been that Zimbabwe's land reform has largely been seen by the international 
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community as a bilateral UK-Zimbabwe issue, and thus has not received the necessary 
attention and commitment, as had been negotiated in the Lancaster Agreement.
371
 
The differences between the government of Zimbabwe and the international community, 
particularly Britain, over land reform reached a height in 1997. President Mugabe and British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair openly disagreed about Zimbabwe's responsibility for redressing 
land reclamation. Subsequently, Britain's Minister for International Development Clare Short 
wrote to the Zimbabwean government stating that, "we do not accept that Britain has a 
special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe.
372
" As a result, 
Zimbabwe accused the new British government of following the same racist policies as its 
predecessors.
373
 
In the wake of the government's notice of compulsory acquisition of 1,471 farms-about 3.9 
million hectares and increasing confrontation between the British and the Zimbabwean 
government over the financing of land transfers, an international donors' conference on land 
reform and resettlement was held in September 1998. A set of principles was adopted to 
govern "phase two" of land resettlement in Zimbabwe and a promise of donor funds, but 
there were conditions though, including improved governance of the land reform process, a 
poverty reduction approach the implementation of, market friendly land reform programmes 
and, the use of the rule of law.
374
 
These conditions were seen by the Zanu-PF led government as a stalling strategy. 
Consequently, relations between the concerned parties reached an all-time low in 1999, when 
the conference failed to deliver economic aid or finance for land reform. This escalated when 
the Mugabe saw the international community as having embarked on a coordinated political 
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regime change track, rather than on a development dialogue process, given its alleged support 
for the new Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the opposition party and its civil 
society alliance.
375
 
These differences between Harare and London and the latter's failure to meet the costs of land 
purchase were to have profound impact on the Zimbabwean community. By 1999, eleven 
million hectares of the richest land were still in the hands of about 4,500 commercial farmers, 
the great majority of them white. Moreover, some farms purchased for redistribution had in 
fact been given to government ministers and other senior officials rather than to the landless 
peasantry.
376
 Most rural black Zimbabweans continued to suffer immense poverty. In the face 
of government failure to deliver, grassroots land occupations were already taking place in the 
1980s and 1990s; in many cases government security forces then removed people from the 
land with some brutality. This was particularly the case in the context of the conflict in the 
1980s in Matabeleland between Zanu-PF and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), 
the other main liberation movement, which drew its support base from among the Ndebele 
people. By late 1997 and 1998, much larger scale occupations took place.
377
 
6.5 Structural Adjustment: The Beginning of an Economic Meltdown 
Exacerbating these problems was a growing economic crisis in the country, which was the 
same in most African countries. Zimbabwe was once considered the most successful 
democracy in Africa, with a strong economy. The country's economic growth surpassed the 
average global growth rate in the 1980s, expanding at much higher than the average growth 
of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, Zimbabwe found itself in the midst of a security 
dilemma—overwhelmed by mismanagement, corruption, political violence and economic 
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crisis.
378
 A question that begs an urgent answer was; what went wrong in Zimbabwe and what 
were the major factors at play? 
The situation in Zimbabwe can largely be attributed to the introduction of the International 
Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Programmes. Unlike other developing countries, 
Zimbabwe was not suffering from an unsustainable foreign debt crisis when it turned to the 
IMF for help with its budget deficit in the late 1980s. However Jean Shaoul argued that, far 
from helping Zimbabwe's economic development, the aim of the SAPs outlined in the 
Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95), was to remake Zimbabwe's economy in the 
interests of the transnational corporations.
379
 
To understand the role of the IMF and its policies in Zimbabwe in setting the stage for future 
instability it's useful to briefly examine post-independence Zimbabwe's economy. 
Independent Zimbabwe inherited an economy with a diversified productive base that was 
more industrialised than most countries in Africa, a well-developed infrastructure and a 
relatively sophisticated financial sector. The average growth rate in the first decade after 
independence (1980-89) was 5%, up from 4% in the previous decade; the comparative 
growth rates for the global economy and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s were 3.1% and 
2.3% respectively.
380
 
However, Zimbabwe, like its counterparts, was also experiencing the usual disparities in 
income and wealth distribution, a labour force needing skills, and heightened shortages of 
basic needs - ranging from land to housing to water and energy – and all this by a large part 
of its population. In other words, it faced the customary developmental challenges in the 
African context. Overall, however, the Zimbabwean economy had a great deal going for it in 
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the first decade of independence. Foreign investors, bankers and aid agencies ignored the 
official Marxist-Leninist policies and were prepared to invest in, or lend to, Zimbabwe. 
Indeed, towards the end of that decade GDP (admittedly aided by recovery from drought) 
grew faster than at any time since the 1960s – 7.4% (1988), 5.4% (1989) and 6.4% (1990).381 
The collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War forced the Mugabe government 
into a policy U-turn in 1991, which saw the abandonment of its socialist-inclined policies in 
exchange for market-driven economic policies in the form of an Economic Structural 
Adjustment Plan (ESAP).
382
 The decision to adopt the ESAP in 1990/91 was driven by a 
combination of donor pressure – the World Bank had virtually withdrawn from lending to 
Zimbabwe because of its economic stance in the late 1980s – and by local business pressure. 
The ESAP followed the same logic as those imposed by the IMF all over the world in the 
1980s. It basically liberalised the country's economy, cutting social spending, privatising 
publicly owned companies and above all opening up the economy to foreign capital.
383
 
The introduction of the ESAP, as with the rest of Africa, had devastating effects on 
Zimbabwe. It struck at the very heart of the political and economic programme followed by 
Mugabe's government since independence. This was to expand social and public services 
while leaving the white settler community's share of the country's land, wealth and income 
intact. By cutting social provision, structural adjustment removed the very limited safety net 
for the nation's people at the same time as increasing the overall level of poverty.
384
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By 1994, the cost of financial "liberalisation", devaluation, hikes in interest rates and the 
other measures that come with SAPs, meant that the cost of government debt more than 
doubled from 13 percent of domestic revenue in 1989 to 27 percent in 1994.
385
 Since the 
payment of this debt to the international banks could not be avoided, and tax revenues had 
fallen, the burden of adjustment fell on non-debt expenditure. All factors combined, 
Zimbabwe experienced led to a massive contraction, (equal to 15 percent of GDP between 
1992 and 1995) in order to meet the IMF's fiscal targets. In absolute terms, the fiscal deficit 
actually increased over the period.
386
 
Social services suffered deep cuts. The effects on education were catastrophic. Over the 
period 1990-94, there was a 20 percent decline in real spending on primary education. Taking 
into account increased enrolment, real expenditure per pupil fell by about 40 percent. The 
deterioration in social provision and rising costs have also led to the re-emergence of diseases 
such as cholera, malaria and yellow fever, and the spread of new ones such as HIV/AIDS. 
With 25 percent of those aged 15 to 49 infected with the HIV virus, Zimbabwe is the worst 
affected country in Africa.
387
 
The deterioration of social conditions in Zimbabwe has been aggravated by increasing 
poverty, especially in rural areas. During the first half of the 1990s, poverty increased 
dramatically in rural areas. Urban poverty has also intensified. This was as a result of the 
increasing rates of urban unemployment, largely attributed to the lowering of tariff barriers in 
the economy. This had devastating consequences, as it led to the closing down of a number of 
factories and destroying more than 50,000 jobs. Manufacturing output also plummeted from 
32% of the GDP to 14.5% in 1992; real wages went down, inflation went up and economic 
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growth stagnated. The economic crisis was compounded by a drought in 1992 and another in 
1995.
388
 
By 1997, Zimbabwe was in the throes of a serious economic and political crisis. Spiralling 
food and fuel prices inspired opened the floodgates for a massive movement of all sections of 
society against the government's neoliberal inspired economic policies, as advocated by the 
World Bank and the IMF. Growing militancy, especially amongst workers became the order 
of the day and as a result between 1997 and 1998 there were a record number of strikes 
involving more than 1 million workers.
389
 Despite the domestic financial problems, in June 
1998, the government sent the first of what would eventually be 11,000 soldiers from the 
Zimbabwean army to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to fight in support of the 
government of President Laurent Kabila, thus further exacerbating the country's economic 
problems.
390
 
What followed was an unprecedented economic crisis. The economy took declined 
tremendously and the Zimbabwean dollar was devalued by more than 80% as a result of these 
moves. The international lending institutions refused, or chose not to acknowledge, the 
devastation caused by their policies on the Zimbabwean economy and the effects it had on 
society in general. Instead they went on to demand more cuts, more privatisation and an end 
to food subsidies, despite the fact that this approach had already caused "IMF-riots" all over 
the world. However, this was now more than the government could bear. Mugabe was fast 
realising that the state was beginning to lose its legitimacy because of the failure of the neo-
liberal policies. Thus the government increasingly refused to implement the plans of the IMF 
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and at the end of 1999 both the IMF and the World Bank suspended their loans, culminating 
in a threat of expulsion in 2005.
391
 
In its bid to service its large debt burden the Zimbabwean finance ministry, from 2001, 
solicited US$1.4 million each quarter to make token payments on the debt, and from mid-
2003 through 2004 found US$16.5 million to send to the IMF.
392
 It was also at this point that 
the country ran out of petrol and many other essential imports. As a result, by mid-2005, 
Mugabe had run up repayment arrears of US$295 million to the IMF, and more than US$1 
billion to other lenders, including the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The 
total foreign debt that was either in arrears or about will come due in the next decade is 
US$4.5 billion, far more than the national GDP in a given year.
393
 What was regrettable about 
the country's high indebtedness was that it was the Zimbabwean masses that have been 
hardest hit by the crisis, as it was their economic security that has been, and continued, to be 
sacrificed in order to prevent their government from sinking further into insolvency. This 
serves as an indicator (not only for Zimbabwe, but for much of Africa) that, not only have the 
remedies of the IMF been bitter, but the patients are clearly not recovering, and chances of 
ever recovering look very bleak.
394
 
6.6 The Failure of Structural Adjustment and the Genesis of a Security 
Dilemma 
It was clear that political consequences would follow in the shape of a loss of political 
support for the Mugabe government. Civil discontent led to an outcry for economic and 
political reform, eventually leading to a banding together of representatives from a wide 
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range of interests groups to form a new political party, the MDC in 1999.
395
 The creation of 
the MDC in 1999 was the first time in Zimbabwe's post-independence history that an 
opposition party had succeeded in creating a genuinely national movement, and thus 
represented a real threat to the ruling party.
396
 In particular, the MDC was the first party to 
attract support from white Zimbabweans, and received significant financial support from the 
white business and commercial farming communities, whose interests were being threatened 
by the increasingly radical speeches of the government regarding the land question and 
therefore saw the party as the only political tool they could use to defeat Mugabe.
397
 
From the onset there were different groupings with different political and ideological 
orientations within the broad MDC formation. On the one hand, there were the workers who 
wanted an independent political voice in order to fight against what they perceived as 
neoliberal policies implemented by the government. On the other hand, there were forces 
from the middle-class, the Church, and NGOs, who opposed Zanu-PF's undemocratic 
tendencies. These factions within the party contributed to their limitations in forming a 
formidable force against the Mugabe government.
398
 
The effects of the unstable economy on the domestic political balance of power came as no 
surprise, as a government's legitimacy rests on its ability to secure a minimum standard of 
living and the effective distribution of resources for its citizens. Government's failure to do so 
led to fierce competition especially when, as in the case of Zimbabwe, the available surplus 
of these resources was limited. This was especially the case where there was an absence of 
strong institutions in areas of governance, the judiciary, and social investment to absorb 
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economic shocks and manage and satisfy competing resource demands, including national 
elites' own predation on resources. 
6.7 The Third Chimurenga 
The crisis in Zimbabwe was set in motion by the watershed constitutional referendum held in 
February 2000, which was met by major opposition culminating in its rejection by a majority 
'no' vote. The constitution was rejected on a number of grounds. Chief amongst these was that 
it made provisions that would greatly strengthen the executive at the expense of parliament; 
increase executive powers with respect to military intervention within or outside Zimbabwe; 
introduce compulsory national service; allow for an unlimited presidential term of office for 
the present incumbent; and absolve government from having to pay compensation for any 
expropriated land if Britain did not make funds available.
399
 In addition, according to Brian 
Kagoro, "It was a protest vote against the manner in which the constitution-making process 
had been carried out by the government
400
", as well as "an angry protest against the 
performance of the government and parlous state of the economy
401
". 
This unprecedented defeat of the Zanu-PF government by the MDC and others increasingly 
outspoken critics of his government, precipitated the largely state-sponsored land invasions, 
political violence, institutional interference and economic decline. It also and the beginnings 
of what the ruling party refers to as the third Chimurenga.
402
 The starting point was the run-
up to the June 2000 elections where the ruling party used the land reform issue, as a tool to 
regain political support and legitimacy which was on a decline. "Land is the Economy; the 
Economy is Land" became the Zanu-PF campaign slogan, which revived the call for radical 
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land redistribution to fulfil the promises made at independence.
403
 This in turn gave official 
blessing to a new wave of land occupations led by members of the War Veterans Association 
that had rapidly accelerated following the referendum result. Members of the army were also 
involved in coordinating and facilitating these occupations, which saw an occupation of more 
than 1,000 of the country's 4,500 commercial farms.
404
 
It was at this point that Mugabe became an international pariah in the eyes of what he 
considered as imperialist powers, particularly Britain. They complained about violence 
against white farmers, having previously been silent on the face of widespread repression 
against workers during the 1997-98 strike movement, and opposed the 'fast-track land 
reform'. However, it is worth noting that the 'fast track' resettlement programme has largely 
been unsuccessful, as it did not realise its set objectives. It was hoped that this programme 
would lead to the stimulation of successful small- and medium-scale capitalist farming, but 
this never materialised, due to, according to Hammer, the government's failure to deliver 
critical farm inputs, technical services, infrastructure and security to new black settlers.
405
 
What had begun in Zimbabwe, as a working-class party resisting Mugabe's neoliberalism, 
bad governance, and need for economic security, had escalated into a politico-military 
security problem. The onset of the crisis had given rise to patterns of authoritarian repression 
in Zimbabwe, mainly directed at people claimed by government to be members or supporters 
of the political opposition.
406
 This period has also been characterised by the introduction of 
draconian legislations that severely restricted political freedom, such as the Public Order and 
Security Act, and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. These are aimed 
at curtailing freedom of expression led to the closing of political space and the closing down 
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of independent newspapers and persecution of independent journalists.
407
 Furthermore, there 
has also been an increase in 'de-professionalisation' of the bureaucracy, politicisation of the 
security services and armed forces, and militarisation of everyday life. The compulsory 
introduction into educational syllabus of 'patriotic history', Mugabe-ism'; and the inculcation 
of an ethic of suspicion and fear amongst ordinary citizens
408
 were indicative of this new era 
in Zimbabwe. 
Associated with both extremes of economic and political decline since 2000, was the wide 
scale internal displacement and severe impoverishment especially of ex-farm workers and 
also, increasingly, of opposition supporters. An even greater security issue concerns the mass 
exodus of citizens as both political and economic refugees to countries within the Southern 
Africa region, particularly South Africa.
409
 The integration of immigrant communities had 
become a major challenge not only for the South African government, but also for the entire 
SADC region. These immigrants, especially those that entered Zimbabwe's neighbouring 
countries illegally, were often socially excluded from these communities- where safety nets 
were not provided to ensure even their basic welfare, which was further exacerbated by 
problems of xenophobia that even barred them from securing any form of employment.
410
 
6.8 Enter Thabo Mbeki and South Africa 
There has never been any foreign policy issue that was so tied up to the South Africa's leader 
than the Zimbabwe's crisis. When Thabo Mbeki assumed leadership in 1999, all signals were 
clear that at the rate Zimbabwe was going, it could explode. This was due to the deteriorating 
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political and economic environment. As stated above, the land occupations and the 2000 
election campaign that followed the referendum and the defeat of Zanu-PF government were 
characterised by widespread violence and lawlessness.
411
 
The Zimbabwe situation posed a difficult challenge to the Mbeki presidency—as it did to 
SADC. The series of initiatives that South Africa took in pursuit of its quiet diplomacy may 
be subdivided between those undertaken between 2000 and March 2002 to date. Throughout 
2000 there was some hope that the land question could be resolved once the parliamentary 
elections were out of the way. The position of South Africa appeared to be that Zimbabwe 
had a genuine grievance in the land issue, and that the British government and white farmers 
should play facilitative roles in resolution of the issue. At the same time, Mbeki called for an 
end to the violence in the land reform programme and in the 2000 election campaign.
412
 
There was a series of four visits to Harare by President Mbeki, and another to Bulawayo, to 
open Zimbabwe's International Trade Fair. Bilateral meetings after the 2000 elections 
included the participation of senior South African ministers with their Zimbabwean 
counterparts on post-election plans for economic recovery, and a possible South African 
contribution to such a programme, with a particular focus on trade and finance issues.
413
 
More such ministerial meetings followed in 2001. South Africa also played a role in 
persuading the UN to dispatch an envoy to Harare to discuss possible assistance for the land 
reform programme. The envoy, Mark Malloch Brown, visited Harare in December 2000 for 
high-level talks relating to the land issue.
414
 
The Mbeki government also sought to draw upon a third party from outside the region to 
weigh in on its diplomatic overtures. It was President Obasanjo of Nigeria who accompanied 
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Mbeki to Harare to discuss both the land question and breakdown of the rule of law. This was 
the first of such visits by Mbeki and Obasanjo during 2001, 2002 and 2003. There was a 
sense in which the drawing of Obasanjo into the discussions with Harare was either an 
admission by Mbeki that he did not have the clout to convince Mugabe to change course, or 
an astute move to cover himself in case there was some negative fall-out from the discussions 
(particularly criticism of South Africa playing 'big-brother').
415
 Indeed, there was a not 
unreasonable assumption that Mugabe would take seriously the overtures of the two largest 
powers on the African continent. A great deal was at stake: the credibility of NEPAD was 
partly dependant on whether Mugabe would be nudged towards an abandonment of 
repression and lawlessness.
416
 This was because in the NEPAD document, it clearly stated 
that: 
The first priority is to address investors' perception of Africa as a "high risk" continent, 
especially with regard to security of property rights, regulatory frameworks and markets. 
Several key elements of the New Partnership for Africa's Development will help to lower 
these risks gradually, and include initiatives relating to peace and security, political and 
economic governance, infrastructure and poverty reduction. Interim measures for risk 
mitigation will be put in place, including credit guarantee schemes and strong regulatory and 
legislative frameworks.
417
 
In 2001 and 2002, both Mbeki and Obasanjo—through the Commonwealth - pursued the 
same goal, by difficulty, trying to restrain the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting's then chairperson, John Howard of Australia. Howard, as a representative of the so-
called 'White Commonwealth,' was prone to support those who pushed for tougher measures 
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against the Mugabe government. It fell to the two African leaders to restrain the 
Commonwealth from taking a more hard-line position, such as the expulsion of Zimbabwe 
from the organisation.
418
 
Meanwhile, there was little to show for these diplomatic initiatives by the Mbeki government, 
or those in conjunction with the Obasanjo government. It was not Mugabe's intention to 
reciprocate these overtures. He was bent on procrastinating on the issues of ending political 
violence and implementing land reform in an orderly and transparent manner. Sparks has 
observed that: 
Mugabe felt that he could twist Mbeki around his little finger. He seemed to enjoy 
publicly humiliating him. He did so right after the Victoria Falls summit of 2000. [A]t 
that meeting, Mbeki thought he had negotiated a deal in which Mugabe agreed to 
withdraw the war veterans from the farms they had started invading and occupying, in 
return for South Africa interceding with Britain to reinstate a 1998 donors' agreement 
to provide money to compensate those whose land was to be expropriated. But a few 
days later, Mugabe reneged on the deal by publicly encouraging the war veterans to 
continue occupying white farms.
419
 
This episode underlined what has been a consistent pattern: playing for time by the Mugabe 
regime in order to retain power and its consolidation, irrespective of efforts by Pretoria and 
SADC to defuse and/or resolve Zimbabwe's crisis must have been quite frustrating, for 
Mbeki. In 2001, there appeared to be a shift in the focus of quiet diplomacy approach. The 
new focus was on a possible post-Mugabe arrangement. Having identified Mugabe's 
leadership of Zanu-PF and his unreliability as a negotiating partner as problems, the shift was 
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to identify moderate and pragmatic elements in Zanu-PF that could be prepared to work out a 
deal with the MDC. This would become the path to Zimbabwe's recovery – with international 
assistance. This shift would form the basis of the concept of inter-party dialogue that could 
lead to a government of national unity, or at least a transitional administration that could 
restore normalcy and prepare for legitimate elections.
420
 The current end game search for a 
post-Mugabe scenario is defined by the March 29, 2008 elections won by the main MDC and 
its leader-in-waiting, Morgan Tsvangirai. This calls for Zanu-PF/MDC negotiations as the 
latest in inter-party dialogue. 
Several developments, beginning in March 2002 would put South Africa's mediating 
approach to severe test. The first related to Pretoria's assessment of the 2002 presidential 
election; the second its response to the Commonwealth's suspension of Zimbabwe in 2002 
and extension of suspension in 2003. Both the assessment and response by South Africa were 
widely perceived as tactically siding with the Mugabe government. This marked the 
beginning of a sustained criticism of the quiet diplomacy, both within South Africa, 
Zimbabwe the wider international community. 
Prior to the 2002 Zimbabwe's Presidential election South Africa's approach to the Zimbabwe 
question had still appeared even-handed, befitting its potential role of mediator between 
Zanu-PF and the MDC. However a puzzling development was the endorsement of the 
conduct and outcome of the election by a government-sponsored South African observer 
mission, headed by Sam Motsuenyane. The verdict that the result was 'legitimate' was made 
fairly quickly after the publication of the election outcome. This was contradicted by the 
assessments of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, the Commonwealth Observer Group and the 
Zimbabwe Election Support Network. They concluded that the election conduct and outcome 
were deeply flawed. Significantly an examination of SADC's norms and standards for 
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elections indicated that 11 of the most significant standards were flouted in the 2002 
election.
421
 The readiness of the South Africans to whitewash the election conduct and 
outcome was quickly followed by the undertaking (together with Nigeria) of a rapid initiative 
to persuade Zanu-PF and MDC to enter negotiations for a government of national unity. 
A similarly puzzling position was South Africa's stance on Zimbabwe during the 
Commonwealth summit in Abuja in December 2003. As a matter of principle, it was against 
the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. The Mbeki government in fact pushed 
for the lifting of the suspension on Zimbabwe, despite the fact that the latter had ignored the 
corrective measures on governance and electoral reform recommended by the 
Commonwealth. Pretoria preferred a quiet diplomacy approach to ensure that Zimbabwe 
remained within the Commonwealth, instead of the extension of Zimbabwe's suspension. 
The extent to which South Africa opposed the line orchestrated by most Commonwealth 
states stirred surprise in many quarters. Not only did South Africa unsuccessfully back a Sri 
Lankan candidate against the incumbent Secretary General, Don McKinnock, but also 
denounced the Commonwealth's extension of Zimbabwe's suspension together with several 
other SADC states, to the disappointment of Obasanjo. By the end of 2003 there was not 
much to show for quiet diplomacy as the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe showed 
no signs of abating. There were still no formal talks underway between the ruling Zanu-PF 
and the opposition MDC. The succession issue in Zanu-PF had been neutralised at its 
December 2003 conference, and repression continued. 
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6.9 Understanding South Africa's 'Softly, Softly' Approach 
According to Elizabeth Sidiropoulos and Tim Hughes,
422
 Mbeki raised South Africa's foreign 
policy stakes far higher, both in potential reward and in risk with regards to its policy in 
neighbouring Zimbabwe. South Africa's stance on the spiralling crisis in Zimbabwe was a 
reflection of the difficulty powerful states had in applying principle to situations on their 
doorstep. It is very clear that there was very little consensus among other regional players on 
the need for principled action, partly because the problem ailing Zimbabwe had not been seen 
by most states in the region as one of bad governance and corrupt leadership, but rather of 
addressing the unfinished business of its colonial legacy.
423
 
From the outset South Africa and President Mbeki were involved in developments in 
Zimbabwe. The President adopted a 'quietly, quietly approach', which as crisis progressed, 
emphasised principles of sovereignty in preference to South Africa's global vision for the 
continent. Implicit in this vision was the compromising of sovereignty in favour of pan-
African interdependence. Here, Zimbabwe's crisis and South Africa's predicament in trying to 
defuse it required that Pretoria deviate from this vision. This was informed partly by Mbeki's 
concern that he might lose influence over Mugabe in the protracted negotiations over the 
delicate resolution of the conflict in the DRC, where Zimbabwe still had troops.
424
 Hence a 
DRC/Great Lakes settlement took precedence over resolving Zimbabwe's crisis. It was also 
clear, given Mugabe's personality that it would be naïve to think that Zanu-PF would be 
compliant in the event of a concerted push to force it into an agreement with an opposition 
which could result in the government's removal from power and loss of its substantial 
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economic perquisites. Hence quiet diplomacy which allowed the target to save face was 
believed to be the most effective way of dealing with the crisis.
425
 
South Africa undertook much of its foreign policy engagement with Zimbabwe through a 
multilateral framework under the auspices of SADC. The possibility of sanctions was ruled 
out. Concern was expressed that any form of economic boycott could lead to an even greater 
flow of refugees across the Limpopo, South Africa's Northern Province bordering Zimbabwe 
and that it would harm the country's business interests in Zimbabwe. South Africa provided a 
lifeline to the Zimbabwean economy, which included extending credit lines for power 
supplies through its parastatal power supplier, Eskom. South Africa also acted as an 
intermediary between Zimbabwe and the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and 
also the UN Development Programme, especially on the issue of land reform. In addition, 
South Africa worked through SADC to find ways of resolving the crisis. However, it was 
only at the SADC Summit of August 2001, "where the tone of the final communiqué stressed 
the importance of respect for law and property in Zimbabwe", that the organisation could be 
said "to have begun to publicly recognise the damage that Mugabe's policies were doing to 
the region.
426
" In the ensuing period, Pretoria has announced on many different occasions that 
a breakthrough in talks between Zanu-PF and the MDC was imminent, only to have this 
refuted by one or other of the main actors. 
Critics of 'quiet diplomacy' identified the reasons for the policy's failure as being that the 
South African government did not gain domestic support, especially from the constituencies 
most affected by the Zimbabwean crisis. The unemployed in South Africa felt threatened by 
economic refugees from Zimbabwe, and therefore wanted to see decisive action from their 
                                                          
425
 Loc. cit.  
426
 Loc. cit. 
 176 
government to ensure that this threat does not materialise… similarly, South African business 
suffered major losses in Zimbabwe.
427
 
Indeed, Moeletsi Mbeki (brother to President Mbeki) argued that it was the South African 
government's conception of South Africa as a 'weak, poor, black African country', which was 
at odds with the perceptions of South Africans of all races that it was a 'rich', 'strong 
democratic country surrounded by weak countries, many of them ruled by incompetent 
and/or corrupt governments', and that it should therefore 'kick butt' in Zimbabwe.
428
 
It was not unreasonable to personalise South African policy on Zimbabwe. It was clear from 
research interviews and indeed all public pronouncements that South Africa's position on 
Zimbabwe has been formulated within the Presidency. This confirms the point that there are 
both costs and benefits accruing to Mbeki's stewardship of NEPAD. 
The upside was the political stature accruing from the leadership he had shown at 
international summits, especially those of the G8. The downside for the president was the 
heightened expectation in the international community and the G8 in particular that the 
architect of NEPAD will take all steps necessary to ensure that his brainchild was not 
damaged. This referred not so much to actions by African states that defy the principles of 
NEPAD, but more specifically to the presumption that Mbeki can make every effort to be 
seen to be exercising decisive leadership with recalcitrant leaders within Southern Africa, and 
in particular with respect to South Africa's most important trading neighbour.
429
 
That Mbeki failed to act decisively on Zimbabwe (or perhaps more accurately had failed to 
make any positive impact on the Zimbabwean crisis) was perplexing and damaging to 
NEPAD. That a raft of South African cabinet ministers who had paid official visits to 
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Zimbabwe , including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, failed to speak out against its human 
rights abuses and the threat to regional stability that Zimbabwe represents was equally 
disturbing. How can South Africa's seemingly paradoxical positions on NEPAD and 
Zimbabwe be explained? 
This was an opaque and complex question, but a number of points can be made. The first 
related to an existential question regarding NEPAD, and indeed its promotion within Africa. 
This question was not about what the document said, but rather what NEPAD wanted to 
achieve and what leverage it had to enforce its principle objectives. There are basic 
assumptions made within the NEPAD document about the common aspiration to peace, 
security, development, good political governance, sound corporate governance, and fiscal and 
economic discipline. Yet the achievement of these desiderata requires profound changes in 
the behaviour of some governments and elites in Africa. Did NEPAD represent a threat to 
such regimes; a threat without any leverage to back up its agenda? Despite NEPAD's 
adoption by the AU as its blueprint for Africa's recovery, the depth of Africa's commitment to 
its core principles across the continent was at best mixed. Demonstrably this was the case 
within the Zanu-PF government and for President Mugabe in particular. Simply put, NEPAD 
compliance is too high a domestic political price for despotic, corrupt and authoritarian 
regimes in Africa to pay. 
The second assumption was that South Africa had both the desire and the capacity to bring 
about fundamental political change in Zimbabwe, or at the very least, that it recognised the 
threat to NEPAD that Zimbabwe represented (as opposed to the threat that NEPAD 
represented to Zimbabwe's status-quo) and act in a manner that was designed to protect and 
promote the programme. There are a number of elements to this argument. The first related to 
South Africa's desire to see political change in Zimbabwe. This was far from obvious. 
Although the ANC enjoyed strong fraternal ties with the Zimbabwe African People's Union 
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(ZAPU), since its absorption into Zanu-PF the mantle of the party-to-party relationship had 
been transferred. Whilst the ANC recognised the Zanu-PF as the Zimbabwean party of 
liberation, this sentiment was not fully reciprocated by elements of Zanu-PF, who remained 
sceptical of the ANC's 'struggle credentials', particularly during the Rhodesian civil war. Also 
apart from reluctance of the ANC government to criticise a party with whom it enjoyed 
fraternal ties, it had worked extensively since 1994 not to be viewed as the political behemoth 
of the region. Given the country's massive economic size and increasing penetration and 
dominance by South Africa's private sector in Southern African region, this was an 
increasingly difficult position to maintain. 
Furthermore, there was a simplistic assumption made by some Western governments and 
activists that the Mugabe government and its policies were unpopular within South Africa 
and Southern Africa. Of late, this indeed became the case, especially in the wake of March 
29th elections won by the MDC and the lack of African legitimacy of the run-off 'won' by 
Mugabe. But it was not always the case, looking back over the years. Mugabe's enthusiastic 
reception at the World Summit on Sustainable Development Summit held in Sandton, South 
Africa surprised many his critics. 
Mugabe had, indeed, been an iconic popular figure in Africa, and received support (at least at 
the political level) from Angola, Namibia and on occasion Mozambique and Malawi. The 
only country to openly and consistently criticised the Mugabe government was Botswana, 
which in turn, had been accused by Harare of providing a military base to enable the US and 
Britain to overthrow the Zimbabwe government. South Africa was cognisant of Mugabe's 
African popularity, and Mbeki's power to act was further inhibited by domestic political 
considerations. These constraints relate to the fact that the ANC was elected to office as part 
of a tripartite alliance that had shown increasing signs of rupture because of the unpopularity 
of governmental economic policy. This last point had some bearing on the situation in 
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Zimbabwe, whose opposition MDC was a broad alliance of popular, business, civic and 
union movements. These groups are likely to enjoy stronger sympathy from the ANC's 
alliance partners than Zanu-PF itself. The South African government is publicly sceptical of 
the MDC on the grounds that it may be 'unfit or unprepared to govern'. Interestingly, this was 
an epithet used by many about the ANC before the party came to power in South Africa. 
There was also the inevitable accusation that the MDC was a front for, or supported by, white 
and Western interests. However the ANC government's real fear regarding the MDC was that 
if it came into power in Zimbabwe it could embolden the populist and union element within 
the tripartite alliance in South Africa that sought a fundamental departure from current 
government policy - or even a dissolution of the alliance - in favour of the establishment of a 
fully-fledged stand-alone political party that could contest elections against the ANC. Indeed 
a successful MDC in Zimbabwe might exert a worrying domestic demonstration effect on the 
ANC-led government.
430
 
Seldom discussed by foreign policy analysts attempting to understand South Africa's so-
called 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe – largely because it was difficult to assess - is the 
issue of interpersonal dynamics between President Mugabe and President Mbeki and, MDC 
faction leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. Mugabe once enjoyed regional and international status as 
'first amongst political equals' in the region, this position was usurped by President Mandela 
after 1994 much to the apparent bitterness of Mugabe. During Mandela's presidency, a 
notable example of antagonism that arose between the two countries was that of the role and 
function of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC). 
Mugabe wanted to keep the OPDSC entirely independent of the SADC summit of the heads 
of state. He wanted to chair it himself; while Mandela believed it should be accountable to 
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the summit.
431
 To add insult to injury, the special trade relationship that had existed between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe was phased out by Mandela's new post-apartheid government. 
Mandela's globally iconic charismatic stature however was too much for Mugabe to 
overcome, generating tensions that spilled over into other areas of regional inter-state 
relations within SADC. 
When Mbeki became president, reports held that the personal relationship between him and 
Mugabe was not good. Questions of traditional respect, age, seniority, struggle credentials, 
political philosophy and indeed competing intellects no doubt played a part Mbeki's failure to 
make a breakthrough with Mugabe. This may in part have accounted for the apparently 
increasingly active role played by Nigerian President Obasanjo during 2003 in attempts to 
resolve the Zimbabwean crisis. This included elements of shuttle diplomacy between Abuja, 
Pretoria and Harare.
432
 This came to an end when Obasanjo hosted the Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting in Abuja and Mugabe pulled Zimbabwe out of the body. 
Whatever tensions were observed between Mbeki and Mugabe, the South African president's 
relations with MDC leader, Tsvangirai was seen as troubled. Tsvangirai, in many perceptions, 
had evoked the experience of Zambia's controversial labour leader-turned-president Fred 
Chiluba. Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) had by electoral votes 
ousted long-sitting and a hero of the struggle against colonial and apartheid in Southern 
Africa, Kenneth Kaunda, who had mentored Southern Africa's liberation movements. 
Chiluba's farcical administration soon undermined his credibility, deepening suspicions of 
Western support for challengers of liberation movement regimes who had not emerged out of 
the struggle. This appeared to settle on relations between incumbent governments emanating 
from liberation movements and labour movements, with the emergence of the MDC out of 
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Zimbabwe's liberation movement coalition more or less coinciding with increasingly 
contentious relations between South Africa's ruling ANC and its COSATU alliance partner, 
reinforced by the fraternal ties between South African and Zimbabwean labour movements 
and the antagonistic relations that developed between them and their respective Zanu-PF and 
ANC regimes. 
For this reason, while Mbeki may have had troubled relations with Mugabe, he was accused 
of being biased against Tsvangirai. Moreover, some observers suggested that Mbeki and the 
ANC preferred an alternative Zanu-PF leader to Mugabe as opposed to seeing a Tsvangirai-
led MDC come to power. However, such a scenario had not materialised in Zimbabwe as 
former finance minister Simba Makoni's bid as an independent flopped, which left no real 
alternatively acceptable leader within Zanu-PF who could inspire international support. 
Hence speculations that Mbeki as well as Mugabe did not mind seeing MDC faction leader, 
Arthur Mutambara fill this role. Thus, even as MDC-Tsvangirai was perceived to have won 
the March 29, 2008 elections, leading to a round of Mbeki-led negotiations mandated by the 
AU and SADC to come up with a national unity government, speculation has been rife about 
the possibility of an Mbeki-Mugabe-Mutambara deal that could end up side-lining 
Tsvangirai, though this placed in jeopardy international support for Zimbabwe's recovery. 
This latest episode in Zimbabwe's endgame saga was strongly suggestive of critical 
importance of the inter-personal 'chemistry' operating as a major influence on 'quiet 
diplomacy,' and whether or not such an approach to conflict resolution can bear fruit, even 
with the African multilateral interventions of SADC and the AU. 
In light of the above, South Africa's handling of Zimbabwe had shown that there were limits 
to what can be achieved through a multilateral framework backstopping a bilateral political 
intervention aimed at mediating a political stalemate. South Africa regarded the establishment 
of an effective multilateral structure as the best way of dealing with conflicts in Africa. This 
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inspired its support for the creation of the current Peace and Security Council under the AU, 
which was the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts. Yet multilateral frameworks invariably produced a lowest common 
denominator consensus in situations which required quick and decisive action which were 
often politically difficult to take. The failure to make any substantial progress on a return to 
normality in Zimbabwe was also a clear marker that while a 'softly, softly' approach may be a 
good starting point for engagement, it may not be the ultimate way resolve the situation if 
there was insufficient political will in place, or political bias acting as leverage.
433
 In the 
wake of the latest SADC Summit installing Mbeki as the Chair as he neared the end of his 
term as president, there was concern that SADC's acquiescence in allowing Mugabe to 
reconvene a parliament, even though Zanu-PF was now in the minority, will generate yet 
another round of manoeuvres and manipulations that undermined the negotiations which 
were underway between Zanu-PF and the MDC. 
6.10 Conclusion 
South Africa learned more lessons about its foreign policy in Zimbabwe. The more obvious 
lesson was that it succeeds when its national role conceptions of leader, peacekeeper, bridge 
builder and African partnership converge with that of those most powerful states in the global 
arena, especially the US, Britain and other western countries. Although Mbeki achieved 
limited successes in his diplomatic approach towards Zimbabwe, his approach by and large, 
was in direct conflict with some of his African renaissance vision. It also further 
demonstrated sharply limitations of the country's national role conceptions. In a nutshell, 
national role conceptions, regardless of their perceived clarity or goof intentions, for a 
country in the middle global power ranking such as South Africa, tend to be either propelled 
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to higher heights or constrained by bigger powers. The next chapter serves as the thesis' 
conclusion; it focuses on the fourteen years of the Mandela – Mbeki presidencies (1994 – 
2008) a period specifically covered in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
LESSONS LEARNT: SOUTH AFRICA'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN 
AFRICA? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Before embarking on this discussion, it is imperative to emphasise that post-1994 South 
African foreign policy and implementation can be seen as falling into two phases. The first 
phase of the Mandela Presidency from 1994 - 1999 was based on the belief that a universal 
commitment to the promotion of human rights, democracy, justice and conflict resolution 
Africa's interests, "should be cornerstones of South African foreign policy.
434
". During this 
phase, South Africa was readmitted back into the international community, resuming its seat 
in the UN General Assembly in June 1994 and other relevant political and economic 
institutions of global governance. 
The second phase was during Mbeki Presidency's from 1999 to 2008 focused more on 
playing an influential role in world affairs by prioritising Africa's interests and focusing on 
the continent's links to a broader agenda of South-South cooperation. Packaged within the 
visionary call for an African Renaissance, priorities emphasised peacekeeping initiatives on 
the continent and the reform of African institutions and approaches to governance.
435
 In 
achieving these objectives, South Africa found itself in a conundrum. Scholars at the time 
noted that it still had much to learn: 
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In African terms, South Africa was still the newest African nation, so how could it assume a 
leadership role without causing offence to entrenched interests? If it were to deploy its 
considerable diplomatic, economic and military weight to pursue contentious foreign policy 
goals throughout the region, would it not be accused of acting like its bully apartheid regime? 
If it indeed walked a tight rope thus supporting democratic aspirations and condemned 
African tyrants on one hand, while stitching strategic partnerships with Western countries 
avoiding at the same time being labelled "blue-eyed boy of the West".
436
 
Furthermore, there was an ongoing debate among countries of the South, especially in Africa, 
that South Africa was perceived to be "too western, both in life-style and its support of issues 
considered to be the agenda of the North such as the observance of human rights and 
promotion of good governance.
437
" In an effort to better understand the dynamics that these 
dual roles created, this section reviewed the experiences analysed in the forgoing chapters 
involving countries where South Africa was directly involved in conflict mediation efforts 
and peacekeeping initiatives. The aim is to elicit lessons that may be gleaned from these 
experiences in Lesotho, Burundi, the DRC and Zimbabwe for what they conveyed about 
South Africa's post-apartheid diplomacy as a legitimately recognised African power. What 
are the lessons learned in Lesotho? 
7.2 South Africa's Military Incursion and Peacekeeping Missions in Africa 
7.2.1 Lessons Learned: Lesotho 1998 
Apart from President Nelson Mandela being brought up short in his effort to isolate Nigerian 
dictator Sani Abacha after the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa in 1995, the military intervention 
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in Lesotho culminated in a lengthy period of mediating the Kingdom's political crisis, which 
was a defining moment for South Africa's African diplomacy. Without drawing too much on 
the historical background between South Africa and Lesotho, it is important here to revisit 
the 22 September 1998 South Africa and Botswana deployment of around 8 000 troops under 
the SADC banner of "Operation Boleas". Its aim was to suppress unrest and prevent what 
looked like a coup in the making by junior officers of the Royal Lesotho Defence Force 
(RLDF).
438
 There were reported to have been casualties involving eight South Africans and 
58 Basotho troops. South Africa came in for withering criticisms from other SADC countries 
and the United Nations. Viewed from operational standpoint, it was seen as a failure because 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF) troops were deployed on the basis of 
"inadequate intelligence, orders and objectives, with the result that angry protesters were not 
prevented from burning down South African-related and government buildings in the capital 
Maseru.
439
". Some contended that the operation was taken without the UN approval. Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter states that no enforcement action can be undertaken by regional 
bodies, such as SADC, without prior approval by the UN Security Council. Accordingly 
South Africa, Botswana, and SADC failed to obtain prior authorization from the UN Security 
Council as required in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
440
 
One can argue that this operation seems to have changed the way South Africa was perceived 
on the continent. One of the reasons behind this was that the intervention evoked 'the bad old 
days' of "apartheid style military adventurism aimed at serving South Africa's economic 
interests". More specifically, it entailed securing the US$4 billion Katse Dam Project needed 
to supply water to the industrial heartland of South Africa.
441
 This 'motivation', one can 
argue, regarding Pretoria's intervention in a relatively poor country, led to the perception that 
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South Africa sought to play the role of regional hegemon, thereby fuelling the possibility of 
isolation within the continent. Pretoria would soon learn what it meant to be perceived as 
inspiring 'less than legitimate intent' by other African states. 
Notwithstanding the criticism directed towards this new nation, South Africa's intervention in 
the Mountain Kingdom was viewed at home with a different eye to that of the world. For 
Pretoria the Lesotho saga was seen as a milestone for its policy in the region, a form of 
initiation in the continent's conflict resolution and management arena. South Africa's 
intervention in the Basotho crisis marked the first time that the post-apartheid government 
ever deployed troops on foreign soil in a conflict situation. Of greater significance was the 
fact that the exercise served to impart invaluable lessons for future engagements and 
interventions within the SADC sub-region and farther afield in the continent. 
The controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the intervention in the Lesotho crisis in 1998, 
even though carried out under SADC auspices, underscored the urgency of the formulation of 
a policy on extra-territorial deployments of the type that occurred in Lesotho by both Pretoria 
and other SADC-member states. This was critical for preventing a reoccurrence of the 
Lesotho debacle. This would entail a number of things being taken into consideration, 
including: 
The extent to which all the major role players within the government have been informed 
and/or involved both the preparation and planning for and subsequent execution of such a 
mission should be determined. Informally a number of allegations have been made by 
prominent government representatives that they were either not informed or scantly informed 
of the plans for the Lesotho intervention. This raised the need, in line with the 
pronouncement of the White Paper, to identify the relevant role players in government and 
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ensure the institution of appropriate standard operating procedures at the highest level of the 
executive.
442
 
Beyond the domestic front it is also imperative to note that there is a 'check and balance 
system' at a sub-regional level that is used as a guideline for deciding involvement in 
continental peacekeeping missions. In this regard, Rocklyn Williams placed an emphasis on 
the importance of clearly set "legal and procedural mandates governing the participation of 
countries in peace missions" at different levels, namely the UN, the domestic mandate and, 
where applicable, regional and sub-regional mandates.
443
 Adhering to such guidelines would, 
in future, serve to legitimise peacekeeping operations. Involvement would have to be 
authorised by key actors at different levels. Such actions would thus prevent another Lesotho 
scenario and prevent scenarios where decision-making is sought from only one regional 
grouping, or that excluded other levels in the decision making process.
444
 Indeed, learning 
these lessons would reinforce South Africa's essentially anti-hegemonic tendencies in over-
reaction to the apartheid regime's destabilisation campaigns. 
Further, lessons learned for South Africa and the region included acknowledgement that any 
possibility for securing lasting peace and stability in Lesotho was highly reliant upon the 
formulation of a well-structured post-conflict reconstruction and development plan; one that 
would re-establish constitutionalism and nurture a conducive environment for the Kingdom's 
economic development. 
South Africa's intervention in Lesotho went far beyond military, it has contributed 
enormously in stabilising political, economic, and social issues bedevilling the country. Since 
2008, President Jacob Zuma has continued strengthening diplomatic relations with Maseru. 
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On the 12th of August 2010, President Zuma paid a state visit to Lesotho under theme; 
consolidating the African Agenda. This visit demonstrated the continuation to what Mandela 
and Mbeki had committed to Lesotho. Key among these was the joint venture on the Phase II 
of the Katse Dam and US$100 million South Africa committed to the construction of yet 
another water dam. South A 
7.2.2 Lessons Learned: Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
This section argued that South Africa's involvement in the peace processes in Burundi and 
the DRC to a larger extent reflected South Africa's commitment to peaceful conflict 
resolution, even if this view was not widely shared in the African continent. The discussion 
on 'lessons learned' will be predicated on this argument. 
The Burundian war dates back to 1993, when the first democratically elected president 
Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated. He was the first Hutu to serve as Head of State in a 
country where the minority Tutsi had historically been dominant. Since then many attempts 
were made to resolve conflict between the Hutus and the minority Tutsis.
445
 South Africa's 
involvement in Burundi began in August 1998, when Nelson Mandela became mediator in 
the peace process that subsequently led to the historic signing of the Arusha Agreement on 
August 28, 2000. Another milestone for South Africa in the peace process was when, under 
the guidance of then Deputy President Jacob Zuma, Burundians held a referendum on the 
new power-sharing constitution on 28 February 2005. 
Southall also argued that South Africa played a key mediation role in Burundi based on their 
capacity and neutrality as 'honest' brokers: 
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The deployment of South African troops as the key component of the International 
military force, on the grounds that no other African countries had either the capacity 
or willingness to undertake this key role…It was seen as an honest and neutral broker, 
and one that was prepared to commit to peace through its deployment of troops, by 
the UN, EU and IMF/World Bank.
446
 
The DRC experience is critically important due to its intertwining with South Africa's 
increasing involvement, at the time, in Zimbabwe's unfolding crisis which, in some degree 
was linked to Mugabe's DRC intervention. Hence, the other reason: the fact that Tshwane-
Pretoria and Harare came to occupy different, indeed adversarial, roles in the DRC/Great 
Lakes crisis. In the DRC, South Africa continued the role of 'honest, neutral broker' it was 
playing in Burundi. This was in an attempt to end the protracted conflict that had dominated 
the DRC since the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire. South Africa was criticised for 
refusing to intervene militarily in the DRC alongside Angola and Namibia as well as 
Zimbabwe. According to Landsberg, this move was seen by the DRC alliance as a double 
standard after South Africa refused to intervene on the side of the 'beleaguered' Kabila.
447
 
Landsberg further notes the serious tone of accusations and tensions at the time: 
Together with Mugabe, Dos Santos and Namibian president, Sam Nujoma, Kabila 
accused South Africa of promoting regional apartheid policies. The four leaders 
charged Pretoria with siding with Uganda, Rwanda and the Congolese rebels in an 
effort to topple Kabila and of harbouring Congolese rebels.
448
 
South Africa's involvement in the DRC had also been treated with suspicion that it was 
motivated by its commercial and trade interests in this mineral rich country. Further, some of 
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South Africa's companies were also accused of playing upon South Africa's lead in the peace 
process to take unfair advantage in securing contracts and business deals.
449
 
It has often been argued that South Africa's sole motivation for continued commitment to the 
peacemaking process in the Great Lakes is based on the rich economic opportunities 
available in the Great Lakes region, particularly in the DRC. The possibility that Tshwane-
Pretoria might view the DRC/Great Lakes stability in strategic stability terms linked to a 
broader African agenda is indeed, in Mbeki's renaissance vision, a possibility that has 
received little focus against the obvious economic dimension of South African capital. In 
South Africa's view, the crisis in the region underscored the importance of democratic 
governance, security and economic development to building African stability. It is for these 
very reasons that this section of the paper argues that Mbeki placed great urgency in the 
finding of a sustainable peace to Africa's conflicts as the foundational basis for envisioning 
an African Renaissance. According to this vision a 'new developmentalism' had emerged on 
the horizon for Africa: 
South Africans have in recent years elevated this notion to an ideology referred to as the 
"new developmentalism." For Mbeki, the 'new developmentalism' can only come about 
through a linkage approach to politics. Mbeki appears genuinely committed to economic 
takeoff and development in Africa. He has consistently articulated the view that South Africa 
can only prosper if the broader Southern African and African regions prosper. For South 
Africa to be stable, the rest of the region has to be equally stable. 
Despite criticisms over its true intent, South Africa's position eventually saw the withdrawal 
of a number of countries' troops from the DRC. These included troops from Zimbabwe, and 
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the signing of the Global and inclusive Accord by the warring factions in Pretoria on the 17 
December 2002. The warring factions made provisions for a transitional constitution and a 
power-sharing government. This paved the way for the drafting of a new constitution in the 
DRC, which was unanimously adopted by the National Assembly in May 2005. Whilst there 
were initial delays, leading to the postponement of the presidential and parliamentary 
elections that had been scheduled for June 2005, multi-party elections which were held in 
July, leading subsequently to a second round on the 29 October since neither Kabila nor 
Bemba gained 50 percent of the votes during the first round. 
Tshwane-Pretoria's involvement in these two Great Lakes nations provided it with a platform 
to put its Africa policy to the test and to build on the foundations that were laid by its 
problematic intervention in Lesotho. Drawing on its own experiences, and lessons learned, 
the Great Lakes crisis afforded Tshwane-Pretoria the opportunity to develop a philosophy of 
peacekeeping for the region. South Africa having just emerged from its own negotiated 
settlement gave the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki a more holistic perspective on 
conflict resolution. At times, it also allowed it to broaden the 'conventional parameters' when 
necessary in comparison to its counterparts.
450
 Beyond the reliance on home grown methods 
of conflict resolutions, South Africa's successes in the Great Lakes was also based on the fact 
that its diplomacy gained support from within Africa through the African Union and the 
Western world, particularly major global players including the former colonial powers. 
Henceforth, South Africa balanced its legs as it walked cautiously in both the "South and the 
North" in seeking peaceful resolutions in Burundi and the DRC. The direct benefits of such 
diplomatic strategy deployed in South Africa's mediations efforts in the Great Lakes region 
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were two-fold. First, Tshwane-Pretoria sought and gained trust within Africa (shedding off 
the lingering mistrust caused by the apartheid South Africa's destabilising hegemonic roles) 
At the heart of this newly established philosophy was the belief that, conciliatory forms of 
conflict resolution are the most viable methods for achieving durable peace and stability in 
the context of civil wars and similar crises on the continent. This position stems from the 
success of South Africa's negotiated settlement and from Mbeki's personal style of politics. 
He prefers the art of persuasion, and negotiations that he can direct, and has consistently been 
opposed to the blunt instruments of coercive diplomacy, accenting the use of force. Hence, 
mediation and facilitation of dialogue have emerged as a primary strategy of Pretoria in the 
brokering of peace deals in the continent's conflicts. 
Whilst they were very useful as a guiding tool, there were real dangers in using foreign 
transition and peacekeeping models. South Africa was certainly guilty of this, especially in 
Burundi. While Mandela tried not to impose South Africa's transition model on the 
Burundians, there were instances when he "stuck too narrowly to the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) model.
451
" As such, he failed to acknowledge local 
"complexities and specificities," particularly the resource base of the conflict. The DRC 
model had a similar shortcoming in that it also failed to reconcile the economic dimensions of 
the conflict with the imperatives of peacemaking. This highlights the importance of local 
ownership of the transition and reconstruction processes, so as to guarantee both the success 
and sustainability of the peace projects, which is of course subject to the external actors 
taking a step back, so as to provide them with the necessary ground to do so. 
The crisis in the Great Lakes region, with particular reference to the DRC case, has shown 
another lesson learned. Securing of peace agreements is a critical step in conflict resolution, 
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but it is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Further, it does not necessarily signal 
an end to conflict. Drawing this lesson learnt shows that there is more to peacemaking than 
the mere signing of agreements; a lesson learnt by Mbeki personally. This same lesson can be 
applied to the hosting of elections. Whereas both nations, Burundi and DRC, had held 
democratic elections; elections in themselves do not produce democracies. Indeed, the entire 
continent's history clearly demonstrates that a number of African leaders have held elections 
in the last decade, but that democracy has remained an elusive dream. 
These lessons and achievements however minimal, have been hailed as having marked a 
critical step towards a more secure and democratic Great Lakes region. It is not that simple, 
however. Anyone familiar with the history of the region understands that the Great Lakes has 
certain complexities and challenges facing it when it comes to building a stable democratic 
apparatus. Some of these challenges are specific to Burundi and the DRC, and the region in 
general while others are typical of most aspiring democracies. It is generally accepted that in 
transitioning from one governmental system to another, there are almost unavoidable 
conflicts, as recent events in the DRC have shown, due to various interest groups competing 
the control political power and economic resources. 
All of this highlights the lesson of continuous engagement by Tshwane-Pretoria and the 
international community during the post-transition phase. It is important for these players to 
oversee reconstruction in these countries so as to prevent any chances of sliding back into 
conflict, as the stability and the maintenance of a fully functional democracy, is reliant upon 
it. To this end South Africa has embarked on a project referred to as "developmental 
peacekeeping". This entails the deployment of peacekeepers together with multidisciplinary 
teams of developmental economists, civil engineers, public development managers and policy 
developers, in support of the post-conflict reconstruction. This involves engaging other South 
African ministries and departments in the process in addition to foreign affairs. Tshwane-
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Pretoria's efforts in this regard have culminated in the establishment of bilateral cooperation 
between Pretoria and both the governments of Bujumbura and Kinshasa. 
South Africa's successes in the Great Lakes region rest on its continued commitment to using 
a multilateral approach. Multilateralism is both a primary goal and primary strategy of South 
Africa's foreign policy. This approach is consistent with the country's negotiated settlement 
and pluralist politics and with the emphasis in African state politics on unity and solidarity. 
Given the history of apartheid destabilisation, South Africa is acutely sensitive to being 
perceived by other African countries as a bully. Mbeki is determined to build effective 
multilateral institutions on the continent in collaboration with strategic partners like Nigeria. 
The AU is the principal vehicle for multifaceted co-operation and NEPAD is intended to 
secure international partners and strengthen Africa's voice in global forums. More generally, 
South Africa promotes multilateralism in the international system as the best means of 
maintaining global order, addressing global problems, mitigating the domination and 
unilateralism of powerful states, and empowering weaker countries. 
It can be argued, however, that the commitment to multilateralism in Africa is sometimes 
substantially at odds with the commitment to democracy and respect for human rights. 
Paradoxically, African multilateralism, which is intended in part to overcome South Africa's 
constraints of limited capacity and influence, may, itself be a significant constraint in the 
pursuit of its objectives. 
Many scholars have aimed criticism at South Africa for its reluctance on intervention and 
conflict resolution, and for its reluctance in taking up the peacekeeping challenge on the 
continent. Tshwane-Pretoria is seen on the one hand as preferring to play a peacemaker role, 
but not that of a peace enforcer. In spite of its painstaking efforts to be an 'honest broker' in 
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African conflicts, it does not have natural allies to help bolster that role. In fact, South Africa 
appears to be marginalised in Southern and Central Africa.
452
 
Ironically, this pacific foreign posture has been a source of much friction in Southern Africa, 
the shambolic Lesotho intervention notwithstanding. In the 1990s the efforts of SADC to set 
up a viable security regime failed because member states were polarised around incompatible 
pacific and militarist approaches. One camp, led by South Africa and supported by Botswana, 
Mozambique and Tanzania, wanted a common security regime whose primary basis for 
multilateral co-operation and peacemaking would be political rather than military. The other 
camp, led by Zimbabwe and supported by Angola and Namibia, preferred a mutual defence 
pact and prioritised military cooperation and responses to conflict. This polarisation was 
largely defined by each camp's differences over military versus non-military/diplomatic 
means of intervening in the DRC. Thus, in 1999 a Zimbabwean defence official claimed that 
Pretoria's opposition to the use of armed force in peacemaking was the major reason for the 
impasse around the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.
453
 In fact, 
this was self-serving from the Zimbabwean perspective at the time in as much as Mugabe and 
Zimbabwe wanted autonomy within SADC as the key 'command and control' state 
overseeing regional security, something that South Africa and other SADC members were 
not willing to concede. However, had Mugabe and Zimbabwe had their way, this would 
mollified Zimbabwe's sense of being overshadowed by the new South Africa and its iconic 
leader, Nelson Mandela who had the added advantage, within the African political-cultural 
context, of being Mugabe's elder! 
The war that commenced in the DRC in 1998 revealed the strategic import of this division, as 
the pacific group promoted a diplomatic solution while Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola 
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deployed troops in support of President Kabila. The DRC imbroglio damaged relations 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe, cripple the Organ and gave rise to the notion of two 
SADCs. 
It was through its peacekeeping attempts in the Great Lakes region that Tshwane-Pretoria has 
emerged as a regional power. This has enhanced its role as a serious middle-ranked power in 
world affairs. South Africa has also invested considerable political capital in forging strategic 
partnerships with key countries in realising continental and international goals, notably 
Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. To assert itself in the Great Lakes, it has 
attempted to embrace all parties to the conflicts. The Mbeki government's decision to become 
involved in peacekeeping operations has further bolstered its image as a major power in 
Africa and has enhanced its credibility as a genuine peacemaker. 
7.2.3 Lessons Learned: Zimbabwe. 
Perhaps it is useful to first give a brief overview of Zimbabwe's economic conditions. It 
should be emphasised that Zimbabwe was once considered a very prosperous country with 
modern roads and infrastructure, strong education system, low crime rate and diversified 
economy. It was argued that one of the reasons behind this prosperity was its sophisticated 
commercial farming sector.
454
 Vast tracts of large-scale farms produced thousands of acres of 
tobacco, cotton and other cash crops. About 4 500 white families owned these farms. In 
contrast, 840 000 Black farmers made their living on small and relatively infertile plots in the 
communal lands, producing maize, ground-nuts and other staples.
455
 By the late 1990s there 
was increasing pressure from the British, the Zimbabwean government, and white 
commercial farmers that land reform and redistribution take place. One of the motivations 
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was to improve agricultural productivity and simultaneously increase wealth for the Black 
majority as well as for food security contingencies. 
However, the grave mistake made by Mugabe was on the method used to redistribute the 
land. Since the commercial farming sector provided much of the country's foreign exchange; 
created thousands of jobs and produced the essential staple of maize.
456
 In the beginning of 
the year 2000 Zimbabwe's economy was to change dramatically. Zimbabweans began to 
seize control of white-owned farms with no compensation for its owners, and then 
redistributing it to political cronies in the Zanu-PF party. In class terms, fast-track land 
reform turned out to be a blatantly elite project of accumulation using the poor as 'shock 
troops.' This was the beginning of the crisis since most of the new owners were not 
knowledgeable on farming and this resulted in a drastic drop in agricultural productivity. 
Combined with the financial demands of war veterans who were used by Zanu-PF to spear-
head land confiscations, the formula was set for bankrupting the country. 
To arrest the unfolding crisis South Africa, as the regional power and Zimbabwe's neighbour, 
was expected to exert its influence to bring about a stabilising change of policies in that 
country. According to a Financial Mail story at the time, South Africa's economic strength on 
the Continent, seemed to be quite good: 
The South African economy is medium-sized by global standards, albeit a giant in the 
African context. In constant 2000 US dollars, South Africa's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and GDP per capita in 2003 were about 139 billion and 3000, respectively. 
The next largest African economy is Egypt, whose GDP and per capita income in 
2003 were, respectively, almost 30 billion and 1500 dollars less than South Africa's. 
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Further underlining South Africa's pre-eminence in Africa is the fact that in 2003 it 
accounted for about 38% of total sub-Saharan Africa's GDP.
457
 
Given the volatility of the rand and its vulnerability to external perceptions of developments 
in South and Southern Africa, Zimbabwe increasingly unfolded as a risk liability for South 
Africa. Thus, the first lesson: to do nothing about a crisis on one's border is not an option for 
a variety of reasons. The crisis in Zimbabwe could not be ignored in terms of Tshwane-
Pretoria's need to influence external perceptions of South Africa that might negatively impact 
the Rand's valuation. As much as it was loath to intrusively intervene in Zimbabwe's politics, 
Tshwane-Pretoria's quiet diplomacy unfolded against this backdrop. It is against this 
background that Pretoria's relations with Harare have possibly been the most challenging and 
contested area of its Africa policy. Despite criticism from international and domestic 
observers against Mbeki for his posture on Zimbabwe, as rightly pointed out by Tim Hughes 
of the South African Institute of International Affairs, "with the exception of Nigerian 
President Obasanjo who enjoys far less leverage than Mbeki, no other African leader has 
consistently attempted to mediate in the Zimbabwean crisis.
458
" 
In keeping constant with his preference for constructive engagement and, while rejecting 
coercive means, Mbeki has stuck to his policy of 'Quiet diplomacy' in attempting to bring 
about change in Zimbabwe. Quiet diplomacy in this forms entails a style that is characterised 
by "Skilful negotiations, conducted with tact, persistence, and impartiality, but without 
fanfare.
459
" Several observations and lessons emerge from this experience that relate to the 
intractability of arriving at a political solution to Zimbabwe's crisis. A second lesson from the 
Zimbabwean experience of settlement diplomacy underlines how quiet diplomatic behind-
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the-scenes engagement can become complicated by a regional and international political 
atmosphere of polarisation around a country experiencing the kind of crisis that has affected 
Zimbabwe and deep division over its resolution. While the West has tended to view the 
Mugabe government as a corrupt, repressive regime, a human rights violator with no respect 
for the rule of law and private property; African perceptions throughout the continent and in 
South Africa tended, until recently to view the actions of Mugabe and Zanu-PF as legitimate 
expressions of the politics of redress addressing the unfinished business of overcoming the 
country's racist white settler-colonial legacy. 
Given the recent election results, however, which in the first round of polling on March 29, 
2008 saw the opposition led by the MDC gain a majority in the voting, the terms of 
legitimacy have changed. The lesson from this experience is that in the diplomatic quest for a 
political settlement where an opposition succeeds in overcoming the odds of power wielded 
by an incumbent regime. It is clear that broad-based African support among governments as 
well as civil society can be mobilised for changes that can benefit from and energise 
diplomatic mediation efforts. Hence the MDC's support within the region and on the 
continent has expanded while the African legitimacy of Mugabe has significantly diminished. 
Flowing from this however, is a realisation that such shifts do not guarantee diplomatic a 
break-through in a situation that can become ever more complicated. Hence a fourth lesson to 
be drawn is that the overwhelming power of a neighbouring state caught up in quiet 
diplomatic mediation is not guaranteed to yield desired results and is more likely to involve a 
protracted, open-ended political process before a satisfactory resolution of the crisis 
materialises. Here South Africa in its relations with Zimbabwe is not unique as China's 
interaction with North Korea can be cited as can the complicated US-Cuba relationship. 
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7.3 Substantive Conclusions 
South Africa's military intervention along with Botswana in Lesotho and its current politico-
diplomatic intervention in Zimbabwe can be viewed as 'book-ends' in Tshwane-Pretoria's 
experience in trying to establish peace and security in its Greater SADC. In spite of the 
military nature of the intervention in Lesotho, this experience does not necessarily detract 
from South Africa's preference for 'soft-powered' non-military means in effecting conflict 
resolution. Apart from the fact that the Lesotho experience differed substantially from the 
nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe, Burundi and DRC in that Tshwane-Pretoria and Gaborone 
were intervening to pre-empt a threatened coup d'état, the fact of the matter is that this 
intervention culminated an already lengthy mediation process spear-headed by South Africa 
and was followed by a resumption of that process which finally did succeed in bring political 
factions in the Kingdom into a workable accommodation. Moreover, it can also be argued 
that South Africa could not allow for an independent political entity embedded in the 
heartland of the South African republic to implode within its midst. Lesotho's crisis 
represented a clearly destabilising security threat in South Africa. 
As a neighbouring country mired in its own internal political dynamics and with an 
insignificant military machine of its own, Zimbabwe presented a different kind of crisis, 
albeit one in which like Lesotho, the question of regime legitimacy was paramount. 
Otherwise, Tshwane-Pretoria's efforts in Zimbabwe have also tended to be undermined by 
inconsistencies between South African rhetoric and actions. On the one hand, within the 
framework of NEPAD, it preaches a commitment to constitutionalism and a respect for 
human rights. Yet at the same time it is seen as being in cahoots with President Mugabe who 
has, in the eyes of many, displayed a total disregard for the rule of law and promoted state 
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repression in Zimbabwe.
460
 While such criticism is not without merit as the Zimbabwean 
scenario has unfolded, it has become clear that to the extent that certain political trends in 
Zimbabwe such as the political rise of a-based opposition are perceived as mirroring similar 
tendencies in South Africa itself, other realpolitik considerations have intruded into Tshwane-
Pretoria's political calculus driving its 'quiet diplomacy' in Zimbabwe. The lesson here is that 
to the extent that a country's domestic politics becomes a factor in mediating tensions and 
conflicts in a neighbouring state with similar political dynamics, will complicate politico-
diplomatic intervention in the service of conflict mediation. South Africa's intervention in 
Zimbabwe's crisis therefore has revealed certain political biases that have complicated its 
efforts and contributed to contradictions and inconsistencies in spite of South Africa's own 
anti-apartheid struggle and negotiated political settlement. This is an experience that has 
tended to enhance South Africa's moral-political capital in its conflict mediation efforts 
elsewhere in Africa. South Africa's experience in this regard has tended to place it in an 
awkward position in relation to the rest of the continent where high-minded moral-politik has 
had little impact. 
South Africa's quiet diplomacy has been driven by the lessons learned in Nelson Mandela's 
abortive political intervention in Nigeria. South Africa's failure to prevent the execution of 
Nigeria's activist and playwright Ken Saro Wiwa in 1995 is exemplary in this regard. Thus 
South Africa learned something from its unilateral approach to the Nigerian crisis when it 
pursued a tough position on the Abacha dictatorship. Mandela took a position to apply 
sanction on Nigeria without consulting the Commonwealth, SADC, and OAU now AU. The 
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response was that everybody distanced themselves from South Africa's position and Pretoria 
was left looking "exposed and ineffective.
461
" Mbeki's own response was that: 
Never again would South Africa go it alone in opposing belligerent African despots. 
This issue [Saro Wiwa's execution] highlighted the potential limits of our influence as 
an individual country…and the need to act in concert with others and to forge 
strategic alliances in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.
462
 
Mbeki's observation reinforces the argument that South Africa has tended to be cautious in its 
African diplomacy, lest it be seen as a 'bully boy' on the continent because it needed to value 
the importance of cooperation with other African countries and leaders. Lesson: South 
Africa's African conflict resolution diplomacy cannot fall outside the inter-African politico-
diplomatic culture of vetting such initiatives within the African-accepted framework of 
political intercourse among African states. To the extent that South Africa, under Mbeki, has 
desired to accelerate its integration into the continental system by learning and applying these 
lessons has been paramount and have tended to take South Africa off its immediate post-
apartheid moral pedestal. 
Beyond its constant struggle with denouncing its 'bully boy' image Pretoria has had to 
contend with regional politics. This is particularly relevant in light of Mbeki's commitment to 
multilateralism in pursuit of his African agenda, which demands for regional co-operation 
and partnerships. This commitment to participation in multilateral issues was reiterated by 
Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana-Zuma when she stated, "We declare our readiness and 
preparedness to serve the people's of Africa, the South and the world in this capacity.
463
" 
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Much of Pretoria's engagement with Harare is dictated by the dynamics within SADC, which 
are largely driven by camaraderie and the need to maintain a united front. It is in this spirit 
that SADC has tended to avoid interfering in member states' domestic affairs in the hopes of 
avoiding "adversarial relations that might jeopardise trade and functional co-operation,
464
" 
which has been the general posture towards the situation in Zimbabwe. As such it would be 
unfair to expect Pretoria to deviate from this position more so with lessons learnt with the 
Lesotho and Nigerian debacles. South Africa can never be too cautious, especially when 
cognisant of the legacies of colonialism and apartheid and more importantly the power 
struggles within SADC. Moreover, South Africa has been very much a part of these power-
struggles rooted in the divisions opened up by the DRC/Great Lakes crisis; divisions that 
continue to be in play up to the present in determining how SADC responds to the crisis in 
Zimbabwe and how much leeway South Africa has in its AU-SADC mandated role as 
mediator. Going back to the DRC/Great Lakes crisis, Tshwane-Pretoria had to proceed 
cautiously in how it related to Zimbabwe, given Zimbabwe's leadership as a military 
intervener in the DRC civil war and the need for South Africa to get the entirety of SADC on-
side in resolving the war in the Congo. Tshwane-Pretoria could ill-afford to ostracise 
Zimbabwe if it was to succeed in its twin project of resolving the conflict in the DRC while 
navigating Zimbabwe's problems as well. South Africa's uncomfortable position in this 
regard was best captured by Chris Landsberg, who stated that: 
South Africa could not hope to ostracise Mugabe for his autocratic rule in Zimbabwe 
while hoping to achieve its regional objectives in the DRC. These were uncomfortable 
trade-offs that South Africa had to make in its decision to pursue 'quiet diplomacy.
465
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Tshwane-Pretoria was indeed under pressure between incompatible goals and as awkward as 
the situation was, the success of the Congolese project and the security of the greater Great 
Lakes was riding on Mbeki's aptitude to involve all the power-brokers in that region. Mugabe 
was an integral part of this 'delicate solution', having deployed troops to the DRC in support 
of Kabila. It was for this reason, according to Landsberg, that "the pursuit of South Africa's 
strategy toward the DRC saw Mbeki singling out Mugabe and Kagame as the regional 
balancers of powers, holding the key to a settlement of the war in the DRC.
466
" Such a 
gesture was seen as critical for strengthening regional partnerships and more importantly 
Tshwane-Pretoria's fragile relations with Harare. This pattern was undoubtedly instrumental 
in setting the stage for the kind of continuing interaction between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe that would unfold as the latter's crisis deepened and South Africa became ever 
more caught up in its mediating role between the incumbent Zanu-PF regime and the MDC. 
Finding a solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe has proved elusive. Mbeki's 'quiet diplomacy' 
policy has only recently begun to bear fruit in the wake of SADC conferring upon him the 
formal mandate as mediator. The fact that he was able in July 2008 to get Zanu-PF and the 
two MDC factions to sign a negotiating framework agreement was an achievement in itself 
although, at the time of writing resulted in a final settlement. Yet the fact that the situation 
has gotten this far is a reflection on the complex interplay between diplomatic efforts to 
resolve a crisis, on the one hand, and actual political developments on the ground that change 
the dynamics on the other. After all Mbeki's much maligned 'quiet diplomacy' did have the 
salutary effect of guaranteeing a sufficiently transparent election, enabling Tsvangirai and the 
MDC to win the presidential and parliamentary poll. This outright MDC win in turn changed 
the internal and external political dynamics in the of an MDC that had been on the verge of 
being totally written off as a serious opposition force. The fact that Mugabe and the Joint 
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Operations Command (JOC) tried to reverse matters in the presidential run-off with a brutally 
repressive campaign resulting in African election monitors from the AU, SADC and the Pan-
African Parliament judging it to be unfree-and-unfair further eroded the Mugabe regime's 
support within Africa and regionally. Thus, have the dynamics of interplay between South 
African-SADC diplomatic intervention and political developments on the ground in 
Zimbabwe driven an unfolding process that has steadily narrowed Mugabe's options. 
In a further example of the unintended consequences that can result from such interplay, 
SADC's decision to relent in allowing Mugabe to reopen parliament in breach of the 
negotiating framework agreement, in spite of the results of the March 29th poll and facilitate 
a deal between Zanu-PF and the breakaway faction has backfired. Yet another new 'on the 
ground' development has occurred with the main MDC's candidate for speaker of parliament 
Lovemore Moyo being elected into that position, apparently with some support from a few 
Zanu-PF members of parliament. This could well open up renewed deep divisions within 
Zanu-PF. The lesson to take from these latest Zimbabwean developments is that the outcome 
of any variant of 'quiet diplomacy' in a situation like Zimbabwe is likely to be contingent on a 
dynamic situation wherein the 'balance of forces' on the ground begin to shift in a manner that 
allows for diplomatic intervention to break log-jams sufficiently to further a momentum of 
change with unpredictable consequences that may or may not move stalemates toward a 
conclusion. Thus the verdict of 'quiet diplomacy's' efficacy in Zimbabwe is still out other than 
the observation that can be made that such a diplomatic intervention strategy is not one 
guaranteed to deliver quick solutions. And indeed some situations like Zimbabwe's crisis are 
not about to lend themselves to quick fixes in any case. Hence a corollary lesson of 'quiet 
diplomacy' in such a situation is the requirement of patience and endurance to see such a 
protracted scenario through to whatever conclusion it leads to and in the process, take 
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advantage of opportunities to direct where the process goes in hope of arriving at a credible, 
internationally accepted accommodation. 
Finally, the fact that SADC and the AU have deferred to South Africa to take the lead in 
resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe is testimony to the realist acknowledgement that South 
Africa enjoys a 'sphere of influence' such that with its status as the hegemon of Southern 
Africa, Tshwane-Pretoria is the only actor that can credibly navigate a solution to 
Zimbabwe's crisis. This has not prevented Mugabe and Zanu-PF and the military junta in the 
JOC from trying to outmanoeuvre both Mbeki as well as their MDC opponents. Undoubtedly 
part of Mbeki's frustrations has been the fact that he has constantly been subject to such 
humiliation from Mugabe and Zanu-PF. On the other hand, the fact that he and his 
negotiating team influenced by South Africa's own domestic politics and an aversion to 
seeing liberation movement regimes ousted from power, have not been enthusiastic about 
Tsvangirai's prospects of becoming Zimbabwe's head-of-state has also feed into Mugabe's 
manipulation. But the interplay between the dynamics 'on the ground' in Zimbabwe and how 
those dynamics are shifting the 'balance of forces' underlines the ultimate lesson that no 
amount of politico-diplomatic intervention short of the Lesotho military option will bring 
things to a head unless the people themselves 'on the ground' are ready, capable and willing to 
take their own initiatives in their own interest in resolving their crises whatever they may be. 
In that sense Mbeki's simple refrain that only the people of Zimbabwe can resolve their own 
problems is being proven correct by the unfolding of events. In this vein South Africa's 'quiet 
diplomacy' plays the role of facilitator which, apart from crisis management, has been about 
all that South Africa could perform in its intervention. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
CONCLUSION 
 
At the time of submitting this thesis (September 2013), much has taken place in South 
Africa's foreign policy towards Africa. The era of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki covered 
by the thesis, i.e. 1994 – 2008, remains a subject of great interest in the academic arena. It is 
also a highly contested period of South Africa's foreign policy commonly referred as the 
'golden period of the country's foreign policy'). Mandela and Mbeki played a critical role in 
the formulation and definition of the country's national role conceptions. It was under these 
leaders that 'human rights became the cornerstone' of South Africa's foreign policy. South 
Africa's foreign policy under their leadership became more predictable and orientated 
towards Africa and the Global South. 
Mbeki was unseated by Jacob Zuma as the President of the ruling party ANC in December 
2007 and recalled as the President of the country in August 2008. In no little amount of irony, 
on the heels of the former President's presiding over the signing ceremony of a precarious 
political settlement in Zimbabwe in 2008, Mbeki was ousted amidst ongoing political tension 
at the time within the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Against this backdrop it is 
important to reflect on South Africa's post-apartheid Africa policy over the past nineteen 
years of freedom and democracy. It has been aptly characterised as a 'learning to lead' 
apprenticeship during a period of 'trial and error' experimentation. This characterisation 
attempts to capture the sometimes contradictory mix of idealism and pragmatic realism that 
Pretoria has sought to balance in navigating a series of fine lines. The reality of the natural 
regional hegemon that it is in African and especially Southern African context, its past as 
regional destabiliser along with its early projection of itself as champion of human rights on 
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the one hand, champion of an Afro-centric South-South solidarity commitment on the other 
as well as bridge between North and South. 
The contradictions emerging from this set of priorities has formed the backdrop of the case-
studies in South Africa's pursuit of the peace and security dimension of its renaissance 
African Agenda in Lesotho, the Great Lakes conundrums involving the stabilising of the 
DRC and Burundi and the pursuit of a negotiated power sharing deal aimed at resolving 
Zimbabwe's political stalemate and economic meltdown. At least during the immediate post-
apartheid aftermath, South Africa enjoyed such a 'high moral ground' of international 
standing as a 'miracle' transition to democracy, that it approached its increasingly pronounced 
African commitment with very high initial expectations regarding its capacity to work its will 
in conflict-ridden areas of the continent. This would be a reflection of the natural leadership 
that much of the world and the West in particular assumed it would fulfil. In so doing, South 
Africa would in a sense take on burden-sharing division of between itself and the West. South 
Africa was therefore seen as a point of reference on matters of peace and security by most 
developed countries. 
At the same time as these high expectations were influencing international perceptions of 
South Africa, the new post-apartheid political leadership had to come to terms with a number 
of mitigating realities that would increasingly prove to be constraints as it navigated its way 
through the politico-diplomatic landmines of the African continent. The incoming successor 
elite to the National Party (NP) regime was after all an untried and untested leadership in the 
fine arts of governance and statecraft in spite of the fact of the newly ruling ANC being the 
oldest African nationalist movement on the continent. Moreover, as Pretoria under the 
founding administration of Nelson Mandela's Government of National Unity (GNU) sought 
to navigate its way into its leadership niche on the continent, it was faced with the urgent 
need of integrating South Africa into the inter-African system as another independent African 
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nation-state on a continent of jealously sovereign post-colonial governments that were 
increasingly ambivalent about the 'new' South Africa. 
This ambivalence was particularly pronounced during the Mandela period when South 
African foreign policy overall had yet to jell into its Afro-centric identity that it would 
assume under the administration of former ANC leader Thabo Mbeki. South Africa during 
this period projected a universal progressive internationalism that paid tribute to countries 
that had supported the liberation movement in the spirit of Third World solidarity while 
projecting a human rights liberalism accompanied by a penchant for being drawn into 
mediating other conflicts in different parts of the world. An example being East Timor in its 
struggle against Indonesia, Northern Ireland and the Israel-Palestinian conflict as well as 
increasingly a raft of African conflicts in need of conflict resolution in the Great Lakes and 
elsewhere. 
It took being brought up short in the Nigerian political crisis presented by the brutal Sani 
Abacha military regime to begin bringing the Mandela government 'down-to-earth' as to the 
limits of its leadership potential on an African continent that demanded a certain protocol of 
protectionism among the African heads-of-state leadership club comprising the OAU. 
President Mandela discovered a much steeper 'learning curve' in the diplomatic politics of 
inter-African relations than originally anticipated as the Abacha transgressions were so 
egregious that it would have appeared that much of the rest of Africa's leaders would have 
lined up behind him in his denunciation of the Nigerian junta. Yet, Mandela found himself 
out on a limb. This experience had to have made an indelible impact on his understudy, 
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki as the latter moved toward the articulation of an African 
Renaissance vision aimed at accelerating South Africa's integration into the continent as 
champion of its renewal. It is against this backdrop that South Africa's military intervention 
into the troubled Kingdom of Lesotho unfolded under the aegis of the South Africa-
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Botswana-Zimbabwean 'troika' that foreshadowed the eventual Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) establishment of its OPDSC dimension, but not before another 
confrontation ensued between Mandela and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe over 
differing strategies to be employed in the resumption of conflict in the DRC. 
Apart from the fact that Mandela objected to the military counter-intervention of Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Angola in the DRC in of a negotiated process that would lead to the withdrawal 
of Ugandan and Rwandan troops and their rebel proxies. Mandela opposed Mugabe's NATO 
model for a prospective SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation – the 
current OPDSC – in of a model that would remain under the SADC Summit and accountable 
to it, a position that ultimately won out over Mugabe's Southern African 'NATO'. But this 
political tug-of-war further heightened tensions between South Africa and Zimbabwe and 
Harare's allies in Windhoek and Luanda which would ultimately carry over into South 
Africa's controversial politico-diplomatic intervention in Zimbabwe's crisis under the rubric 
of Quiet Diplomacy. 
It is against this background that this thesis has sought to analyse South Africa's 'rights of 
passage' into continental leadership in terms of its performance in Lesotho, the Great Lakes 
crises of DRC and Burundi and in Zimbabwe. As such, it can be concluded that South Africa 
defies neat categorization within the theoretical framework of such constructs as 'regional 
hegemon,' 'middle power,' 'pivotal state' and purveyor of 'soft power' vis-à-vis its identity as 
an African 'great power' on the one hand, and in terms of its role in the international system 
on the other. These considerations pertain to how we characterise South Africa in its African 
and broader international context and whether or not these different contexts reinforce or 
detract from how South Africa's niche is interpreted. 
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As South Africa has navigated its stage of learning to lead, it has exhibited a mix of 
characteristics in consonance with several of these conceptual paradigms. The role of 
'regional hegemon' in the case of its Lesotho intervention, as regionally-based 'middle power' 
in assuming lead conflict resolution and political mediation roles in African conflict and post-
conflict situations while limiting external intervention. However, South Africa as an African 
hegemonic power and a 'pivotal state' played a critical role in mediating conflicts, 
strengthening democracy and bringing peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo Lesotho, Burundi and Zimbabwe. Put another way, South Africa's role in Africa and 
vis-à-vis the continent and the international community is a multi-dimensional. In 
paradigmatic theoretical terms, its engagement in the case-studies explored in this thesis; all 
from South Africa's perspective as articulated by former President Mbeki and his lieutenants, 
rationalised under the vision of an African Renaissance wherein ending Africa's conflicts and 
promoting post-conflict recovery and stabilisation were deemed pre-conditional imperatives 
to the continent's economic developmental momentum. 
As South Africa has navigated this policy expression of Mbeki's Africa vision, there were at 
least two problematic areas of implementation that this policy has encountered based on the 
nature of the specific African conflict resolution/mediation in question. There was an external 
dimension having to do with how South Africa's diplomacy in specific African conflict 
resolution and mediation instances has either converged or diverged with the Great Power 
interests of the West and of non-Western and/or emerging state actors like China. Then there 
was an internal dimension having to do with the extent to which South Africa's leaders have 
cultivated a supportive domestic constituency for its Africa policy and commitments and how 
domestic contradictions have complicated Pretoria's African agenda. This latter concern has 
been of particular importance in the case of Zimbabwe as reflected in controversy 
surrounding Mbeki's Quiet Diplomacy strategy of engaging Zanu-PF and the MDC. Another 
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dimension of this has been reflected in the explosive magnitude of xenophobic violence 
unleashed in South Africa's townships during May and June of 2008; violence on such a scale 
that caused a mass exodus scramble by non-South African Africans to leave South Africa. 
Further compounding South Africa's dilemmas has been Western ambivalence encountered 
by Pretoria regarding its politico-diplomatic approach to priority items on its African agenda 
such as Zimbabwe. 
As a 'middle power' within Africa, South Africa has emerged as the international 
community's foremost 'pivotal state' in addressing Africa's challenges, including the 
continent's conflicts. In deference to the dictum of 'African solutions to African problems,' 
there has been a natural inclination for the US and its European allies to defer to South Africa 
in conjunction with other key African powers like Nigeria or the AU, to take the lead in 
trying to resolve conflicts or political stalemates on the continent. The problem however was 
that within the larger global geopolitical context, South Africa's approach to resolving 
African problems has not always been in synch with Western priorities. South Africa's 
approach to the situations cited in this thesis have sometimes converged with and at other 
times diverged from the interests of the West. The tensions that have flowed from this 
convergence-divergence context in South Africa's external relations in regard to its approach 
to African crises reflected a very fundamental principle in South African foreign policy under 
an ANC government: they were a 'middle power' and 'pivotal state' it may be within the larger 
global context of interacting with the Great Powers, South Africa refuses to adopt a 'sub-
imperial' role as a regional power doing the West's bidding in Africa. 
The liberation movement heritage of the ANC and its alliance partners grounded in the global 
'Third World' struggle against Western imperialism has entrenched within the ANC an anti-
imperialist reflex that guarded against South Africa being perceived as a 'pro-Western' or 
'pro-US' proxy for their various Great Power agendas on the continent. To do otherwise 
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would, among other things, undermine South Africa's objective of integrating its identity into 
the larger fabric of inter-African relations in a manner that would allay suspicions (rightly or 
wrongly held) that South Africa's power on the continent was deployed at the service of 
Western as opposed to African interests. South Africa's leaders were and have been acutely 
aware of the extent to which the country's interests converge with or diverge from Western 
interests. Given South Africa's domestic and external interests and imperatives, pragmatism 
dictates that it not over-do an approach to its international relations where it diverges with the 
West for the sake of it less convergence be misinterpreted as actually aligning with the West. 
South Africa's governing elites defined their own national role conceptions within these 
contexts. 
Convergence after all does not reflect a complete identity of interests. From the West's 
vantage point, staying out of African crises as much as possible was much preferred to being 
drawn into such predicaments. France may be an exception as there were instances when it 
has complicated Mbeki's mediation efforts in the Cote d'Ivoire situation where Paris' vested 
interest in maintaining its 'sphere of influence' has been of paramount importance. Otherwise 
South Africa's political, diplomatic and military in Lesotho and in the Great Lakes have been 
non-controversial instances of convergence of interests between South Africa and the West. 
The West, however, has been very ambivalent about South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy in 
regard to Zimbabwe; a situation where there has been a clear divergence of interests between 
the punitive approach of the US and EU and South Africa's emphasis on non-punitive 
engagement; emphasising diplomacy and negotiation irrespective of set-backs due to the 
internal dynamics of Zimbabwean politics which South Africa refused to try to exert any kind 
of coercive influence over. 
The Zimbabwean case of South African divergence has tended to reinforce a larger picture of 
South African convergence if not alignment with such non-Western 'emerging' powers as 
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China in a Western 'threat perception' of competition with Beijing for influence and even 
external hegemony on the continent. Thus South Africa's stance on Zimbabwe has been seen 
as one of a piece with South Africa's alignment with Russia as well as China in their UN 
Security Council vetoes over sanctions against Sudan, Myanmar and Iran while Beijing and 
Moscow have similarly backed Pretoria up on its resistance to more intrusive prospects of 
Western involvement on the issue of Zimbabwe. South Africa's objective was to place limits 
on Western politico-diplomatic intervention in the continent, especially in its Southern 
African where issues of economic autonomy arise where a return of Western imperialism,' 
may appear to be facilitated by the West's attempts to influence events such as in the case of 
arriving at a Zimbabwean settlement. Still, there are limits to what South African politico-
diplomatic strategy aimed at shielding Zimbabwe from Western intrusion could be 
accomplished as was reflected on the conditionalities of recovery aid and investment pending 
the MDC being assured of a meaningful share of power in the prospective unity government 
arrived at under Mbeki's mediation. 
For an African Renaissance to be credible Africa must be able to dictate its own fate, 
meaning it must be able to manage and place limits on external 'interference' in the 
continent's affairs. This underlines the importance of the convergence-divergence dichotomy 
as a framework for analysing how South Africa's role as a pivotal 'middle power' vis-à-vis the 
rest of Africa and non-African external actors plays out in various case-studies and situations. 
Having explored this dimension the question becomes, how does this diplomacy and extent of 
engagement in the continent play out in the South African domestic context? This was 
especially pressing given Thabo Mbeki's exit from the scene as South Africa's President amid 
a continuing range of commitments Pretoria had underway in the rest of Africa, including all 
the countries focused on in this thesis. There was already a growing concern as to whether or 
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not the renaissance will continue post-Mbeki even though this was a policy embedded in 
successive national congress resolutions of the ANC and its alliance partners. 
In other words the primary constituency for South Africa's exercise of leadership in Africa 
was the ANC itself and the Tripartite Alliance. Although the extent to which the ANC and its 
alliance partners become actively involved in the African agenda had much to do with their 
specific interests in the rest of the continent. Closer to home, in Southern Africa, there has 
been a growing ANC-Tripartite Alliance interest and involvement in less indulgent settlement 
diplomacy in Zimbabwe with regard to Zanu-PF with COSATU enjoying a close alliance 
with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in opposition to continued Zanu-PF 
rule. Similar interests animate the Tripartite Alliance – especially COSATU's – interest in the 
democratisation of Swaziland. Nevertheless, apart from these instances, there was concern 
about the staying power of South Africa's level of engagement and commitment on the 
continent now that Mbeki was no longer President. Thus the new Defence Minister (and 
former Minister for Safety & Security) Charles Nqakula was at pains to stress Pretoria's 
unchanging commitment to the DRC's post-conflict recovery. 
When Nqakula handed over the first of three battalions that the Defence Department trained 
in terms of an agreement between South Africa and the DRC, he made the following 
comment: "Although this was a difficult time for everyone in our country, the changes proved 
that our democracy has matured over the past 14 years," while assuring that "the South 
African government will continue to honour its obligations in respect of the bilateral and 
trilateral commitments," stressing the Congo's "strategic importance" to South Africa.
467
 Still 
questions abound given the xenophobic violence against African immigrants by impoverished 
South Africans in urban townships and settlements that exploded all over the country in May 
and June of 2008. 
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A situation reflecting a disconnect between South Africa's external African agenda in the 
continent and its urgent need to close the widening gap between rich and poor in South 
Africa; the fact that even though there has been a burgeoning black middle class, there was 
also an expanding black under-class not benefiting from the fruits of South Africa's transition 
to democracy. This was a state of affairs that also raised questions about how effective South 
Africa's leadership in the rest of the continent was if South Africa and South Africans are not 
tangibly benefiting from the fruits of its diplomacy, especially in such a resource-rich mega-
state as the DRC. For all the effectiveness and commitment shown by South Africa's 
diplomacy of conflict resolution and mediation in the continent, where, some ask was the 
economic diplomacy to go along with such interventions to ensure that South Africa benefits. 
To what extent was the African Renaissance satisfying the national interests? The answer to 
this question and how it could be answered in the years to come may well contain the final 
verdict on the legacy of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki in their guidance of South 
Africa's 'learning to lead' as an African power and the extent of continuity in Pretoria's 
engagement in the continent. 
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